[ULPIANUS libro uicensimo nono ad edictum. ] §16.1.8.prQuamuis pignoris datio intercessionem faciat, tamen Iulianus libro duodecimo digestorum scribit redditionem pignoris, si creditrix mulier rem, quam pignori acceperat, debitori liberauerit, non esse intercessionem.
[ULPIAN, On the Edict, book 29] Although the giving of a pledge constitutes an intercession, nevertheless Julian writes in the twelfth book of his Digests that the return of a pledge is not an intercession, if a female creditor has released to the debtor the thing she had received as a pledge.
§16.1.8.1Si mulier interuenerit apud tutores filii sui, ne hi praedia eius distraherent, et indemnitatem eis repromiserit, Papinianus libro nono quaestionum non putat eam intercessisse: nullam enim obligationem alienam recepisse neque ueterem neque nouam, sed ipsam fecisse hanc obligationem.
If a woman has intervened with her son's tutors so that they would not sell his estates, and has promised them indemnity, Papinian in the ninth book of his Questions does not think that she has interceded; for she has not taken upon herself any liability of another, whether old or new, but has herself created this obligation.
§16.1.8.2Si mulier apud Primum pro Secundo interuenerit, mox pro Primo apud creditorem eius, duas intercessiones factas Iulianus libro duodecimo digestorum scribit, unam pro Secundo apud Primum, aliam pro Primo apud creditorem eius, et ideo et Primo restitui obligationem et aduersus eum.
If a woman has intervened with Primus on behalf of Secundus, and soon after with his creditor on behalf of Primus, Julian writes in the twelfth book of his Digests that two intercessions have been made: one on behalf of Secundus with Primus, and another on behalf of Primus with his creditor; and therefore the obligation is restored both to Primus and against him.
Marcellus autem notat esse aliquam differentiam, utrum hoc agatur, ut ab initio mulier in alterius locum subdatur et onus debitoris, a quo obligationem transferre creditor uoluit, suscipiat, an uero quasi debitrix delegetur, scilicet ut, si quasi debitrix delegata est, una sit intercessio.
Marcellus, however, notes that there is some difference whether the intention is that from the very beginning the woman is substituted in place of another and takes upon herself the burden of the debtor from whom the creditor wished to transfer the obligation, or whether she is delegated as if she were a debtor, namely, that if she is delegated as if she were a debtor, there is only one intercession.
proinde secundum hanc suam distinctionem in prima uisione, ubi quasi debitrix delegata est, exceptionem ei senatus consulti Marcellus non daret: sed condemnata uel ante condemnationem condicere utique ei a quo delegata est poterit uel quod ei abest uel, si nondum abest, liberationem.
Accordingly, according to this distinction of his, in the first scenario, where she is delegated as if she were a debtor, Marcellus would not give her the exception of the senatusconsultum; but after condemnation, or even before condemnation, she will certainly be able to bring a condictio against the person by whom she was delegated, either for what she has lost, or, if she has not yet lost anything, for her release.
§16.1.8.3Interdum intercedenti mulieri et condictio competit, ut puta si contra senatus consultum obligata debitorem suum delegauerit: nam hic ipsi competit condictio, quemadmodum, si pecuniam soluisset, condiceret: soluit enim et qui reum delegat.
Sometimes a condictio is also competent to an interceding woman, for instance, if, having bound herself contrary to the senatusconsultum, she has delegated her own debtor; for here she has a condictio, just as she would bring a condictio if she had paid money; for he who delegates a debtor also pays.
§16.1.8.4Sed si is, qui a muliere delegatus est, debitor eius non fuit, exceptione senatus consulti poterit uti, quemadmodum mulieris fideiussor.
But if the person delegated by the woman was not her debtor, he will be able to use the exception of the senatusconsultum, just like a guarantor of a woman.
§16.1.8.5Plane si mulier intercessura debitorem suum delegauerit, senatus consultum cessat, quia et si pecuniam numerasset, cessaret senatus consultum: mulier enim per senatus consultum releuatur, non quae deminuit, restituitur.
Clearly, if a woman intending to intercede has delegated her debtor, the senatusconsultum does not apply, because even if she had counted out cash, the senatusconsultum would not apply; for a woman is relieved by the senatusconsultum, but she who has diminished her assets is not restored.
§16.1.8.6Sed si eum delegauerit qui debitor eius non fuit, fraus senatus consulto facta uidebitur et ideo exceptio datur.
But if she has delegated someone who was not her debtor, a fraud on the senatusconsultum will be deemed to have been committed, and therefore the exception is granted.
§16.1.8.7Quotiens pro debitore intercesserit mulier, datur in eum pristina actio, etsi ille prius acceptilatione liberatus sit quam mulier intercesserit.
Whenever a woman has interceded on behalf of a debtor, the original action is granted against him, even if he was released by acceptilation before the woman interceded.
§16.1.8.8Si conuenerit cum debitore, ut expromissorem daret, et acceptum ei latum sit, deinde is dederit mulierem quae auxilio senatus consulti munita est, potest ei condici, quasi non dedisset: quid enim interest, non det an talem det? non erit igitur actio utilis necessaria, cum condictio competat.
If it has been agreed with a debtor that he should provide a substitute debtor (expromissor), and a release has been granted to him, and then he has provided a woman who is protected by the help of the senatusconsultum, a condictio can be brought against him as if he had not provided one; for what difference does it make whether he does not provide one, or provides such a person? Therefore, an action on the case (actio utilis) will not be necessary, since a condictio is competent.
§16.1.8.9Marcellus quoque scribit, si mulieri post intercessionem accepto tulerit creditor, nihilo minus restitutoriam actionem ei dari debere: inanem enim obligationem dimisit.
Marcellus also writes that if the creditor has released the woman by acceptilation after her intercession, the restorative action ought nevertheless to be granted to him; for he released an empty obligation.
§16.1.8.10Si mulier post intercessionem sic soluerit, ne repetere possit, iuste prior debitor actionem recusat.
If, after her intercession, the woman has paid in such a way that she cannot recover it, the former debtor justly refuses the action.
sed cum releuatur reus, si mulier sic soluit, ut repetere non possit, et cum ei mulieri, quae repetere non poterat, si soluisset, accepto tulit creditor, similiter releuatur reus.
But just as the principal debtor is relieved if the woman has paid in such a way that she cannot recover it, so also when the creditor has released by acceptilation that woman who, if she had paid, could not have recovered, the debtor is similarly relieved.
§16.1.8.11quamquam in omnes qui liberati sunt restituitur actio, non tamen omnibus restituitur.
Although the action is restored against all who have been released, yet it is not restored to everyone.
ut puta duo rei stipulandi fuerunt: apud alterum mulier intercessit: ei soli restituitur obligatio, apud quem intercessit.
For instance, there were two joint creditors (rei stipulandi); the woman interceded with one of them; the obligation is restored only to him with whom she interceded.
§16.1.8.12Si mulieri heres extiterit creditor, uidendum, an restitutoria uti non possit.
If the creditor becomes the heir to the woman, it must be considered whether he cannot use the restorative action.
et ait Iulianus libro duodecimo restitutoria eum nihilo minus usurum, non immerito, cum non obligatae cum effectu successerit: denique in Falcidia hoc aes alienum non imputabitur.
And Julian in the twelfth book says that he will nevertheless use the restorative action, and not without reason, since he has succeeded to one who was not effectively bound; consequently, this debt will not be imputed under the Falcidian law.
§16.1.8.13Plane si mihi proponas mulierem ueteri debitori successisse, dicendum erit restitutoria eam conueniri posse, sed et directa actione: nihil enim eius interest, qua actione conueniatur.
Clearly, if you propose to me that the woman has succeeded to the former debtor, it must be said that she can be sued by the restorative action, but also by the direct action; for it makes no difference to her by which action she is sued.
§16.1.8.14Si, cum essem tibi contracturus, mulier interuenerit, ut cum ipsa potius contraham, uidetur intercessisse: quo casu datur in te actio, quae instituit magis quam restituit obligationem, ut perinde obligeris eodem genere obligationis, quo mulier est obligata: uerbi gratia si per stipulationem mulier, et tu quasi ex stipulatu conuenieris.
If, when I was about to contract with you, a woman intervened so that I should contract with her instead, she is deemed to have interceded; in which case an action is granted against you, which establishes rather than restores an obligation, so that you are bound in the same kind of obligation as that by which the woman was bound: for instance, if the woman was bound by a stipulation, you also will be sued as if on a stipulation.
§16.1.8.15Illud uidendum est, si mulier pro eo interuenit, qui, si cum ipso contractum esset, non obligaretur, an hac actione ille debeat teneri? ut puta si pro pupillo intercessit, qui sine tutoris auctoritate non obligatur.
This must be considered: if a woman has intervened on behalf of someone who, if the contract had been made with him, would not be bound, should he be held liable under this action? For instance, if she interceded on behalf of a ward, who is not bound without his tutor's authority.
et puto non obligari pupillum, nisi locupletior factus est ex hoc contractu.
And I think the ward is not bound unless he has been made richer by this contract.
item si minor uiginti quinque annis sit, pro quo mulier intercessit, in integrum restitutionem poterit implorare: uel filius contra senatus consultum contracturus est.
Likewise, if the person on whose behalf the woman interceded is a minor under twenty-five years of age, he will be able to petition for restitution to his original position (in integrum restitutio); or if a son-in-power was about to contract contrary to the senatusconsultum [Macedonianum].