§71.18Academici veteres beatum quidem esse etiam inter hos cruciatus fatentur, sed non ad perfectum nec ad plenum.
The Old Academics indeed admit that a man is happy even among these tortures, but not to perfection nor to the full.
Quod nullo modo potest recipi; nisi beatus est, in summo bono non est.
This can in no way be accepted; unless he is happy, he is not in the supreme good.
Quod summum bonum est, supra se gradum non habet, si modo illi virtus inest, si illam adversa non minuunt, si manet etiam comminuto corpore incolumis; manet autem.
That which is the supreme good does not have a step above itself, if only virtue is in it, if adversity does not diminish it, if it remains unharmed even when the body is shattered; and indeed it does remain.
Virtutem enim intellego animosam et excelsam, quam incitat quicquid infestat.
For I understand virtue as something courageous and lofty, which whatever attacks it incites.
§71.19Hunc animum, quem saepe induunt generosae indolis iuvenes, quos alicuius honestae rei pulchritudo percussit, ut omnia fortuita contemnant, profecto sapientia nobis infundet et tradet.
This mind, which young men of noble disposition often put on, whom the beauty of some honorable thing has struck, so that they despise all fortuitous things, wisdom will surely infuse and deliver to us.
Persuadebit unum bonum esse, quod honestum; hoc nec remitti nec intendi posse, non magis quam regulam, qua rectum probari solet, flectes.
It will convince us that the only good is that which is honorable; that this can neither be relaxed nor strained, any more than you can bend a rule by which the straight is usually tested.
Quicquid ex illa mutaveris, iniuria est recti.
Whatever you change from it is an injury to the straight.
§71.20Idem ergo de virtute dicemus: et haec recta est, flexuram non recipit.
Therefore we shall say the same of virtue: this too is straight, it does not admit of bending.
Rigida re quid amplius intendi potest? Haec de omnibus rebus iudicat, de hac nulla.
What more can be strained in a rigid thing? This judges of all things, but nothing judges of this.
Si rectior ipsa non potest fieri, ne quae ab illa fiunt quidem alia aliis rectiora sunt.
If it cannot be made straighter itself, neither indeed are the things which are done by it any straighter one than another.
Huic enim necesse est respondeant; ita paria sunt.
For they must correspond to this; thus they are equal.
§71.21"Quid ergo?" inquis, "iacere in convivio et torqueri paria sunt?" Hoc mirum videtur tibi? Illud licet magis admireris;
"What then?" you say, "is reclining at a banquet and being tortured equal?" Does this seem strange to you?
iacere in convivio malum, in eculeo bonum est, si illud turpiter, hoc honeste fit.
You may wonder more at this: to recline at a banquet is an evil, to be on the rack is a good, if the former is done basely, the latter honorably.
Bona ista aut mala non efficit materia, sed virtus.
It is not the material that makes those things good or bad, but virtue.
Haec ubicumque apparuit, omnia eiusdem mensurae ac pretii sunt.
Wherever this has appeared, all things are of the same measure and value.
§71.22In oculos nunc mihi manus intentat ille, qui omnium animum aestimat ex suo, quod dicam paria bona esse honeste iudicantes et honeste pericli tantis, quod dicam paria bona esse eius, qui triumphat, et eius, qui ante currum vehitur invictus animo.
Now that man, who estimates the mind of all from his own, points his hand into my eyes, because I say that the goods of those who judge honorably and of those who face danger honorably are equal, because I say that the goods of him who triumphs and of him who is carried before the chariot undefeated in mind are equal.
Non putant enim fieri, quicquid facere non possunt; ex infirmitate sua de virtute ferunt sententiam.
For they do not think that whatever they cannot do can happen; they pass judgment on virtue from their own weakness.
§71.23Quid miraris, si uri, vulnerari, occidi, alligari iuvat, aliquando etiam libet? Luxurioso frugalitas poena est, pigro supplicii loco labor est, delicatus miseretur industrii, desidioso studere torqueri est.
Why do you wonder if being burned, wounded, killed, bound is pleasing, sometimes even well-pleasing? To the luxurious man, frugality is a punishment; to the lazy man, labor is in the place of torture; the delicate man pities the industrious; to the sluggish man, to study is to be tortured.
Eodem modo haec, ad quae omnes inbecilli sumus, dura atque intoleranda credimus, obliti, quam multis tormentum sit vino carere aut prima luce excitari.
In the same way, we believe these things, toward which we are all weak, to be hard and intolerable, forgetting to how many it is a torment to be without wine or to be roused at dawn.
Non ista difficilia sunt natura, sed nos fluvidi et enerves.
Those things are not difficult by nature, but we are fluid and nerve-less.
§71.24Magno, animo de rebus magnis iudicandum est; alioqui videbitur illarum vitium esse, quod nostrum est.
We must judge of great things with a great mind; otherwise, that will seem to be their defect which is ours.
Sic quaedam rectissime, cum in aquam demissa sunt, speciem curvi praefractique visentibus reddunt.
Thus certain things that are most straight, when they are immersed in water, return the appearance of being bent and broken to those who look at them.
Non tantum quid videas, sed quemadmodum, refert; animus noster ad vera perspicienda caligat.
It matters not only what you see, but how you see it; our mind is dim for perceiving the truth.
§71.25Da mihi adulescentem incorruptum et ingenio vegetum; dicet fortunatiorem sibi videri, qui omnia rerum adversarum onera rigida cervice sustollat, qui supra fortunam existat.
Give me a young man uncorrupted and vigorous in intellect; he will say that he who raises all the burdens of adversity with a rigid neck, who stands above fortune, seems happier to him.
Non mirum est in tranquillitate non concuti; illud mirare, ibi extolli aliquem ubi omnes deprimuntur, ibi stare ubi omnes iacent.
It is no wonder not to be shaken in tranquility; wonder at this, that someone is raised up where all are depressed, and stands where all lie down.
§71.26Quid est in tormentis, quid est in aliis, quae adversa appellamus, mali? Hoc, ut opinor, succidere mentem et incurvari et succumbere.
What is there of evil in tortures, what in other things which we call adversity? This, as I think: that the mind sinks, and is bent, and succumbs.
Quorum nihil sapienti viro potest evenire; stat rectus sub quolibet pondere.
None of these can happen to a wise man; he stands straight under any weight whatsoever.
Nulla illum res minorem facit; nihil illi eorum, quae ferenda sunt, displicet.
No thing makes him lesser; nothing of those things which must be borne displeases him.
Nam quicquid cadere in hominem potest, in se cecidisse non queritur.
For whatever can fall upon a man, he does not complain that it has fallen upon himself.
Vires suas novit.
He knows his own strength.
Scit se esse oneri ferendo.
He knows that he is capable of bearing the burden.
§71.27Non educo sapientem ex hominum numero nec dolores ab illo sicut ab aliqua rupe nullum sensum admittente summoveo.
I do not withdraw the wise man from the category of men, nor do I remove pains from him as if from some rock admitting no sensation.
Memini ex duabus illum partibus esse compositum; altera est inrationalis, haec mordetur, uritur, dolet; altera rationalis, haec inconcussas opiniones habet, in trepida est et indomita.
I remember that he is composed of two parts: one is irrational, this is bitten, burned, hurts; the other is rational, this has unshaken opinions, is fearless and unconquered.
In hac positum est summum illud hominis bonum.
In this is placed that supreme good of man.
Antequam impleatur, incerta mentis volutatio est; cum vero perfectum est, inmota illa stabilitas est.
Before it is filled, there is an uncertain wavering of the mind; but when it is perfected, that is an immovable stability.