[ULPIANUS libro uicensimo septimo ad edictum. ] §13.4.2.prArbitraria actio utriusque utilitatem continet tam actoris quam rei: quod si rei interest, minoris fit pecuniae condemnatio quam intentum est, aut si actoris, maioris pecuniae fiat.
[ULPIANUS from the twenty-seventh book on the edict.] An arbitrary action contains the interest of both parties, the plaintiff as well as the defendant: so that if the defendant has an interest, the condemnation is for a smaller sum of money than was claimed, or if the plaintiff has an interest, it may be for a larger sum of money.
§13.4.2.1Haec autem actio ex illa stipulatione uenit, ubi stipulatus sum a te Ephesi decem dari.
Now this action arises from that stipulation where I stipulated for ten to be given by you at Ephesus.
§13.4.2.2Si quis Ephesi decem aut Capuae hominem dari stipulatus experiatur, non debet detracto altero loco experiri, ne auferat loci utilitatem reo.
If anyone who has stipulated for ten to be given at Ephesus or a slave at Capua should bring an action, he must not bring it by omitting either place, so as not to deprive the defendant of the advantage of the place.
§13.4.2.3Scaeuola libro quinto decimo quaestionum ait non utique ea, quae tacite insunt stipulationibus, semper in rei esse potestate, sed quid debeat, esse in eius arbitrio, an debeat, non esse.
Scaevola, in the fifteenth book of Questions, says that those things which are tacitly contained in stipulations are by no means always in the power of the defendant, but what he owes is in his choice, while whether he owes is not.
et ideo cum quis Stichum aut Pamphilum promittit, eligere posse quod soluat, quamdiu ambo uiuunt: ceterum ubi alter decessit, extingui eius electionem, ne sit in arbitrio eius, an debeat, dum non uult uiuum praestare, quem solum debet.
And therefore, when someone promises Stichus or Pamphilus, he can choose which one to pay as long as both are alive; but when one of them has died, his choice is extinguished, lest it be in his choice whether he owes, while he does not wish to perform the living one, whom alone he owes.
quare et in proposito eum, qui promisit Ephesi aut Capuae, si fuerit in ipsius arbitrio, ubi ab eo petatur, conueniri non potuisse: semper enim alium locum electurum: sic euenire, ut sit in ipsius arbitrio, an debeat: quare putat posse ab eo peti altero loco et sine loci adiectione: damus igitur actori electionem petitionis.
Wherefore also in the case proposed, he who promised at Ephesus or at Capua, if it were in his own choice where he should be sued, could not have been summoned; for he would always choose the other place; thus it would happen that it would be in his own choice whether he owes; wherefore he thinks that he can be sued in either place and without the addition of the place; we therefore give the plaintiff the choice of the claim.
et generaliter definit Scaeuola petitorem electionem habere ubi petat, reum ubi soluat, scilicet ante petitionem.
And Scaevola generally defines that the plaintiff has the choice of where to sue, and the defendant of where to pay, namely before the claim.
proinde mixta, inquit, rerum alternatio locorum alternationi ex necessitate facit actoris electionem et in rem propter locum: alioquin tollis ei actionem, dum uis reseruare reo optionem.
Consequently, he says, a mixed alternation of things with an alternation of places of necessity gives the plaintiff the choice, and indeed in respect of the thing because of the place; otherwise you deprive him of his action, while you wish to reserve the option to the defendant.
§13.4.2.4Si quis ita stipulatur 'Ephesi et Capuae', hoc ait, ut Ephesi partem et Capuae partem petat.
If anyone stipulates thus, "at Ephesus and Capua," he means this, that he may claim a part at Ephesus and a part at Capua.
§13.4.2.5Si quis insulam fieri stipuletur et locum non adiciat, non ualet stipulatio.
If anyone stipulates for a building to be built and does not add the place, the stipulation is invalid.
§13.4.2.6Qui ita stipulatur 'Ephesi decem dari', si ante diem, quam Ephesum peruenire possit, agat, perperam ante diem agi, quia et Iulianus putat diem tacite huic stipulationi inesse.
He who stipulates thus, "for ten to be given at Ephesus," if he sues before the day on which he could reach Ephesus, sues improperly before the time, because Julian also thinks that a time is tacitly contained in this stipulation.
quare uerum puto, quod Iulianus ait eum, qui Romae stipulatur hodie Carthagine dari, inutiliter stipulari.
Wherefore I think it is true what Julian says, that he who stipulates at Rome for something to be given today at Carthage, stipulates uselessly.
§13.4.2.7Idem Iulianus tractat, an is, qui Ephesi sibi aut Titio dari stipulatus est, si alibi Titio soluatur, nihilo minus possit intendere sibi dari oportere.
The same Julian discusses whether he who has stipulated for something to be given at Ephesus to himself or to Titius, if payment is made to Titius elsewhere, can nevertheless claim that it ought to be given to himself.
et Iulianus scribit liberationem non contigisse atque ideo posse peti quod interest.
And Julian writes that discharge did not take place, and therefore the interest can be claimed.
Marcellus autem et alias tractat et apud Iulianum notat posse dici et si mihi alibi soluatur, liberationem contigisse, quamuis inuitus accipere non cogar: plane si non contigit liberatio, dicendum ait superesse petitionem integrae summae, quemadmodum si quis insulam alibi fecisset quam ubi promiserat, in nihilum liberaretur.
Marcellus, however, both discusses elsewhere and notes on Julian that it can be said that even if payment is made to me elsewhere, discharge does take place, although I am not compelled to accept it against my will; clearly, if discharge did not take place, he says it must be said that the claim for the entire sum remains, just as if anyone had built a building elsewhere than where he had promised, he would be discharged in respect of nothing.
sed mihi uidetur summae solutio distare a fabrica insulae et ideo quod interest solum petendum.
But it seems to me that the payment of a sum of money differs from the construction of a building, and therefore only the interest should be claimed.
§13.4.2.8Nunc de officio iudicis huius actionis loquendum est, utrum quantitati contractus debeat seruire an uel excedere uel minuere quantitatem debeat, ut, si interfuisset rei Ephesi potius soluere quam eo loci quo conueniebatur, ratio eius haberetur.
Now we must speak of the duty of the judge in this action, whether he ought to adhere to the quantity in the contract, or whether he ought either to exceed or to diminish the quantity, so that if it had been of interest to the defendant to pay at Ephesus rather than at the place where he was sued, account should be taken of this.
Iulianus Labeonis opinionem secutus etiam actoris habuit rationem, cuius interdum potuit interesse Ephesi recipere: itaque utilitas quoque actoris ueniet.
Julian, following the opinion of Labeo, also took account of the plaintiff, who might sometimes have an interest in receiving at Ephesus; therefore, the interest of the plaintiff will also come in.
quid enim si traiecticiam pecuniam dederat Ephesi recepturus, ubi sub poena debebat pecuniam uel sub pignoribus, et distracta pidnora sunt uel poena commissa mora tua? uel fisco aliquid debebatur et res stipulatoris uilissimo distracta est? in hanc arbitrariam quod interfuit ueniet et quidem ultra legitimum modum usurarum.
For what if he had given bottomry money to be recovered at Ephesus, where he himself owed money under a penalty or under pledges, and the pledges were sold or the penalty incurred through your delay? Or what if something was owed to the imperial treasury and the stipulator's property was sold at a very low price? Into this arbitrary action the interest will come, and indeed beyond the legal limit of interest.
quid si merces solebat competere: an et lucri ratio habeatur, non solius damni? puto et lucri habendam rationem.
What if merchandise was accustomed to yield profit: should account be taken also of profit, and not only of loss? I think account should be taken also of profit.