[ULPIANUS libro uicensimo nono ad edictum. ] §15.4.1.prMerito ex iussu domini in solidum aduersus eum iudicium datur, nam quodammodo cum eo contrahitur qui iubet.
[ULPIAN, On the Edict, book 29] It is with good reason that an action is granted against a master in solidum on his order, for in a certain sense, a contract is made with the person who orders it.
§15.4.1.1Iussum autem accipiendum est, siue testato quis siue per epistulam siue uerbis aut per nuntium siue specialiter in uno contractu iusserit siue generaliter: et ideo et si sic contestatus sit: 'Quod uoles cum Sticho seruo meo negotium gere periculo meo', uidetur ad omnia iussisse, nisi certa lex aliquid prohibet.
Furthermore, an "order" is to be understood whether someone ordered in the presence of witnesses, or by letter, or by words, or through a messenger, or whether he ordered specifically in one contract or generally; and therefore, even if he made a declaration in this manner: 'Conduct whatever business you wish with my slave Stichus at my risk,' he is deemed to have ordered for all transactions, unless a specific law forbids something.
§15.4.1.2Sed ego quaero, an reuocare hoc iussum antequam credatur possit: et puto posse, quemadmodum si mandasset et postea ante contractum contraria uoluntate mandatum reuocasset et me certiorasset.
But I ask whether he can revoke this order before credit is extended; and I think he can, just as if he had given a mandate and afterwards, before the contract, had revoked the mandate by a contrary will and had informed me.
§15.4.1.3Sed et si mandauerit pater dominusue, uidetur iussisse.
Moreover, even if a father or a master has given a mandate, he is deemed to have ordered.
§15.4.1.4Sed et si serui chirographo subscripserit dominus, tenetur quod iussu.
Additionally, if a master has countersigned a slave's chirograph, he is held liable on his order.
§15.4.1.5Quid ergo si fideiusserit pro seruo? ait Marcellus non teneri quod iussu: quasi extraneus enim interuenit: neque hoc dicit ideo, quod tenetur ex causa fideiussionis, sed quia aliud est iubere, aliud fideiubere: denique idem scribit, etsi inutiliter fideiusserit, tamen eum non obligari quasi iusserit, quae sententia uerior est.
What then if he has become a surety for his slave? Marcellus says that he is not liable on his order, for he intervened as if he were a stranger; and he does not say this because the master is held liable on the grounds of suretyship, but because to order is one thing, and to become a surety is another. Finally, the same author writes that even if he has become a surety ineffectively, he is still not bound as if he had ordered, which opinion is more correct.
§15.4.1.6Si ratum habuerit quis quod seruus eius gesserit uel filius, quod iussu actio in eos datur.
If anyone ratifies what his slave or son has done, an action on the order is granted against them.
§15.4.1.7Si pupillus dominus iusserit, utique non tenetur, nisi tutore auctore iussit.
If a master who is a ward has ordered, he is certainly not held liable unless he ordered with the authorization of his tutor.
§15.4.1.8Si iussu fructuarii erit cum seruo contractum, item eius cui bona fide seruit, Marcellus putat quod iussu dandam in eos actionem: quam sententiam et ego probo.
If a contract has been made with a slave on the order of a usufructuary, or likewise on the order of one whom the slave serves in good faith, Marcellus thinks that an action on the order should be granted against them, and I also approve of this opinion.
§15.4.1.9Si curatore adulescentis uel furiosi uel prodigi iubente cum seruo contractum sit, putat Labeo dandam quod iussu actionem in eos quorum seruus fuerit: idem et in uero procuratore.
If a contract has been made with a slave on the order of a curator of a minor, an insane person, or a prodigal, Labeo thinks that an action on the order should be granted against those whose slave he was; the same applies in the case of a true procurator.
sed si procurator uerus non sit, in ipsum potius dandam actionem idem Labeo ait.
But if he is not a true procurator, the same Labeo says that the action should rather be granted against him himself.