[ULPIANUS libro uicensimo nono ad edictum. ] §15.1.3.prLicet tamen praetor, si cum eo qui in potestate sit gestum sit, polliceatur actionem, tamen sciendum est et si in nullius sit potestate, dari de peculio actionem, ut puta si cum seruo hereditario contractum sit ante aditam hereditatem.
[ULPIAN, On the Edict, Book 29] Although the praetor promises an action if a transaction has been entered into with one who is in someone's power, it must nevertheless be understood that even if he is in no one's power, an action concerning the peculium is granted; for example, if a contract is made with a slave belonging to an inheritance before the inheritance is accepted.
§15.1.3.1Unde Labeo scribit et si secundo tertioue gradu substitutus sit seruus et deliberantibus primis heredibus cum eo contractum sit, mox repudiantibus eis ipse liber heresque exstiterit, posse dici de peculio eum conueniri et de in rem uerso.
Hence Labeo writes that even if a slave is substituted in the second or third degree, and a contract is made with him while the first-degree heirs are deliberating, and subsequently, upon their refusal of the inheritance, he himself becomes free and heir, it can be said that he can be sued concerning the peculium and concerning what has been turned to his profit.
§15.1.3.2Parui autem refert, seruus quis masculi an mulieris fuerit: nam de peculio et mulier conuenietur.
However, it is of little importance whether a slave belonged to a male or a female; for a woman also will be sued concerning the peculium.
§15.1.3.3Pedius etiam impuberes dominos de peculio obligari ait: non enim cum ipsis impuberibus contrahitur, ut tutoris auctoritatem spectes.
Pedius also says that owners below the age of puberty are liable concerning the peculium; for the contract is not made with the prepubescents themselves, so that you would look for the authority of a tutor.
idem adicit pupillum non posse seruo peculium constituere nec tutoris auctoritate.
The same writer adds that a ward cannot establish a peculium for a slave, even with the authority of a tutor.
§15.1.3.4In furiosi quoque curatorem dicimus dandam de peculio actionem: nam et huius seruus peculium habere potest, non si fuerit concessum, ut habeat, sed si non fuerit prohibitum, ne habeat.
We say that an action concerning the peculium should also be granted against the curator of an insane person; for the slave of such a person can also have a peculium, not if permission has been granted for him to have it, but if he has not been forbidden to have it.
§15.1.3.5Si filius familias uel seruus pro aliquo fideiusserint uel alias interuenerint uel mandauerint, tractatum est, an sit de peculio actio.
If a son in power or a slave acts as surety for someone, or otherwise intervenes, or gives a mandate, it has been discussed whether there is an action concerning the peculium.
et est uerius in seruo causam fideiubendi uel mandandi spectandam, quam sententiam et Celsus libro sexto probat in seruo fideiussore.
And it is more correct that in the case of a slave, the cause of the suretyship or mandate must be examined, an opinion which Celsus also approves in his sixth book regarding a slave who is a surety.
si igitur quasi intercessor seruus interuenerit, non rem peculiarem agens, non obligabitur dominus de peculio.
Therefore, if a slave intervenes as a mere intercessor, not acting in a matter concerning the peculium, the master will not be liable concerning the peculium.
§15.1.3.6Iulianus quoque libro duodecimo digestorum scribit, si seruus mandauerit, ut creditori meo solueretur, referre ait, quam causam mandandi habuerit: si pro creditore suo solui mandauit, esse obligatum dominum de peculio: quod si intercessoris officio functus sit, non obligari dominum de peculio.
Julian also writes in the twelfth book of his Digests that if a slave has given a mandate that payment be made to my creditor, he says it matters what cause for the mandate he had: if he mandated payment on behalf of his own creditor, the master is liable concerning the peculium; but if he performed the office of an intercessor, the master is not liable concerning the peculium.
§15.1.3.7Cui congruit, quod idem Iulianus scribit, si a filio meo fideiussorem accepero, quidquid a fideiussore accepero, id me non de in rem uerso, sed de peculio actione mandati praestaturum.
Consistent with this is what the same Julian writes: if I have accepted a surety from my son, whatever I receive from the surety, I shall perform not under the action concerning what has been turned to profit, but under the action of mandate concerning the peculium.
idem accipias et in serui fideiussore, idemque si alius mihi pro filio meo debitore soluisset.
You should understand the same in the case of a slave's surety, and the same if another person had paid me on behalf of my son who was a debtor.
quod si filius meus debitor non fuisset, exceptione doli fideiussorem usurum et, si soluisset, condicturum scribit.
But if my son had not been a debtor, he writes that the surety would use the plea of fraud and, if he had paid, would bring an action for recovery of the payment.
§15.1.3.8Si seruus, cum se pro libero gereret, compromiserit, quaeritur, an de peculio actio ex poena compromissi quasi ex negotio gesto danda sit, sicuti traiecticiae pecuniae datur.
If a slave, while conducting himself as a free man, has entered into an arbitration agreement, the question is raised whether an action concerning the peculium should be granted for the penalty of the arbitration agreement as if from unauthorized management, just as it is granted for maritime loans.
sed hoc et Neruae filio et mihi uidetur uerius ex compromisso serui non dandam de peculio actionem, quia nec si iudicio condemnetur seruus, datur in eum actio.
But to both Nerva's son and myself, it seems more correct that an action concerning the peculium should not be granted on the arbitration agreement of a slave, because not even if the slave is condemned in a trial is an action granted against him.
§15.1.3.9Sed si filius fideiussor uel quasi interuentor acceptus sit, an de peculio patrem obligat, quaeritur.
But if a son has been accepted as a surety or as a quasi-intervener, the question is raised whether he binds his father concerning the peculium.
et est uera Sabini et Cassii sententia existimantium semper obligari patrem de peculio et distare in hoc a seruo.
And the opinion of Sabinus and Cassius is correct, who think that the father is always bound concerning the peculium, and that in this respect he differs from a slave.
§15.1.3.10Quare et ex compromisso pater tenebitur.
Therefore, the father will also be held liable on an arbitration agreement.
et ita Papinianus quoque libro nono quaestionum scribit nec interesse ait, ex qua causa compromiserit, utrum ex ea causa, ex qua potuit cum patre de peculio agere, an uero ex ea qua non potuit, cum ex stipulatu pater conueniatur.
And Papinian also writes thus in the ninth book of his Questions, and says it does not matter for what cause he entered into the arbitration agreement, whether for a cause on which he could have sued the father concerning the peculium, or for one on which he could not, since the father is sued on a stipulation.
§15.1.3.11Idem scribit iudicati quoque patrem de peculio actione teneri, quod et Marcellus putat, etiam eius actionis nomine, ex qua non potuit pater de peculio actionem pati: nam sicut in stipulatione contrahitur cum filio, ita iudicio contrahi: proinde non originem iudicii spectandam, sed ipsam iudicati uelut obligationem.
The same writer writes that the father is also liable under the action concerning the peculium for a judgment debt, a view which Marcellus also holds, even in the name of an action under which the father could not have been subject to an action concerning the peculium; for just as a contract is made with a son in a stipulation, so it is made by a trial.
quare et si quasi defensor condemnatus sit, idem putat.
Consequently, he thinks that the origin of the trial is not to be examined, but the obligation, as it were, of the judgment itself; therefore, even if he has been condemned as a quasi-defender, he thinks the same.
§15.1.3.12Ex furtiua causa filio quidem familias condici posse constat.
It is established that on the ground of theft, an action for recovery can be brought against a son in power.
an uero in patrem uel in dominum de peculio danda est, quaeritur: et est uerius, in quantum locupletior dominus factus esset ex furto facto, actionem de peculio dandam: idem Labeo probat, quia iniquissimum est ex furto serui dominum locupletari impune.
But the question is raised whether it should be granted against the father or master concerning the peculium. And it is more correct that, to the extent the master has been made richer by the theft committed, the action concerning the peculium should be granted; Labeo approves the same, because it is most unjust for a master to be enriched with impunity from a slave's theft.
nam et circa rerum amotarum actionem filiae familias nomine in id quod ad patrem peruenit competit actio de peculio.
For also regarding the action for property removed, on account of a daughter in power, the action concerning the peculium lies for what came into the hands of the father.
§15.1.3.13Si filius familias duumuir pupillo rem saluam fore caueri non curauit, Papinianus libro nono quaestionum de peculio actionem competere ait.
If a son in power who is a duumvir has not seen to it that security was given to a ward that his property would be safe, Papinian says in the ninth book of his Questions that the action concerning the peculium lies.
nec quicquam mutare arbitror, an uoluntate patris decurio factus sit, quoniam rem publicam saluam fore pater obstrictus est.
And I think it makes no difference whether he became a decurion with his father's consent, since the father is bound that the public interest shall be kept safe.