§95.1Petis a me, ut id, quod in diem suum dixeram debere differri, repraesentem et scribam tibi, an haec pars philosophiae, quam Graeci paraeneticen vocant, nos praeceptivam dicimus, satis sit ad consummandam sapientiam.
You ask of me that I present now and write to you that which I had said ought to be deferred to its proper day: namely, whether this part of philosophy which the Greeks call paraenetic, and we call preceptive, is sufficient for completing wisdom.
Scio te in bonam partem accepturum si negavero.
I know you will take it in good part if I deny it.
Eo magis promitto et verbum publicum perire non patior: "postea noli rogare, quod inpetrare nolueris. " §95.2Interdum enim enixe petimus id, quod recusaremus, si quis offerret.
Therefore, I promise it all the more, and I do not allow the common proverb to perish: "hereafter do not ask for what you would be unwilling to obtain." For sometimes we earnestly ask for that which we would refuse if anyone offered it.
Haec sive levitas est sive vernilitas, punienda est annuendi facilitate.
Whether this is levity or fawning, it ought to be punished by the readiness of nodding assent.
Multa videri volumus velle, sed nolumus.
We wish to seem to wish many things, but we do not wish them.
Recitator historiam ingentem attulit minutissime scriptam, artissime plicatam, et magna parte perlecta "desinam," inquit, "si vultis. "Adclamatur "recita, recita "ab iis, qui illum ommutescere illic cupiunt.
A reader brought a huge history written very minutely, folded very tightly, and when a large part had been read through, he said, "I shall stop, if you wish." "Read on, read on!" is shouted by those who desire him to become silent right there.
Saepe aliud volumus, aliud optamus et verum ne dis quidem dicimus, sed di aut non exaudiunt aut miserentur.
Often we wish one thing, pray for another, and do not speak the truth even to the gods; but the gods either do not hear or they take pity on us.
§95.3Ego me omissa misericordia vindicabo et tibi ingentem epistulam inpingam, quam tu si invitus leges, dicito: "ego mihi hoc contraxi "teque inter illos numera, quos uxor magno ducta ambitu torquet, inter illos, quos divitiae per summum adquisitae sudorem male habent, inter illos, quos honores nulla non arte. atque opera petiti discruciant, et ceteros malorum suorum compotes. .
I, having dismissed pity, will avenge myself and thrust upon you a huge letter, which if you read unwillingly, say: "I have brought this upon myself," and count yourself among those whom a wife married with great courting tortures, among those whom riches acquired through the greatest sweat make ill, among those whom honors sought by every art and effort torment, and the rest who have obtained their own evils.
Sed ut omisso principio rem ipsam adgrediar, "beata," inquiunt, "vita constat ex actionibus rectis; ad actiones rectas praecepta perducunt; ergo ad beatam vitam praecepta sufficiunt. " §95.4Non semper ad actiones rectas praecepta perducunt, sed cum obsequens ingenium est; aliquando frustra admoventur, si animum opiniones obsident pravae.
But that I may omit the preface and approach the matter itself: "A happy life," they say, "consists of right actions; precepts lead to right actions; therefore, precepts are sufficient for a happy life." Precepts do not always lead to right actions, but only when the disposition is obedient; sometimes they are applied in vain, if crooked opinions besiege the mind.
§95.5Deinde etiam si recte faciunt, nesciunt facere se recte.
Then, even if they act rightly, they do not know that they are acting rightly.
Non potest enim quisquam nisi ab initio formatus et tota ratione compositus omnes exequi numeros, ut sciat, quando oporteat et in quantum et cum quo et quemadmodum et quare.
For no one, unless formed from the beginning and put together by total reason, can perform all the measures, so that he may know when he ought, and to what extent, and with whom, and in what manner, and why.
Non potest toto animo honesta conari, ne constanter quidem aut libenter, sed respiciet, sed haesitabit.
He cannot attempt honorable things with his whole soul, nor indeed constantly or willingly, but he will look back, he will hesitate.
§95.6"Si honesta," inquit, "actio ex praeceptis venit, ad beatam vitam praecepta abunde sunt; atqui est illud, ergo et hoc. "His respondebimus actiones honestas et praeceptis fieri, non tantum praeceptis.
"If an honorable action," he says, "comes from precepts, precepts are abundantly sufficient for a happy life; but the former is true, therefore also the latter." To these we shall reply that honorable actions are indeed done by precepts, but not only by precepts.
§95.7"Si aliae," inquit, "artes contentae sunt praeceptis, contenta erit et sapientia, nam et haec ars vitae est.
"If other arts," he says, "are content with precepts, wisdom will also be content, for this too is the art of life.
Atqui gubernatorem facit ille, qui praecipit: sic move gubernaculum, sic vela summitte, sic secundo vento utere, sic adverso resiste, sic dubium communemque tibi vindica. Alios quoque artifices praecepta conformant; ergo in hoc idem poterunt artifice vivendi. " §95.8Omnes istae artes circa instrumenta vitae occupatae sunt, non circa totam vitam.
Yet he who gives instructions makes a pilot: 'move the rudder thus, lower the sails thus, use a favorable wind thus, resist an opposing wind thus, claim for yourself what is doubtful and common.' Precepts shape other craftsmen as well; therefore, they will be able to do the same in this artist of living." All those arts are occupied about the instruments of life, not about the whole of life.
Itaque multa illas inhibent extrinsecus et inpediunt, spes, cupiditas, timor.
Therefore, many things from without inhibit and impede them—hope, desire, fear.
At haec, quae artem vitae professa est, nulla re, quo minus se exerceat, vetari potest; discutit enim inpedimenta et traicit obstantia.
But this, which has professed the art of life, can be forbidden by nothing from exercising itself; for it shakes off impediments and passes through obstacles.
Vis scire, quam dissimilis sit aliarum artium condicio et huius? In illis excusatius est voluntate peccare quam casu, in hac maxima culpa est sponte delinquere.
Do you wish to know how unlike is the condition of other arts and of this?
§95.9Quod dico, tale est.
In those, it is more excusable to sin by will than by chance; in this, it is the greatest fault to transgress voluntarily.
Grammaticus non erubescet soloecismo, si sciens fecit, erubescet, si nesciens; medicus si deficere aegrum non intellegit, quantum ad artem, magis peccat quam si se intellegere dissimulat.
What I say is of this sort: a grammarian will not blush at a solecism if he did it knowingly, but he will blush if unknowingly; a physician, if he does not understand that his patient is failing, sins more, as far as art is concerned, than if he pretends he understands.
At in hac arte vivendi turpior volentium culpa est.
But in this art of living, the fault of those who are willing is more shameful.
Adice nunc, quod artes quoque pleraeque, immo ex omnibus liberalissimae habent decreta sua, non tantum praecepta, sicut medicina.
Add now that most arts, indeed the most liberal of all, have their own decrees, not only precepts, just as medicine does.
Itaque alia est Hippocratis secta, alia Asclepiadis, alia Themisonis.
Therefore, one is the sect of Hippocrates, another of Asclepiades, another of Themison.