Humanitext Reader

Seneca the Younger · Moral Letters to Lucilius §95.56-95.64

Right Disposition of the Soul, Doctrines, and Precepts

Passage 188 of 254 · Latin

Summary

Seneca argues that a right action and will require a right disposition of the mind, which is established only by immutable "decrees." Decrees and specific precepts support each other like the roots and branches of a tree.

§95.56Non est necesse fabro de fabrica quaerere, quod eius initium, quis usus sit, non magis quam pantomimo de arte saltandi; omnes istae artes si se sciunt, nihil deest;
It is not necessary for a craftsman to ask about his craft—what its beginning is, what its use is—any more than for a pantomimist about the art of dancing; all these arts, if they know themselves, lack nothing; for they do not pertain to life as a whole.
non enim ad totam pertinent vitam, virtus et aliorum scientia est et sui; discendum de ipsa est, ut ipsa discatur.
Virtue, however, is the knowledge of other things and of itself; we must learn about virtue itself so that virtue itself may be learned.
§95.57Actio recta non erit, nisi recta fuerit voluntas, ab hac enim est actio.
An action will not be right unless the will is right, for from this comes the action.
Rursus voluntas non erit recta, nisi habitus animi rectus fuerit, ab hoc enim est voluntas.
Again, the will will not be right unless the disposition of the mind is right, for from this comes the will.
Habitus porro animi non erit in optimo, nisi totius vitae leges perceperit et quid de quoque iudicandum sit, exegerit, nisi res ad verum redegerit.
Furthermore, the disposition of the mind will not be at its best unless it has perceived the laws of life as a whole and determined what is to be judged concerning each thing, unless it has reduced things to the truth.
Non contingit tranquillitas nisi inmutabile certumque iudicium adeptis; ceteri decidunt subinde et reponuntur et inter missa adpetitaque alternis fluctuantur.
Tranquillity does not fall to any except those who have attained an unchangeable and certain judgment; the rest fall back continually, are restored, and fluctuate alternately between things abandoned and things sought.
§95.58Causa his quae iactationis est? Quod nihil liquet incertissimo regimine utentibus, fama.
What is the cause of this fluctuation for them? It is that nothing is clear to those who use the most uncertain guidance: common rumor.
Si vis eadem semper velle, vera oportet velis.
If you wish always to will the same things, you must will true things.
Ad verum sine decretis non pervenitur; continent vitam.
One does not arrive at the truth without decrees; they sustain life.
Bona et mala, honesta et turpia, iusta et iniusta, pia et impia, virtutes ususque virtutum, rerum commodarum possessio, existimatio ac dignitas, valitudo, vires, forma, sagacitas sensuum; haec omnia aestimatorem desiderant.
Good and bad, honorable and shameful, just and unjust, pious and impious, virtues and the use of virtues, possession of convenient things, reputation and dignity, health, strength, beauty, sharpness of the senses; all these require an estimator.
Scire liceat, quanti quidque in censum deferendum sit.
Let it be permitted to know at how much each thing is to be entered into the census.
§95.59Falleris enim et pluris quaedam quam sunt putas, adeoque falleris, ut, quae maximi inter nos habentur, divitiae, gratia, potentia, sestertio nummo aestimanda sint.
For you are deceived and think some things are worth more than they are; and you are so far deceived that those things which are held of highest value among us—riches, favor, power—are to be valued at a single sesterce.
Hoc nescies, nisi constitutionem ipsam, qua ista inter se aestimantur, inspexeris.
You will not know this unless you inspect the very constitution by which those things are valued among themselves.
Quemadmodum folia per se virere non possunt, ramum desiderant, cui inhaereant, ex quo trahant sucum; sic ista praecepta, si sola sunt, marcent; infigi volunt sectae.
Just as leaves cannot be green by themselves but require a branch to which they may cling and from which they may draw sap, so these precepts, if they are alone, wither; they wish to be grafted into a school.
§95.60Praeterea non intellegunt hi, qui decreta tollunt, eo ipso confirmari illa, quo tolluntur.
Moreover, those who abolish decrees do not understand that they are confirmed by the very fact that they are abolished.
Quid enim dicunt? Praeceptis vitam satis explicari, supervacua esse decreta sapientiae, id est dogmata.
For what do they say? That life is sufficiently regulated by precepts, and that the decrees of wisdom, that is, dogmas, are superfluous.
Atqui hoc ipsum, quod dicunt, decretum est tam me hercules quam si nunc ego dicerem recedendum a praeceptis velut supervacuis, utendum esse decretis, in haec sola studium conferendum; hoc ipso, quo negarem curanda esse praecepta, praeciperem.
And yet this very thing which they say is a decree, by Hercules, just as much as if I were now to say that we must withdraw from precepts as superfluous, that we must use decrees, and that study must be bestowed on these alone; by the very fact that I denied that precepts are to be cared for, I would be prescribing.
§95.61Quaedam admonitionem in philosophia desiderant, quaedam probationem et quidem multam, quia involuta sunt vixque summa diligentia ac summa subtilitate aperiuntur.
Certain things in philosophy require admonition, certain things require proof, and indeed much of it, because they are intricate and are opened only with the greatest diligence and the greatest subtlety.
Si probationes necessariae sunt, et decreta, quae veritatem argumentis colligunt.
If proofs are necessary, so too are decrees, which gather truth by arguments.
Quaedam aperta sunt, quaedam obscura: aperta, quae sensu conprehenduntur, quae memoria; obscura, quae extra haec sunt.
Some things are open, some are obscure: open are those which are grasped by sense and by memory; obscure are those which are outside of these.
Ratio autem non impletur manifestis; maior eius pars pulchriorque in occultis est.
But reason is not filled by manifest things; its greater and more beautiful part is in hidden things.
Occulta probationem exigunt, probatio non sine decretis est; necessaria ergo decreta sunt.
Hidden things demand proof, and proof is not without decrees; therefore, decrees are necessary.
§95.62Quae res communem sensum facit, eadem perfectum, certa rerum persuasio; sine qua si omnia in animo natant, necessaria sunt decreta, quae dant animis inflexibile iudicium.
The same thing that makes common sense makes it perfect: a certain conviction about things; without which, if all things float in the mind, decrees are necessary, which give to minds an inflexible judgment.
§95.63Denique cum monemus aliquem, ut amicum eodem habeat loco, quo se, ut ex inimico cogitet fieri posse amicum, in illo amorem incitet, in hoc odium moderetur, adicimus: "iustum est et honestum. "Iustum autem honestumque decretorum nostrorum continet ratio; ergo haec necessaria est, sine qua nec illa sunt.
Finally, when we advise someone to hold a friend in the same place as himself, to think that a friend can be made out of an enemy, to stimulate love in the former, and to moderate hatred in the latter, we add: "it is just and honorable." But the system of our decrees contains the just and honorable; therefore this system is necessary, without which those precepts do not exist either.
§95.64Sed utrumque iungamus.
But let us join both.
Namque et sine radice inutiles rami sunt et ipsae radices iis, quae genuere, adiuvantur.
For indeed, without a root, branches are useless, and the roots themselves are helped by those things which they produced.
Quantum utilitatis manus habeant, nescire nulli licet, aperte iuvant;
How much utility hands have, no one is permitted not to know; they help openly.
cor illud, quo manus vivunt, ex quo impetum sumunt, quo moventur, latet.
But that heart, by which the hands live, from which they take their impulse, by which they are moved, is hidden.
Idem dicere de praeceptis possum: aperta sunt, decreta vero sapientiae in abdito.
I can say the same about precepts: they are open, but the decrees of wisdom are in secret.
Sicut sanctiora sacrorum tantum initiati sciunt, ita in philosophia arcana illa admissis receptisque in sacra ostenduntur; at praecepta et alia eiusmodi profanis quoque nota sunt.
Just as only the initiated know the holier parts of sacred rites, so in philosophy those secrets are shown only to those who have been admitted and received into the sanctuary; but precepts and other things of that kind are known also to the uninitiated.

Notes

  1. 95.56quod eius initium, quis usus sit — An indirect question clause serving as the object of "quaerere." "eius" is a genitive pronoun referring back to "fabrica."
  2. 95.57Non contingit tranquillitas nisi inmutabile certumque iudicium adeptis — "adeptis" is the perfect participle dative plural of the deponent verb "adipiscor," used substantively ("to those who have attained") and serving as the dative complement of "contingit."
  3. 95.60eo ipso confirmari illa, quo tolluntur — "eo ipso... quo..." is a correlative construction using the ablative of means/cause, meaning "by the very fact that...". "illa" is the subject accusative of the infinitive "confirmari" and refers to "decreta."
  4. 95.64iis, quae genuere, adiuvantur — "genuere" is a shortened form of "genuerunt" (3rd person plural perfect of "gigno"). The subject is "radices," and the relative pronoun "quae" is neuter plural accusative, referring to the branches/leaves produced by the roots.

Cite this passage

Seneca the Younger, Moral Letters to Lucilius §95.56-95.64. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:latinLit:phi1017.phi015.humanitext-lat2:95.56-95.64

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