§76.18Omnes actiones totius vitae honesti ac turpis respectu temperantur; ad haec faciendi et non faciendi ratio derigitur.
All actions of the whole of life are regulated by respect for what is honorable and what is shameful; toward doing or not doing these, the rule of action is directed.
Quid sit hoc, dicam: vir bonus quod honeste se facturum putaverit, faciet, etiam si laboriosum erit, faciet, etiam si damnosum erit, faciet, etiam si periculosum erit; rursus quod turpe erit, non faciet, etiam si pecuniam adferet, etiam si voluptatem, etiam si potentiam.
What this is, I shall explain: a good man will do what he thinks he ought to do honorably, even if it is laborious, he will do it, even if it is damaging, he will do it, even if it is dangerous; on the other hand, what is shameful he will not do, even if it brings money, even if pleasure, even if power.
Ab honesto nulla re deterrebitur, ad turpia nulla invitabitur.
He will be deterred from the honorable by nothing, and invited to the shameful by nothing.
§76.19Ergo si honestum utique secuturus est, turpe utique vitaturus et in omni actu vitae spectaturus haec duo, nec aliud bonum quam honestum nec aliud malum quam turpe, si una indepravata virtus est et sola permanet tenoris sui; unum est bonum virtus, cui iam accidere, ne sit bonum, non potest.
Therefore, if he is surely to follow what is honorable, surely to avoid what is shameful, and in every act of life to look to these two, holding neither any other thing as good except what is honorable, nor any other thing as evil except what is shameful, and if virtue alone is undamaged and remains the only thing of its own constant course; virtue is the one good, to which it can no longer happen that it is not a good.
Mutationis periculum effugit; stultitia ad sapientiam erepit, sapientia in stultitiam non revolvitur.
It escapes the danger of change; foolishness creeps up to wisdom, but wisdom is not turned back into foolishness.
§76.20Dixi, si forte meministi, concupita volgo et formidata inconsulto impetu plerosque calcasse.
I said, if you happen to remember, that most people have trampled underfoot, with a thoughtless impulse, things commonly desired and feared.
Inventus est, qui flammis inponeret manum, cuius risum non interrumperet tortor, qui in funere liberorum lacrimam non mitteret, qui morti non trepidus occurreret.
Someone has been found who would place his hand upon the flames, whose laughter the tormentor could not interrupt, who would not shed a tear at the funeral of his children, who would meet death without trembling.
Amor enim, ira, cupiditas pericula depoposcerunt.
For love, anger, and desire have demanded dangers.
Quod potest brevis obstinatio animi aliquo stimulo excitata, quanto magis virtus, quae non ex impetu nec subito, sed aequaliter valet, cui perpetuum robur est.
What a brief obstinacy of the mind, excited by some stimulus, can achieve, how much more can virtue achieve, which is powerful not from impulse nor suddenly, but uniformly, and which has everlasting strength.
§76.21Sequitur, ut quae ab inconsultis saepe contemnuntur, a sapientibus semper, ea nec bona sint nec mala.
It follows that those things which are often despised by the thoughtless, and always by the wise, are neither goods nor evils.
Unum ergo bonum ipsa virtus est, quae inter hanc fortunam et illam superba incedit cum magno utriusque contemptu.
The only good, therefore, is virtue itself, which walks proudly between this fortune and that, with great contempt for both.
§76.22Si hanc opinionem receperis, aliquid bonum esse praeter honestum, nulla non virtus laborabit.
If you accept this opinion, that there is some good besides what is honorable, every virtue will suffer.
Nulla enim optineri poterit, si quicquam extra se respexerit.
For none can be maintained if it looks to anything outside of itself.
Quod si est, rationi repugnat, ex qua virtutes sunt, et veritati, quae sine ratione non est.
If this is so, it is repugnant to reason, from which virtues come, and to truth, which is not without reason.
Quaecumque autem opinio veritati repugnat, falsa est.
But whatever opinion is repugnant to truth is false.
§76.23Virum bonum concedas necesse est summae pietatis erga deos esse.
You must admit that a good man is of the highest piety toward the gods.
Itaque quicquid illi accidit, aequo animo sustinebit; sciet enim id accidisse lege divina, qua universa procedunt.
Therefore, whatever happens to him, he will bear with an even mind; for he will know that it has happened by divine law, by which the universe proceeds.
Quod si est, unum illi bonum erit, quod honestum; in hoc enim positum est et parere dis nec excandescere ad subita nec deplorare sortem suam, sed patienter excipere fatum et facere imperata.
If this is so, there will be only one good for him, which is what is honorable; for in this is placed both obeying the gods, and not burning with anger at sudden events, and not deploring one's lot, but patiently receiving fate and doing what is commanded.
§76.24Si ullum aliud est bonum quam honestum, sequetur nos aviditas vitae, aviditas rerum vitam instruentium, quod est intolerabile, infinitum, vagum.
If there is any other good than what is honorable, we shall be pursued by a greed for life, a greed for things that equip life, which is intolerable, infinite, and wandering.
Solum ergo bonum est honestum, cui modus est.
Therefore, the only good is what is honorable, which has a limit.
§76.25Diximus futuram hominum feliciorem vitam quam deorum, si ea bona sunt, quorum nullus dis usus est, tamquam pecunia, honores.
We said that the life of men would be happier than that of the gods, if those things are goods of which the gods have no use, such as money and honors.
Adice nunc, quod si modo solutae corporibus animae manent, felicior illis status restat quam est, dum versantur in corpore.
Add now, that if only souls remain when freed from bodies, a happier state awaits them than exists while they are active in the body.
Atqui si ista bona sunt, quibus per corpora utimur, emissis erit peius, quod contra fidem est, feliciores esse liberis et in universum datis clausas et obsessas.
But if those things are goods which we use through our bodies, it will be worse for them when set free; which is contrary to belief, that the closed and besieged souls are happier than those that are free and given to the universe.
§76.26Illud quoque dixeram, si bona sunt ea, quae tam homini contingunt quam mutis animalibus, et muta animalia beatam vitam actura; quod fieri nullo modo potest.
I had also said, if those things are goods which happen to man as well as to dumb animals, then dumb animals will also lead a happy life; which can in no way happen.
Omnia pro honesto patienda sunt; quod non erat faciendum, si esset ullum aliud bonum quam honestum.
All things must be endured for the sake of what is honorable; which would not have had to be done, if there were any other good than what is honorable.
Haec quamvis latius exsecutus essem priore epistula, constrinxi et breviter percucurri.
Although I had discussed these things more at length in my former letter, I have condensed them and run through them briefly.