[ULPIANUS libro quarto ad edictum. ] §2.14.7.prIuris gentium conuentiones quaedam actiones pariunt, quaedam exceptiones.
[ULPIAN, On the Edict, book 4] Of agreements under the law of nations, some generate actions, others exceptions.
§2.14.7.1Quae pariunt actiones, in suo nomine non stant, sed transeunt in proprium nomen contractus: ut emptio uenditio, Iocatio conductio, societas, commodatum, depositum et ceteri similes contractus.
Those which generate actions do not remain under their general name, but pass over into the specific name of a contract: such as purchase and sale, letting and hiring, partnership, loan for use, deposit, and other similar contracts.
§2.14.7.2Sed et si in alium contractum res non transeat, subsit tamen causa, eleganter Aristo Celso respondit esse obligationem.
But even if the matter does not pass over into another contract, yet there is an underlying cause, Aristo elegantly answered Celso that there is an obligation.
ut puta dedi tibi rem ut mihi aliam dares, dedi ut aliquid facias: hoc κυνάλλαγμα esse et hinc nasci ciuilem obligationem.
For example, "I gave you a thing so that you might give me another," "I gave so that you might do something": that this is a κυνάλλαγμα, and from this arises a civil obligation.
et ideo puto recte Iulianum a Mauriciano reprehensum in hoc: dedi tibi Stichum ut Pamphilum manumittas: manumissisti: euictus est Stichus. §2.14.7.3Iulianus scribit in factum actionem a praetore dandam: ille ait ciuilem incerti actionem, id est praescriptis uerbis sufficere: esse enim contractum, quod Aristo κυνάλλαγμα dicit, unde haec nascitur actio.
And therefore I think Julian was rightly criticized by Mauricianus in this case: "I gave you Stichus so that you might manumit Pamphilus; you manumitted him; Stichus has been evicted." Julian writes that an action on the facts should be granted by the praetor; but the latter (Mauricianus) says that a civil action for an uncertain amount, that is, one with prescribed words, is sufficient: for there is a contract, which Aristo calls κυνάλλαγμα, from which this action arises.
§2.14.7.4Si ob maleficium ne fiat promissum sit, nulla est obligatio ex hac conuentione.
If a promise is made in order that a delict may not be committed, no obligation arises from this agreement.
§2.14.7.5Sed cum nulla subest causa, propter conuentionem hic constat non posse constitui obligationem: igitur nuda pactio obligationem non parit, sed parit exceptionem.
But when there is no underlying cause, it is clear that an obligation cannot be established on account of the agreement; therefore, a nude pact does not generate an obligation, but it does generate an exception.
§2.14.7.6Quin immo interdum format ipsam actionem, ut in bonae fidei iudiciis: solemus enim dicere pacta conuenta inesse bonae fidei iudiciis.
Nay, indeed, sometimes it shapes the action itself, as in trials of good faith; for we are accustomed to say that agreed-upon pacts are inherent in trials of good faith.
sed hoc sic accipiendum est, ut si quidem ex continenti pacta subsecuta sunt, etiam ex parte actoris insint: si ex interuallo, non inerunt, nec ualebunt, si agat, ne ex pacto actio nascatur.
But this must be understood in such a way that if indeed the pacts followed immediately, they are inherent even on the part of the plaintiff; if after an interval, they will not be inherent, nor will they be valid if he brings an action, lest an action arise from a pact.
ut puta post diuortium conuenit, ne tempore statuto dilationis dos reddatur, sed statim: hoc non ualebit, ne ex pacto actio nascatur: idem Marcellus scribit.
For example, if after a divorce it was agreed that the dowry should be returned immediately, rather than at the established period of deferment: this will not be valid, lest an action arise from a pact; Marcellus writes the same.
et si in tutelae actione conuenit, ut maiores quam statutae sunt usurae praestentur, locum non habebit, ne ex pacto nascatur actio: ea enim pacta insunt, quae legem contractui dant, id est quae in ingressu contractus facta sunt.
And if in an action on guardianship it was agreed that higher interest than that which is established should be paid, it will have no place, lest an action arise from a pact; for those pacts are inherent which give law to the contract, that is, which were made at the inception of the contract.
idem responsum scio a Papiniano, et si post emptionem ex interuallo aliquid extra naturam contractus conueniat, ob hanc causam agi ex empto non posse propter eandem regulam, ne ex pacto actio nascatur.
I know that the same was answered by Papinian, that if after a purchase, after an interval, something outside the nature of the contract is agreed upon, an action cannot be brought on the purchase for this reason, due to the same rule, lest an action arise from a pact.
quod et in omnibus bonae fidei iudiciis erit dicendum.
And this must be said in all trials of good faith.
sed ex parte rei locum habebit pactum, quia solent et ea pacta, quae postea inter ponuntur, parere exceptiones.
But on the part of the defendant, the pact will have place, because even those pacts which are interposed afterwards are accustomed to generate exceptions.
§2.14.7.7Adeo autem bonae fidei iudiciis exceptiones postea factae, quae ex eodem sunt contractu, insunt, ut constet in emptione ceterisque bonae fidei iudiciis re nondum secuta posse abiri ab emptione.
Moreover, exceptions made afterwards, which arise from the same contract, are inherent in trials of good faith to such an extent that it is established that in purchase and other trials of good faith, before performance has taken place, one can withdraw from the purchase.
si igitur in totum potest, cur non et pars eius pactione mutari potest? et haec ita Pomponius libro sexto ad edictum scribit.
If therefore it is possible as a whole, why can a part of it not be changed by agreement? And Pomponius writes thus in the sixth book On the Edict.
quod cum est, etiam ex parte agentis pactio locum habet, ut et ad actionem proficiat nondum re secuta, eadem ratione.
Since this is so, the agreement also has place on the part of the plaintiff, so that, by the same reason, it may benefit the action before performance has taken place.
nam si potest tota res tolli, cur non et reformari? ut quodammodo quasi renouatus contractus uideatur.
For if the whole matter can be abolished, why can it not also be remodeled? So that in a certain way the contract appears as if renewed.
quod non insuptiliter dici potest.
Which can be said not without subtlety.
unde illud aeque non reprobo, quod Pomponius libris lectionum probat, posse in parte recedi pacto ab emptione, quasi repetita partis emptione.
Hence I equally do not reject what Pomponius approves in his books of readings, that one can withdraw in part from a purchase by agreement, as if the purchase of that part were repeated.
sed cum duo heredes emptori exstiterunt, uenditor cum altero pactus est, ut ab emptione recederetur: ait Iulianus ualere pactionem et dissolui pro parte emptionem: quoniam et ex alio contractu paciscendo alter ex heredibus adquirere sibi potuit exceptionem.
But when two heirs to the buyer existed, and the seller agreed with one of them that there should be a withdrawal from the purchase: Julian says that the agreement is valid and the purchase is dissolved in part; since even from another contract, by making an agreement, one of the heirs could acquire an exception for himself.
utrumque itaque recte placet, et quod Iulianus et quod Pomponius.
Therefore both are rightly approved, both that of Julian and that of Pomponius.
§2.14.7.8Ait praetor: ‘Pacta conuenta, quae neque dolo malo, neque aduersus leges plebis scita senatus consulta decreta edicta principum, neque quo fraus cui eorum fiat facta erunt, seruabo. ' Pactorum quaedam in rem sunt, quaedam in personam.
The praetor says: "Agreements which shall be made neither by malice, nor against laws, plebiscites, decrees of the senate, imperial edicts, and decrees of the emperors, nor whereby fraud is done to any of them, I will uphold." Of pacts, some are in rem, others in personam.
in rem sunt, quotiens generaliter paciscor ne petam: in personam, quotiens ne a persona petam, id est ne a Lucio Titio petam.
They are in rem whenever I agree generally that I will not sue; they are in personam whenever I agree that I will not sue a specific person, that is, that I will not sue Lucius Titius.
utrum autem in rem an in personam pactum factum est, non minus ex uerbis quam ex mente conuenientium aestimandum est: plerumque enim, ut Pedius ait, persona pacto inseritur, non ut personale pactum fiat, sed ut demonstretur, cum quo pactum factum est.
Moreover, whether a pact is made in rem or in personam must be judged not less from the words than from the intention of the contracting parties; for generally, as Pedius says, a person is inserted in a pact, not that a personal pact may be made, but that it may be shown with whom the pact was made.