§94.9Ista enim qui diligentissime monent, ipsi facere non possunt.
For those who most diligently advise these things cannot themselves do them.
Haec paedagogus puero, haec avia nepoti praecipit, et irascendum non esse magister iracundissimus disputat.
These things a tutor prescribes to a boy, these a grandmother to her grandson, and that one must not be angry, a most wrathful teacher discusses.
Si ludum litterarium intraveris, scies ista, quae ingenti supercilio philosophi iactant, in puerili esse praescripto.
If you enter a primary school, you will know that these things, which philosophers boast with huge eyebrows, are in children's rules.
§94.10"Utrum deinde manifesta an dubia praecipies? Non desiderant manifesta monitorem, praecipienti dubia non creditur; supervacuum est ergo praecipere.
"Will you then prescribe things that are obvious or things that are doubtful? Obvious things do not require a monitor, and one who prescribes doubtful things is not believed; therefore, it is superfluous to prescribe.
Id adeo sic disce.
Learn this, moreover, in this way.
Si id mones, quod obscurum est et ambiguum, probationibus adiuvandum erit.
If you advise that which is obscure and ambiguous, it will have to be helped by proofs.
Si probaturus es, illa per quae probas plus valent satisque per se sunt.
If you are going to prove it, those things through which you prove it have more weight and are sufficient by themselves.
§94.11Sic amico utere, sic cive, sic socio.
'Thus treat a friend, thus a citizen, thus an associate.' Why?
Quare? Quia iustum est.
Because it is just.
Omnia ista mihi de iustitia locus tradit.
The topic of justice delivers all these things to me.
Illic invenio aequitatem per se expetendam, nec metu nos ad illam cogi nec mercede conduci, non esse iustum, cui quidquam in hac virtute placet praeter ipsam.
There I find that equity is to be sought for its own sake, and that we are neither forced to it by fear nor hired by reward, and that he is not just who is pleased by anything in this virtue besides itself.
Hoc cum persuasi mihi et perbibi, quid ista praecepta proficiunt, quae eruditum docent? Praecepta dare scienti supervacuum est, nescienti parum.
When I have persuaded myself of this and drunk it in, what benefit do these precepts bring, which teach one who is already educated? To give precepts to one who knows is superfluous, and to one who does not know, it is too little.
Audire enim debet non tantum, quid sibi praecipiatur, sed etiam quare.
For he ought to hear not only what is prescribed to him, but also why.
§94.12Utrum, inquam, veras opiniones habenti de bonis malisque sunt necessaria an non habenti? Qui non habet, nihil a te adiuvabitur; aures eius contraria monitionibus tuis fama possedit.
Are precepts, I say, necessary for one who has true opinions about goods and evils, or for one who does not have them? He who does not have them will receive no help from you; rumor, contrary to your admonitions, has possessed his ears.
Qui habet exactum iudicium de fugiendis petendisque, scit, quid sibi faciendum sit, etiam te tacente.
He who has an exact judgment about what is to be avoided and what is to be sought knows what is to be done by him, even while you are silent.
Tota ergo pars ista philosophiae summoveri potest.
Therefore, this entire part of philosophy can be removed.
§94.13"Duo sunt, propter quae delinquimus: aut inest animo pravis opinionibus malitia contracta aut, etiam si non est falsis occupatus, ad falsa proclivis est et cito specie quo non oportet trahente corrumpitur.
'There are two things because of which we transgress: either there is in the mind a malice contracted from depraved opinions, or, even if it is not occupied by false ones, it is prone to false things and is quickly corrupted by an appearance drawing it where it ought not to go.
Itaque debemus aut percurare mentem aegram et vitiis liberare, aut vacantem quidem, sed ad peiora pronam praeoccupare.
Therefore, we must either thoroughly cure the sick mind and free it from vices, or preoccupy it when it is empty, indeed, but inclined to worse things.
Utrumque decreta philosophiae faciunt; ergo tale praecipiendi genus nil agit. §94.14Praeterea si praecepta singulis damus, inconprehensibile opus est.
The decrees of philosophy do both; therefore, this kind of prescribing does nothing.' Besides, if we give precepts to individuals, it is an incomprehensible task.
Alia enim dare debemus faeneranti, alia colenti agrum, alia negotianti, alia regum amicitias sequenti, alia pares, alia inferiores amaturo.
For we must give some to the money-lender, others to the tiller of the field, others to the merchant, others to the one pursuing the friendships of kings, others to the one who is to love his equals, others to the one who is to love his inferiors.
§94.15In matrimonio praecipies, quomodo vivat eum uxore aliquis, quam virginem duxit, quomodo eum ea, quae alicuius ante matrimonium experta est, quemadmodum eum locuplete, quemadmodum cum indotata.
In marriage, will you prescribe how someone should live with a wife whom he married as a virgin, how with her who has had experience of someone else before marriage, how with a wealthy wife, how with a portionless one?
An non putas aliquid esse discriminis inter sterilem et fecundam, inter provectiorem et puellam, inter matrem et novercam? Omnes species conplecti non possumus, atqui singulae propria exigunt; leges autem philosophiae breves sunt et omnia alligant.
Or do you not think there is some difference between a sterile and a fertile woman, between an older woman and a young girl, between a mother and a stepmother? We cannot encompass all species, and yet each single one demands its own proper requirements; the laws of philosophy, however, are brief and bind everything.
§94.16Adice nunc, quod sapientiae praecepta finita debent esse et certa: si qua finiri non possunt, extra sapientiam sunt; sapientia rerum terminos novit.
Add now that the precepts of wisdom ought to be finite and certain; if any cannot be defined, they are outside wisdom; wisdom knows the limits of things.
"Ergo ista praeceptiva pars summovenda est, quia quod paucis promittit, praestare omnibus non potest; sapientia autem omnes tenet. §94.17Inter insaniam publicam et hanc, quae medicis traditur, nihil interest nisi quod haec morbo laborat, illa opinionibus falsis.
'Therefore, this preceptive part must be removed, because what it promises to a few, it cannot perform for all; wisdom, however, holds all.' Between public madness and this which is delivered to physicians, there is no difference except that the latter suffers from disease, the former from false opinions.
Altera causas furoris traxit ex valitudine, altera animi mala valitudo est.
The one has drawn the causes of madness from physical condition, the other is a bad health of the mind.
Si quis furioso praecepta det, quomodo loqui debeat, quomodo procedere, quomodo in publico se gerere, quomodo in privato, erit ipso, quem monebit, insanior.
If anyone should give precepts to a madman on how he ought to speak, how to walk, how to behave in public, how in private, he will be madder than the very person he is advising.
Ei bilis nigra curanda est et ipsa furoris causa removenda.
In his case, the black bile must be cured and the very cause of madness removed.
Idem in hoc alio animi furore faciendum est.
The same must be done in this other madness of the mind.
Ipse discuti debet; alioqui abibunt in vanum monentium verba. " §94.18Haec ab Aristone dicuntur; cui respondebimus ad singula.
It must itself be dispelled; otherwise, the words of those who advise will go in vain." These things are said by Ariston; to him we shall reply to each point.
Primum adversus illud, quod ait, si quid obstat oculo et inpedit visum, debere removeri.
First, against that which he says, that if anything blocks the eye and hinders the sight, it ought to be removed.
Fateor huic non esse opus praeceptis ad videndum, sed remedio, quo purgetur acies et officientem sibi moram effugiat.
I admit that for this eye there is no need of precepts for seeing, but of a remedy by which the sight may be cleansed and escape the delay hindering it.
Natura enim videmus, cui usum sui reddit qui removet obstantia.
For we see by nature, to which he who removes obstacles restores the use of itself.
Quid autem cuique debeatur officio, natura non docet.
What, however, is owed to each duty, nature does not teach.