§66.45Nec est, quare hoc inter nostra placita mireris; apud Epicurum duo bona sunt, ex quibus summum illud beatumque conponitur, ut corpus sine dolore sit, animus sine perturbatione.
And there is no reason why you should wonder at this among our tenets; with Epicurus there are two goods, from which that supreme and happy life is composed, namely, that the body be without pain, and the mind without perturbation.
Haec bona non crescunt, si plena sunt.
These goods do not grow, if they are full.
Quo enim crescet, quod plenum est? Dolore corpus caret; quid ad hanc accedere indolentiam potest? Animus constat sibi et placidus est; quid accedere ad hanc tranquillitatem potest?
For whither will that which is full grow? The body lacks pain; what can be added to this painlessness? The mind is consistent with itself and is placid; what can be added to this tranquillity?
§66.46Quemadmodum serenitas caeli non recipit maiorem adhuc claritatem in sincerissimum nitorem repurgata, sic hominis corpus animumque curantis et bonum suum ex utroque nectentis perfectus est status et summam voti sui invenit, si nec aestus animo est nec dolor corpori.
Just as the serenity of the sky does not admit any greater clarity once it has been purified into the sheerest brightness, so the state of a man caring for his body and mind and weaving his good from both is perfect and finds the summit of his wish, if there is neither passion in his mind nor pain in his body.
Si qua extra blandimenta contingunt, non augent summum bonum, sed ut ita dicam, condiunt et oblectant.
If any external allurements happen to supervene, they do not increase the supreme good, but, so to speak, season and delight it.
Absolutum enim illud humanae naturae bonum corporis et animi pace contentum est.
For that absolute good of human nature is content with the peace of body and mind.
§66.47Dabo apud Epicurum tibi etiamnunc simillimam huic nostrae divisionem bonorum.
I will give you even now, under Epicurus, a division of goods very similar to this of ours.
Alia enim sunt apud illum, quae malit contingere sibi, ut corporis quietem ab omni incommodo liberam et animi remissionem bonorum suorum contemplatione gaudentis.
For there are some goods with him which he would prefer to happen to himself, such as a bodily rest free from all trouble, and a relaxation of the mind rejoicing in the contemplation of its own goods.
Alia sunt, quae quamvis nolit accidere, nihilominus laudat et conprobat, tamquam illam, quam paulo ante dicebam, malae valetudinis et dolorum gravissimorum perpessionem, in qua Epicurus fuit illo summo ac fortunatissimo die suo.
There are others which, although he would not wish them to happen, he nevertheless praises and approves, such as that endurance of ill health and of the gravest pains which I was speaking of a little while ago, in which Epicurus was on that last and most fortunate day of his.
Ait enim se vesicae et exul erati ventris tormenta tolerare ulteriorem doloris accessionem non recipientia, esse nihilominus sibi illum beatum diem.
For he says that he is tolerating the torments of his bladder and of his ulcerated belly, which admit no further addition of pain, and that that day is nevertheless happy for him.
Beatum autem agere, nisi qui est in summo bono, non potest.
But one cannot lead a happy life unless one is in the supreme good.
§66.48Ergo et apud Epicurum sunt haec bona, quae malles non experiri, sed quia ita res tulit, et amplexanda et laudanda et exaequanda summis sunt.
Therefore, even with Epicurus, there are these goods which you would prefer not to experience, but because circumstance has so brought it, they are both to be embraced and praised and made equal to the highest.
Non potest dici, hoc non esse par maximis bonum, quod beatae vitae clausulam inposuit, cui Epicurus extrema voce gratias egit.
It cannot be said that this is not a good equal to the greatest, which imposed the conclusion of a happy life, for which Epicurus with his last voice gave thanks.
§66.49Permitte mihi, Lucili virorum optime, aliquid audacius dicere: si ulla bona maiora esse aliis possent, haec ego, quae tristia videntur, mollibus illis et debeatis praetulissem, haec maiora dixissem.
Permit me, Lucilius, best of men, to say something rather bold: if any goods could be greater than others, I would have preferred these, which seem sad, to those soft and delicate ones; I would have called these greater.
Maius est enim difficilia perfringere quam laeta moderari.
For it is greater to break through difficulties than to moderate joyful things.
§66.50Eadem ratione fit, scio, ut aliquis felicitatem bene et ut calamitatem fortiter ferat.
By the same reasoning, I know, it happens that someone bears prosperity well and adversity bravely.
Aeque esse fortis potest, qui pro vallo securus excubuit nullis hostibus castra temptantibus et qui succisis poplitibus in genua se excepit nec arma dimisit; "macte virtute esto "sanguinolentis ex acie redeuntibus dicitur.
He can be equally brave who, secure, kept watch before the rampart with no enemies attacking the camp, and he who, with his knees cut, received himself upon his knees and did not let go of his weapons; 'hail to your valor!' is said to those returning bloody from the battle line.
Itaque haec magis laudaverim bona exercita et fortia et cum fortuna rixata.
Therefore, I would rather praise these goods, exercised and brave and having struggled with fortune.
§66.51Ego dubitem, quin magis laudem truncam illam et retorridam manum Mucii quam cuiuslibet fortissimi salvam? Stetit hostium flammarumque contemptor et manum suam in hostili foculo destillantem perspectavit, donec Porsenna, cuius poenae favebat, gloriae invidit et ignem invito eripi iussit.
Should I doubt whether I would praise more that mutilated and shriveled hand of Mucius than the intact hand of any of the bravest? He stood, a despiser of enemies and flames, and gazed at his hand dripping in the enemy's brazier, until Porsenna, who favored his happiness of punishing him, envied his glory and ordered the fire to be snatched away from him against his will.
§66.52Hoc bonum quidni inter prima numerem tantoque maius putem quam illa secura et intemptata fortunae, quanto rarius est hostem amissa manu vicisse quam armata? "Quid ergo?" inquis, "hoc bonum tibi optabis? "Quidni? Hoc enim nisi qui potest et optare, non potest facere.
Why should I not number this good among the primary, and think it as much greater than those secure and unattempted by fortune, as it is rarer to have conquered an enemy with a lost hand than with an armed one? 'What then?' you say, 'will you wish this good for yourself?' Why not? For unless one can also wish this, one cannot do it.
§66.53An potius optem, ut malaxandos articulos exoletis meis porrigam? Ut muliercula aut aliquis in mulierculam ex viro versus digitulos meos ducat? Quidni ego feliciorem putem Mucium, quod sic tractavit ignem, quasi illam manum tractatori praestitisset? In integrum restituit quidquid erraverat;
Or should I rather wish that I may extend my joints to be softened by my pampered minions? That a petty woman, or someone turned from a man into a petty woman, should pull my fingers? Why should I not think Mucius happier, because he handled the fire in such a way as if he had presented that hand to a masseur?
confecit bellum inermis ac mancus et illa manu trunca reges duos vicit.
He restored to completeness whatever he had erred; he finished the war unarmed and maimed, and with that mutilated hand conquered two kings.
VALE.
FAREWELL.