§81.9Mira in quibusdam rebus verborum proprietas est et consuetudo sermonis antiqui quaedam efficacissimis et officia docentibus notis signat.
The propriety of words in certain things is wonderful, and the custom of ancient speech designates some things with extremely effective signs that teach duties.
Sic certe solemus loqui: "ille illi gratiam rettulit. "Referre est ultro, quod debeas, adferre.
Surely we are accustomed to speak thus: "he returned gratitude to him." To return is to bring back voluntarily what you owe.
Non dicimus "gratiam reddidit," reddunt enim et qui reposcuntur et qui inviti et qui ubilibet et qui per alium.
We do not say "he returned gratitude," for those also return who are demanded back, and those who are unwilling, and those in any place whatsoever, and those through another.
Non dicimus "reposuit beneficium" aut "solvit"; nullum nobis placuit, quod aeri alieno convenit, verbum.
We do not say "he replaced the benefit" or "he paid"; no word pleased us which belongs to debt.
§81.10Referre est ad eum, a quo acceperis, rem ferre.
To return is to carry the thing to him from whom you received it.
Haec vox significat voluntariam relationem; qui rettulit, ipse se appellavit.
This word signifies a voluntary return; he who has returned has summoned himself.
Sapiens omnia examinabit secum: quantum acceperit, a quo, quando, ubi, quemadmodum.
The wise man will examine all things with himself: how much he received, from whom, when, where, in what manner.
Itaque negamus quemquam scire gratiam referre nisi sapientem; non magis quam beneficium dare quisquam scit nisi sapiens, hic scilicet, qui magis dato gaudet quam alius accepto.
Therefore we deny that anyone knows how to return gratitude except the wise man; no more than anyone knows how to give a benefit except the wise man, he namely, who rejoices more in the giving than another in the receiving.
§81.11Hoc aliquis inter illa numerat, quae videmur inopinata omnibus dicere, παράδοξα Graeci vocant, et ait: "Nemo ergo scit praeter sapientem referre gratiam? Ergo nec quod debet, creditori suo reponere quisquam scit alius nec, cum emit aliquam rem, pretium venditori persolvere? "Ne nobis fiat invidia, scito idem dicere Epicurum.
Someone numbers this among those things which we seem to say contrary to everyone's opinion, which the Greeks call paradoxes, and says: "Does no one, then, except the wise man know how to return gratitude? Then does no one else know how to repay to his creditor what he owes, nor, when he buys something, to pay the price to the seller?" Lest hatred be directed at us, know that Epicurus says the same thing.
Metrodorus certe ait solum sapientem referre gratiam scire
Metrodorus certainly says that the wise man alone knows how to return gratitude.
§81.12Deinde idem admiratur, cum dicimus: "Solus sapiens scit amare.
Then the same person wonders when we say: "Only the wise man knows how to love.
Solus sapiens amicus est. "Atqui et amoris et amicitiae pars est referre gratiam, immo hoc magis vulgare est et in plures cadit quam vera amicitia.
Only the wise man is a friend." And yet to return gratitude is a part of both love and friendship; indeed, this is more common and falls upon more people than true friendship.
Deinde idem admiratur, quod dicimus fidem nisi in sapiente non esse, tamquam non ipse idem dicat.
Then the same person wonders at our saying that there is no loyalty except in the wise man, as if he himself did not say the same thing.
An tibi videtur fidem habere, qui referre gratiam nescit?
Or does he seem to you to have loyalty, who does not know how to return gratitude?
§81.13Desinant itaque infamare nos tam quam incredibilia iactantes et sciant apud sapientem esse ipsa honesta, apud vulgum simulacra rerum honestarum et effigies.
Therefore let them cease to defame us as if we were boasting of incredible things, and let them know that with the wise man are the honorable things themselves, but with the crowd are the shadows and images of honorable things.
Nemo referre gratiam scit nisi sapiens.
No one knows how to return gratitude except the wise man.
Stultus quoque, utcumque scit et quemadmodum potest, referat; scientia illi potius quam voluntas desit.
Let the fool also return it, however he knows and in whatever way he can; let knowledge rather than will be lacking to him.
Velle non discitur.
To will is not learned.
§81.14Sapiens inter se omnia conparabit, maius enim aut minus fit, quamvis idem sit, tempore, loco, causa, Saepe enim hoc non potuere divitiae in domum infusae, quod opportune dati mille denarii.
The wise man will compare all things among themselves; for a thing becomes greater or smaller, though it be the same, by time, place, and cause. For often riches poured into a house could not do this, which a thousand denarii given opportunely did.
Multum enim interest, donaveris an succurreris, servaverit illum tua liberalitas an instruxerit.
For it makes a great difference whether you have given a gift or brought help, whether your generosity has saved him or equipped him.
Saepe quod datur, exiguum est, quod sequitur ex eo, magnum.
Often what is given is small, but what follows from it is great.
Quantum autem existimas interesse, utrum aliquis quod derat a se, quod praestabat, sumpserit an beneficium acceperit ut daret?
But how great a difference do you think it makes, whether someone took from himself what was lacking, which he performed, or received a benefit in order to give?
§81.15Sed ne in eadem, quae satis scrutati sumus, revolvamur.
But lest we roll back into the same things, which we have sufficiently examined.
In hac conparatione beneficii et iniuriae vir bonus iudicabit quidem quod erit aequissimum, sed beneficio favebit; in hanc erit partem proclivior.
In this comparison of benefit and injury, the good man indeed will judge what will be most fair, but he will favor the benefit; he will be more inclined to this side.
§81.16Plurimum autem momenti persona solet adferre in rebus eiusmodi: "Dedisti mihi beneficium in servo, iniuriam fecisti in patre. Servasti mihi filium, sed patrem abstulisti.
But person usually brings the most weight in matters of this kind: "You gave me a benefit in the case of a slave, you did me an injury in the case of my father.
"Alia deinceps, per quae procedit omnis conlatio, prosequitur et, si pusillum erit, quod intersit, dissimulabit.
You saved my son, but you took away my father." He pursues other things in turn, through which all comparison proceeds, and if what difference there is is tiny, he will disregard it.
Etiam si multum fuerit, sed si id donari salva pietate ac fide poterit, remittet; id est, si ad ipsum tota pertinebit iniuria.
Even if it is much, but if it can be forgiven without violating piety and loyalty, he will remit it; that is, if the injury belongs entirely to himself.