[PAULUS libro singulari de iuris et facti ignorantia. ] §22.6.9.prRegula est iuris quidem ignorantiam cuique nocere, facti uero ignorantiam non nocere.
[PAULUS, in his single book on Ignorance of Law and Fact.] The rule is that ignorance of law is prejudicial to everyone, but ignorance of fact is not.
uideamus igitur, in quibus speciebus locum habere possit, ante praemisso quod minoribus uiginti quinque annis ius ignorare permissum est.
Let us therefore see in what cases this can apply, having first premised that those under twenty-five years of age are permitted to be ignorant of the law.
quod et in feminis in quibusdam causis propter sexus infirmitatem dicitur: et ideo sicubi non est delictum, sed iuris ignorantia, non laeduntur.
This is also said of women in certain cases because of the weakness of their sex: and therefore if there is no crime, but only ignorance of law, they are not harmed.
hac ratione si minor uiginti quinque annis filio familias crediderit, subuenitur ei, ut non uideatur filio familias credidisse.
For this reason, if a person under twenty-five years of age has given credit to a son in power, relief is given to him, so that he is not deemed to have given credit to a son in power.
§22.6.9.1Si filius familias miles a commilitone heres institutus nesciat sibi etiam sine patre licere adire per constitutiones principales, ius ignorare potest et ideo ei dies aditionis cedit.
If a soldier who is a son in power, having been appointed heir by a fellow soldier, does not know that he is permitted by imperial constitutions to enter on the inheritance even without his father, he can be ignorant of the law, and therefore the period for acceptance runs for him.
§22.6.9.2Sed facti ignorantia ita demum cuique non nocet, si non ei summa neglegentia obiciatur: quid enim si omnes in ciuitate sciant, quod ille solus ignorat? et recte Labeo definit scientiam neque curiosissimi neque neglegentissimi hominis accipiendam, uerum eius, qui cum eam rem ut diligenter inquirendo notam habere possit.
But ignorance of fact is not prejudicial to anyone only if extreme negligence is not charged against him: for what if everyone in the city knows what he alone is ignorant of? And Labeo rightly defines that the knowledge to be expected is neither that of an overly inquisitive person nor that of an extremely negligent one, but that of a person who, by diligent inquiry, is able to make himself acquainted with the matter.
§22.6.9.3Sed iuris ignorantiam non prodesse Labeo ita accipiendam existimat, si iuris consulti copiam haberet uel sua prudentia instructus sit, ut, cui facile sit scire, ei detrimento sit iuris ignorantia: quod raro accipiendum est.
But Labeo thinks that the rule "ignorance of law does not benefit" should be understood in this way: if he had access to a jurisconsult or was equipped with his own legal knowledge, so that for one who could easily know, ignorance of law is a detriment; which, however, should be accepted only rarely.
§22.6.9.4Qui ignorauit dominum esse rei uenditorem, plus in re est, quam in exístimatione mentis? et ideo, tametsi existimet se non a domino emere, tamen, si a domino ei tradatur, dominium efficitur.
For one who did not know that the seller of a thing was its owner, is there more weight in the reality than in the opinion of the mind? And therefore, although he may think that he is not buying from the owner, nevertheless, if delivery is made to him by the owner, ownership is established.
§22.6.9.5Si quis ius ignorans lege Falcidia usus non sit, nocere ei dicit epistula diui Pii.
If anyone, being ignorant of the law, has not availed himself of the Falcidian law, a letter of the divine Pius states that this is prejudicial to him.
sed et imperatores Seuerus et Antoninus in haec uerba rescripserunt: 'Quod ex causa fideicommissi indebitum datum est, si non per errorem solutum est, repeti non potest.
But the Emperors Severus and Antoninus also issued a rescript in these words: 'What has been given when not due under a trust, if it was not paid by mistake, cannot be recovered.
Quamobrem Gargiliani heredes, qui, cum ex testamento eius pecuniam ad opus aquae ductus rei publicae Cirtensium relictam soluerint, non solum cautiones non exegerunt, quae interponi solent, ut quod amplius cepissent municipes quam per legem Falcidiam licuisset redderent, uerum etiam stipulati sunt, ne ea summa in alios usus conuerteretur et scientes prudentesque passi sunt eam pecuniam in opus aquae ductus impendi, frustra postulant reddi.
Therefore, the heirs of Gargilianus, who, when they paid the money left by his will for the construction of the aqueduct of the municipality of the Cirtensians, not only did not demand the guarantees which are usually required—to the effect that the townsmen should return whatever they received in excess of what was allowed under the Falcidian law—but even stipulated that this sum should not be converted to other uses, and knowingly and deliberately allowed that money to be spent on the construction of the aqueduct, in vain demand that it be returned to them by the municipality of the Cirtensians, on the ground that they gave more than was due; since it is unjust both that money given for the construction of an aqueduct should be recovered, and that the municipality should spend from the body of its own patrimony on a work which wholly represents the glory of another's liberality.
sibi a re publica Cirtensium, quasi plus debito dederint, cum sit utrumque iniquum pecuniam, quae ad opus aquae ductus data est, repeti et rem publicam ex corpore patrimonii sui impendere in id opus, quod totum alienae liberalitatis gloriam repraesentet. quod si ideo repetitionem eius pecuniae habere credunt, quod imperitia lapsi legis Falcidiae beneficio usi non sunt, sciant ignorantiam facti, non iuris prodesse nec stultis solere succurri, sed errantibus'. §22.6.9.6Et licet municipum mentio in hac epistula fiat, tamen et in qualibet persona idem obseruabitur.
But if they believe they have a right to recover that money on the ground that, having slipped through lack of experience, they did not avail themselves of the benefit of the Falcidian law, let them know that ignorance of fact benefits, but not of law, and that it is not the foolish, but those who err, who are usually assisted.' And although mention is made of townsmen in this letter, yet the same rule shall be observed in the case of any person whatsoever.
sed nec quod in opere aquae ductus relicta esse pecunia proponitur, in hunc solum casum cessare repetitionem dicendum est.
Nor should it be said that, because the money is proposed to have been left for the construction of an aqueduct, the recovery ceases only in this particular case.
nam initium constitutionis generale est: demonstrat enim, si non per errorem solutum sit fideicommissum, quod indebitum fuit, non posse repeti: item et illa pars aeque generalis est, ut qui iuris ignorantia legis Falcidiae beneficio usi non sunt, non possint repetere: ut secundum hoc possit dici etiam, si pecunia, quae per fideicommissum relicta est quaeque soluta est, non ad aliquid faciendum relicta sit, et licet consumpta non sit, sed exstet apud eum cui soluta est, cessare repetitionem.
For the beginning of the constitution is general: for it shows that if a trust, which was not due, was not paid by mistake, it cannot be recovered. Likewise, that other part is equally general, namely, that those who, through ignorance of law, have not availed themselves of the benefit of the Falcidian law, cannot recover. So that according to this, it can also be said that even if the money left by trust and paid was not left for the purpose of performing some work, and although it has not been spent but remains in the hands of the person to whom it was paid, the recovery ceases.