§121.9Ergo omnibus constitutionis suae sensus est et inde membrorum tam expedita tractatio, nec ullum maius indicium habemus cum hac illa ad vivendum venire notitia, quam quod nullum animal ad usum sui rude est. "
Therefore, in all animals there is a sense of their own constitution, and from this comes such ready handling of their limbs; nor do we have any greater proof that they come to life with this knowledge than the fact that no animal is unskilled in the use of itself.
§121.10Constitutio," inquit, "est, ut vos dicitis, principale animi quodam modo se habens erga corpus.
"Constitution," he says, "is, as you say, the ruling part of the soul in a certain state toward the body.
Hoc tam perplexum et subtile et vobis quoque vix enarrabile quomodo infans intellegit? Omnia animalia dialectica nasci oportet, ut istam finitionem magnae parti hominum togatorum obscuram intellegant. "Verum erat quod opponis, si ego ab animalibus constitutionis finitionem intellegi dicerem, non ipsam constitutionem.
How does an infant understand this, which is so complex and subtle and scarcely explainable even to you? All animals must be born logicians so that they may understand that definition, which is obscure to a large part of toga-wearing men." Your objection would be true if I were saying that the definition of constitution is understood by animals, and not the constitution itself.
§121.11Facilius natura intellegitur quam enarratur; itaque infans ille quid sit constitutio non novit, constitutionem suam novit.
Nature is more easily understood than explained; therefore, that infant does not know what a constitution is, but knows his own constitution.
Et quid sit animal, nescit, animal esse se sentit.
And he does not know what an animal is, but feels himself to be an animal.
§121.12Praeterea ipsam constitutionem suam crasse intellegit et summatim et obscure.
Moreover, he understands his own constitution itself roughly, generally, and obscurely.
Nos quoque animum habere nos scimus; quid sit animus, ubi sit, qualis sit aut unde, nescimus.
We also know that we have a soul; yet we do not know what the soul is, where it is, what kind of thing it is, or whence it comes.
Qualis ad nos animi nostri sensus, quamvis naturam eius ignoremus ac sedem, talis ad omnia animalia constitutionis suae sensus est.
Just as our sense of our own soul is for us, although we are ignorant of its nature and seat, so is the sense of their own constitution for all animals.
Necesse est enim id sentiant, per quod alia quoque sentiunt, necesse est eius sensum habeant, cui parent, a quo reguntur.
For they must feel that through which they feel other things as well; they must have a sense of that which they obey and by which they are ruled.
§121.13Nemo non ex nobis intellegit esse aliquid, quod impetus suos moveat; quid sit illud ignorat.
There is no one among us who does not understand that there is something that moves his impulses, though he is ignorant of what it is.
Et conatum sibi esse scit; quis sit aut unde sit, nescit.
And he knows that he has an impulse; but what it is or whence it comes, he does not know.
Sic infantibus quoque animalibusque principalis partis suae sensus est non satis dilucidus nec expressus.
Thus for infants and animals also, the sense of their ruling part exists, though not sufficiently clear or distinct.
§121.14"Dicitis," inquit, "omne animal primum constitutioni suae conciliari, hominis autem constitutionem rationalem esse et ideo conciliari hominem sibi non tamquam animali, sed tamquam rationali.
"You say," he says, "that every animal is first reconciled to its own constitution, but that man's constitution is rational, and therefore man is reconciled to himself not as an animal, but as a rational being.
Ea enim parte sibi carus est homo, qua homo est.
For man is dear to himself in that part by which he is man.
Quomodo ergo infans conciliari constitutioni rationali potest, cum rationalis nondum sit? "Unicuique aetati sua constitutio est, alia infanti, alia puero, alia seni; omnes ei constitutioni conciliantur in qua sunt.
How then can an infant be reconciled to a rational constitution, when he is not yet rational?" Each age has its own constitution—one for the infant, another for the boy, another for the old man; all are reconciled to that constitution in which they are.
§121.15Infans sine dentibus est: huic constitutioni suae conciliatur.
An infant is without teeth; he is reconciled to this constitution of his.
Enati sunt dentes; huic constitutioni conciliatur.
Teeth have grown; he is reconciled to this constitution.
Nam et illa herba, quae in segetem frugemque ventura est, aliam constitutionem habet tenera et vix eminens sulco, aliam, cum convaluit et molli quidem culmo, sed quo ferat onus suum, constitit, aliam cum flavescit et ad aream spectat et spica eius induruit; in quamcumque constitutionem venit, eam tuetur, in eam componitur.
For even that blade of grass, which is destined to become wheat and grain, has one constitution when tender and barely rising from the furrow, another when it has grown strong and stands with a stem that is indeed soft but sufficient to bear its burden, and another when it turns yellow and looks toward the threshing-floor and its ear has hardened; into whatever constitution it comes, it guards that one and is adapted to it.
§121.16Alia est aetas infantis, pueri, adulescentis, senis; ego tamen idem sum, qui et infans fui et puer et adulescens.
The age of the infant, the boy, the youth, and the old man is different; yet I am the same person who was also an infant and a boy and a youth.
Sic, quamvis alia atque aha cuique constitutio sit, conciliatio constitutionis suae eadem est.
Thus, although there is one constitution after another for each person, the reconciliation to one's own constitution is the same.
Non enim puerum mihi aut iuvenem aut senem, sed me natura commendat.
For nature does not commend to me a boy or a young man or an old man, but myself.
Ergo infans ei constitutam* suae conciliatur, quae tunc infanti est, non quae futura iuveni est.
Therefore, an infant is reconciled to that constitution of his which belongs to the infant at that time, not to that which will belong to the young man in the future.
Neque enim, si aliquid illi maius in quod transeat, restat, non hoc quoque in quo nascitur, secundum naturam est.
For even if there remains something greater for him to pass into, this condition in which he is born is also none the less in accordance with nature.
§121.17Primum sibi ipsum conciliatur animal, debet enim aliquid esse, ad quod alia referantur, voluptatem peto, cui? Mihi.
First of all, the animal is reconciled to itself; for there must be something to which other things are referred. I seek pleasure; for whom? For myself.
Ergo mei curam ago.
Therefore, I take care of myself.
Dolorem refugio, pro quo? Pro me.
I avoid pain; for whom? For myself.
Ergo mei curam ago.
Therefore, I take care of myself.
Si omnia propter curam mei facio, ante omnia est mei cura.
If I do all things on account of the care of myself, the care of myself is before all things.
Haec animalibus inest cunctis nec inseritur, sed innascitur.
This is inborn in all animals, and is not engrafted but born with them.