[ULPIANUS libro trigensimo ad edictum. ] §16.3.1.prDepositum est, quod custodiendum alicui datum est, dictum ex eo quod ponitur: praepositio enim de auget depositum, ut ostendat totum fidei eius commissum, quod ad custodiam rei pertinet.
[ULPIANUS on the edict, book 30] A deposit is that which has been given to someone to be kept, named from the fact that it is placed (ponitur); for the preposition "de" intensifies "depositum", to show that everything pertaining to the custody of the thing has been committed to his good faith.
§16.3.1.1Praetor ait: 'Quod neque tumultus neque incendii neque ruinae neque naufragii causa depositum sit, in simplum, earum autem rerum, quae supra comprehensae sunt, in ipsum in duplum, in heredem eius, quod dolo malo eius factum esse dicetur qui mortuus sit, in simplum, quod ipsius, in duplum iudicium dabo. ' §16.3.1.2Merito has causas deponendi separauit praetor, quae continent fortuitam causam depositionis ex necessitate descendentem, non ex uoluntate proficiscentem.
The praetor says: "For what has been deposited not by reason of riot, fire, ruin, or shipwreck, I will grant an action for single value; but for those things which are included above, against the person himself for double value; against his heir, for single value in respect of what is said to have been done by the fraud of the deceased, but for double value in respect of what is the heir's own fraud." Appropriately did the praetor separate these causes of depositing, which contain an accidental cause of deposition arising from necessity, not proceeding from free will.
§16.3.1.3Eum tamen deponere tumultus uel incendii uel ceterarum causarum gratia intellegendum est, qui nullam aliam causam deponendi habet quam imminens ex causis supra scriptis periculum.
However, a person is to be understood as depositing on account of riot, fire, or other such causes, who has no other cause for depositing than the imminent danger arising from the causes written above.
§16.3.1.4Haec autem separatio causarum iustam rationem habet: quippe cum quis fidem elegit nec depositum redditur, contentus esse debet simplo, cum uero extante necessitate deponat, crescit perfidiae crimen et publica utilitas coercenda est uindicandae rei publicae causa: est enim inutile in causis huiusmodi fidem frangere.
This separation of causes, moreover, has a just reason: indeed, when anyone has chosen another's good faith and the deposit is not returned, he ought to be content with single value; but when he deposits because of an existing necessity, the crime of perfidy increases and public interest must be enforced to protect the state; for it is harmful to break faith in causes of this kind.
§16.3.1.5Quae depositis rebus accedunt, non sunt deposita, ut puta si homo uestitus deponatur, uestis enim non est deposita: nec si equus cum capistro, nam solus equus depositus est.
Things which accompany the deposited goods are not themselves deposited; for instance, if a clothed slave is deposited, the clothing is not deposited; nor if a horse with a halter, for only the horse is deposited.
§16.3.1.6Si conuenit, ut in deposito et culpa praestetur, rata est conuentio: contractus enim legem ex conuentione accipiunt.
If it has been agreed that liability for negligence (culpa) should also be undertaken in a deposit, the agreement is valid; for contracts receive their law from the agreement of the parties.
§16.3.1.7Illud non probabis, dolum non esse praestandum si conuenerit: nam haec conuentio contra bonam fidem contraque bonos mores est et ideo nec sequenda est.
You will not approve of the proposition that liability for willful intent (dolus) is not to be performed, even if agreed upon; for this agreement is contrary to good faith and good morals, and therefore is not to be followed.
§16.3.1.8Si uestimenta seruanda balneatori data perierunt, si quidem nullam mercedem seruandorum uestimentorum accepit, depositi eum teneri et dolum dumtaxat praestare debere puto: quod si accepit, ex conducto.
If clothes given to a bath-keeper to be kept are lost, I think that if indeed he received no fee for keeping the clothes, he is held by the action of deposit and ought to answer only for willful intent; but if he did receive a fee, he is liable under the action on hiring.
§16.3.1.9Si quis seruum custodiendum coniecerit forte in pistrinum, si quidem merces interuenit custodiae, puto esse actionem aduersus pistrinarium ex conducto: si uero mercedem accipiebam ego pro hoc seruo, quem in pistrinum accipiebat, ex locato me agere posse: quod si operae eius serui cum custodia pensabantur, quasi genus locati et conducti interuenit, sed quia pecunia non datur, praescriptis uerbis datur actio: si uero nihil aliud quam cibaria praestabat nec de operis quicquam conuenit, depositi actio est.
If anyone should send a slave, perhaps to a mill, to be kept, and if indeed a fee intervened for the custody, I think there is an action against the miller on hiring; but if I was receiving a fee for this slave whom he was receiving into the mill, I can sue on letting; but if the slave's services were balanced against his custody, a kind of letting and hiring intervened, but because money is not paid, an action with prescribed words is granted; if, however, he provided nothing other than food, and nothing was agreed as to services, there is an action of deposit.
§16.3.1.10In conducto et locato et in negotio, ex quo diximus praescriptis uerbis dandam actionem, et dolum et culpam praestabunt qui seruum receperunt: at si cibaria tantum, dolum dumtaxat.
In hiring and letting, and in the transaction from which we have said an action with prescribed words is to be granted, those who received the slave will answer for both willful intent and negligence; but if they received only food, then for willful intent alone.
sequemur tamen, ut Pomponius ait, et quid habuerunt proscriptum aut quid conuenerit, dummodo sciamus et si quid fuit proscriptum, dolum tamen eos praestaturos qui receperunt, qui solus in depositum uenit.
We shall, however, follow, as Pomponius says, also what they had posted or what was agreed upon, provided we know that even if something was posted, those who received the slave will still answer for willful intent, which alone comes into the contract of deposit.
§16.3.1.11Si te rogauero, ut rem meam perferas ad Titium, ut is eam seruet, qua actione tecum experiri possum, apud Pomponium quaeritur.
If I request you to carry my property to Titius so that he may keep it, it is questioned in Pomponius by what action I can proceed against you.
et putat tecum mandati, cum eo uero, qui eas res receperit, depositi: si uero tuo nomine receperit, tu quidem mihi mandati teneris, ille tibi depositi, quam actionem mihi praestabis mandati iudicio conuentus.
And he thinks that the action of mandate lies against you, but the action of deposit against him who received those things; but if he received them in your name, you indeed are liable to me on mandate, and he to you on deposit, which action you will make over to me when sued in the action of mandate.
§16.3.1.12Quod si rem tibi dedi, ut, si Titius rem non recepisset, tu custodires, nec eam recepit, uidendum est, utrum depositi tantum an et mandati actio sit.
But if I gave you a thing so that, if Titius did not receive it, you should keep it, and he did not receive it, it must be considered whether there is only an action of deposit or also of mandate.
et Pomponius dubitat: puto tamen mandati esse actionem, quia plenius fuit mandatum habens et custodiae legem.
And Pomponius doubts; I think, however, that there is an action of mandate, because the mandate was more complete, containing also the law of custody.
§16.3.1.13Idem Pomponius quaerit, si tibi mandauero, ut rem ab aliquo meo nomine receptam custodias, idque feceris, mandati an depositi tenearis.
The same Pomponius asks: if I commission you to keep a thing received from someone in my name, and you do so, whether you are held by mandate or by deposit.
et magis probat mandati esse actionem, quia hic est primus contractus.
And he rather approves that the action is on mandate, because this is the primary contract.