§88.19An liberale studium istuc esse iuventuti nostrae credimus, quam maiores nostri rectam exercuerunt hastilia iacere, sudem torquere, equum agitare, arma tractare? Nihil liberos suos docebant, quod discendum esset iacentibus.
Do we believe that that activity is a liberal study for our youth, which our ancestors trained to stand upright in throwing spears, whirling stakes, managing horses, and handling weapons? They taught their children nothing that should be learned by those lying down.
Sed nec hae nec illae docent aluntve virtutem.
But neither these nor those studies teach or nourish virtue.
Quid enim prodest equum regere et cursum eius freno temperare, adfectibus effrenatissimis abstrahi? Quid prodest multos vincere luctatione vel caestu, ab iracundia vinci?
For what does it profit to rule a horse and to temper its course with a bridle, if one is dragged away by the most unbridled passions? What does it profit to conquer many in wrestling or boxing, if one is conquered by anger?
§88.20"Quid ergo? Nihil nobis liberalia conferunt studia?" Ad alia multum, ad virtutem nihil.
"What then? Do liberal studies confer nothing upon us?" Much for other things, nothing for virtue.
Nam et hae viles ex professo artes, quae manu constant, ad instrumenta vitae plurimum conferunt, tamen ad virtutem non pertinent.
For even these low, avowedly manual arts contribute very much to the instruments of life, yet they do not belong to virtue.
"Quare ergo liberalibus studiis filios erudimus?" Non quia virtutem dare possunt, sed quia animum ad accipiendam virtutem praeparant.
"Why then do we instruct our children in liberal studies?" Not because they can give virtue, but because they prepare the mind for receiving virtue.
Quemadmodum prima illa, ut antiqui vocabant, litteratura, per quam pueris elementa traduntur, non docet liberales artes, sed mox percipiendis locum parat, sic liberales artes non perducunt animum ad virtutem, sed expediunt.
Just as that first instruction in literature, as the ancients called it, through which the elements are delivered to boys, does not teach liberal arts, but prepares a place for them to be received soon after, so liberal arts do not lead the mind to virtue, but clear the way.
§88.21Quattuor ait esse artium Posidonius genera: sunt volgares et sordidae, sunt ludicrae, sunt pueriles, sunt liberales.
Posidonius says that there are four kinds of arts: the vulgar and low, the playful, the childish, and the liberal.
Volgares opificum, quae manu constant et ad instruendam vitam occupatae sunt, in quibus nulla decoris, nulla honesti simulatio est.
The vulgar are those of workmen, which consist in manual work and are occupied with furnishing life, in which there is no pretense of beauty or of the honorable.
§88.22Ludicrae sunt, quae ad voluptatem oculorum atque aurium tendunt.
The playful are those which tend to the pleasure of the eyes and ears.
His adnumeres licet machinatores, qui pegmata per se surgentia excogitant et tabulata tacite in sublime crescentia et alias ex inopinato varietates aut dehiscentibus, quae cohaerebant, aut bis, quae distabant, sua sponte coeuntibus aut his, quae eminebant, paulatim in se residentibus.
To these you may number the mechanics, who devise stages rising by themselves and platforms silently growing on high, and other unexpected varieties, either by things that clung together gaping open, or by those that were apart coming together of their own accord, or by those that stood out gradually sinking back into themselves.
His imperitorum feriuntur oculi omnia subita, quia causas non novere, mirandum.
The eyes of the unskilled are struck by these things; everything sudden is a matter of wonder to them, because they do not know the causes.
§88.23Pueriles sunt et aliquid habentes liberalibus simile hae artes, quas ἐγκυκλίουσ Graeci, nostri autem liberales vocant.
The childish arts, which have something similar to liberal arts, are those which the Greeks call the general arts, but our people call liberal.
Solae autem liberales sunt, immo, ut dicam verius, liberae, quibus curae virtus est.
But the only truly liberal arts, or rather, to speak more truly, the free arts, are those whose care is virtue.
§88.24"Quemadmodum," inquit, "est aliqua pars philosophiae naturalis, est aliqua moralis, est aliqua rationalis, sic et haec quoque liberalium artium turba locum sibi in philosophia vindicat.
"Just as," he says, "there is some part of philosophy that is natural, some moral, some rational, so also this crowd of liberal arts claims a place for itself in philosophy.
Cum ventum est ad naturales quaestiones, geometriae testimonio statur; ergo eius, quam adiuvat, pars est. " §88.25Multa adiuvant nos nec ideo partes nostri sunt.
When we come to natural questions, we stand by the testimony of geometry; therefore, it is a part of that which it helps." Many things help us, yet they are not therefore parts of us.
Immo si partes essent, non adiuvarent.
Indeed, if they were parts, they would not help.
Cibus adiutorium corporis nec tamen pars est.
Food is a help to the body, yet it is not a part.
Aliquid nobis praestat geometriae ministerium; sic philosophiae necessaria est, quomodo ipsi faber.
The service of geometry provides something to us; thus it is necessary to philosophy in the same way as the carpenter is to geometry itself.
Sed nec hic geometriae pars est nec illa philosophiae.
But neither is the latter a part of geometry, nor the former of philosophy.
§88.26Praeterea utraque fines suos habet.
Moreover, each has its own boundaries.
Sapiens enim causas naturalium et quaerit et novit, quorum numeros mensurasque geometres persequitur et subputat.
For the wise man seeks and knows the causes of natural things, whose numbers and measures the geometrician pursues and calculates.
Qua ratione constent caelestia, quae illis sit vis quaeve natura, sapiens scit; cursus et recursus et quasdam observationes, per quas descendunt et adlevantur ac speciem interdum standum praebent, cum caelestibus stare non liceat, colligit mathematicus.
By what system the heavenly bodies consist, what is their power or what is their nature, the wise man knows; the mathematician collects their courses and returns, and certain observations through which they descend and are lifted up, and sometimes present the appearance of standing still, although it is not permitted for heavenly bodies to stand still.
§88.27Quae causa in speculo imagines exprimat, sciet sapiens; illud tibi geometres potest dicere, quantum abesse debeat corpus ab imagine et qualis forma speculi quales imagines reddat.
What cause expresses images in a mirror, the wise man will know; the geometrician can tell you how far a body ought to be from the image, and what shape of mirror returns what kind of images.
Magnum esse solem philosophus probabit; quantus sit, mathematicus, qui usu quodam et exercitatione procedit; sed ut procedat, impetranda illi quaedam principia sunt.
The philosopher will prove that the sun is large; how large it is, the mathematician will prove, who proceeds by a certain use and practice; but that he may proceed, certain principles must be obtained by him.
Non est autem ars sui iuris, cui precarium fundamentum est.
But an art is not independent whose foundation is precarious.
§88.28Philosophia nil ab alio petit, totum opus a solo excitat; mathematice, ut ita dicam, superficiaria est, in alieno aedificat.
Philosophy begs nothing from another, it raises the whole work by itself alone; mathematics is, so to speak, built on another's ground, it builds on what belongs to another.
Accipit prima, quorum beneficio ad ulteriora perveniat.
It receives first principles, by the benefit of which it may arrive at further things.
Si per se iret ad verum, si totius mundi naturam posset conprendere, dicerem multum conlaturam mentibus nostris, quae tractatu caelestium crescunt trahuntque aliquid ex alto.
If it went to the truth by itself, if it could comprehend the nature of the whole world, I should say it would contribute much to our minds, which grow by the treatment of heavenly things and draw something from on high.
Una re consummatur animus, scientia bonorum ac malorum inmutabili; nihil autem ulla ars alia de bonis ac malis quaerit.
The mind is consummated by one thing, the immutable knowledge of good and evil; but no other art seeks anything concerning good and evil.