§87.10O quantum erat saeculi decus, imperatorem triumphalem, censorium, quod super omnia haec est, Catonem uno caballo esse contentum et ne toto quidem! Partem enim sarcinae ab utroque latere dependentes occupabant.
Oh, what a glory of the age it was, that Cato, a triumphal commander, a censor—and what is above all these things—was content with a single nag, and not even the whole of it! For baggage hanging down on both sides occupied a part of it.
Ita non omnibus obesis mannis et asturconibus et tolutariis praeferres unicum illum equum ab ipso Catone defrictum?
Would you not, then, prefer that single horse, rubbed down by Cato himself, to all those fat ponies, Asturians, and trotters?
§87.11Video non futurum finem in ista materia ullum, nisi quem ipse mihi fecero.
I see that there will be no end to this matter, except that which I shall make for myself.
Hic itaque conticescam, quantum ad ista, quae sine dubio talia divinavit futura, qualia nunc sunt, qui primus appellavit "inpedimenta.
Here, therefore, I shall keep silent regarding those things which he who first called them "impediments" undoubtedly foresaw would be in the future just as they are now.
"Nunc volo paucissimas adhuc interrogationes nostrorum tibi reddere ad virtutem pertinentes, quam satisfacere vitae beatae contendimus.
Now I want to deliver to you a very few more of our school's questions pertaining to virtue, which we contend is sufficient for a happy life.
§87.12"Quod bonum est, bonos facit.
"What is good makes people good.
Nam et in arte musica quod bonum est, facit musicum.
For even in the art of music, what is good makes a musician.
Fortuita bonum non faciunt.
Fortuitous things do not make a person good.
Ergo non sunt bona. "Adversus hoc sic respondent Peripatetici, ut quod primum proponimus, falsum esse dicant.
Therefore, they are not goods." To this the Peripatetics reply in such a way as to say that our first premise is false.
"Ab eo," inquiunt, "quod est bonum, non utique fiunt boni.
"From that which is good," they say, "men do not by all means become good.
In musica est aliquid bonum tamquam tibia aut chorda aut organum aliquod aptatum ad usus canendi.
In music there is something good, such as a flute, or a string, or some instrument adapted for the use of singing.
Nihil tamen horum facit musicum. " §87.13Hic respondebimus: "Non intellegitis, quomodo posuerimus quod bonum est in musica.
Yet none of these makes a musician." Here we shall reply: "You do not understand how we have placed what is good in music.
Non enim id dicimus, quod instruit musicum, sed quod facit; tu ad supellectilem artis, non ad artem venis.
For we do not mean that which equips the musician, but that which makes him; you are coming to the equipment of the art, not to the art itself.
Si quid autem in ipsa arte musica bonum est, id utique musicum faciet. " §87.14Etiamnunc facere istuc planius volo.
But if there is any good in the art of music itself, that will by all means make a musician." Even now I want to make this point clearer.
Bonum in arte musica duobus modis dicitur, alterum, quo effectus musici adiuvatur, alterum, quo ars.
Good in the art of music is spoken of in two ways: one by which the effect of the music is aided, the other by which the art itself is aided.
Ad effectum pertinent instrumenta, tibiae et organa et chordae, ad artem ipsam non pertinent.
To the effect belong the instruments, flutes and organs and strings; they do not belong to the art itself.
Est enim artifex etiam sine istis; uti forsitan non potest arte.
For the artist exists even without them; he perhaps cannot use his art.
Hoc non est aeque duplex in homine; idem enim est bonum et hominis et vitae.
This is not equally twofold in man; for the good of man and of life is the same.
§87.15"Quod contemptissimo cuique contingere ac turpissimo potest, bonum non est.
"What can fall to the lot of any most contemptible and most shameful person is not a good.
Opes autem et lenoni et lanistae contingunt.
But riches fall to the lot of both a panderer and a gladiator-trainer.
Ergo non sunt bona. ""Falsum est," inquiunt, "quod proponitis.
Therefore, they are not goods." "It is false," they say, "what you propose.
Nam et in grammatice et in arte medendi aut gubernandi videmus bona humillimis quibusque contingere. " §87.16Sed istae artes non sunt magnitudinem animi professae, non consurgunt in altum nec fortuita fastidiunt.
For both in grammar and in the art of healing or of steering, we see that goods fall to the lot of any of the humblest persons." But those arts do not profess greatness of soul, they do not rise to the heights nor despise fortuitous things.
Virtus extollit hominem et super cara mortalibus conlocat; nec ea, quae bona, nec ea, quae mala vocantur, aut cupit nimis aut expavescit.
Virtue exalts man and places him above those things dear to mortals; it neither desires too much nor dreads those things which are called goods or evils.
Chelidon, unus ex Cleopatrae mollibus, patrimonium grande possedit.
Chelidon, one of Cleopatra's effeminates, possessed a grand patrimony.
Nuper Natalis tam inprobae linguae quam inpurae, in cuius ore feminae purgabantur, et multorum heres fuit et multos habuit heredes.
Recently, Natalis, a man with a tongue as wicked as it was impure—in whose mouth women were purified—was both heir to many and had many heirs.
Quid ergo? Utrum illum pecunia inpurum effecit an ipse pecuniam inspurcavit? Quae sic in quosdam homines quomodo denarius in cloacam cadit.
What then? Did money make him impure, or did he defile the money? Riches fall into certain men just as a denarius falls into a sewer.
§87.17Virtus super ista consistit.
Virtue stands above those things.
Suo aere censetur.
It is valued by its own currency.
Nihil ex istis quolibet incurrentibus bonum iudicat.
It judges none of those things that run in from any direction to be a good.
Medicina et gubernatio non interficit sibi ac suis admiratione talium rerum Qui non est vir bonus, potest nihilominus medicus esse, potest gubernator, potest grammaticus tam mehercules quam cocus.
Medicine and steering do not destroy themselves and their own by the admiration of such things. He who is not a good man can nevertheless be a physician, can be a pilot, can be a grammarian, just as much, by Hercules, as a cook.
Cui contingit habere rem non quamlibet, hunc non quemlibet dixeris; qualia quisque habet, talis est.
You would not call him an ordinary man who happens to have no ordinary thing; as each one has what kind of things, such is he.