§118.9Quidam ita finierunt: "bonum est, quod petitionem sui movet, vel quod impetum animi tendentis ad se movet. "Et huic idem opponitur; multa enim impetum animi movent, quae petantur petentium malo.
Some have defined it thus: "The good is that which excites a desire for itself, or which excites the impulse of a mind tending toward itself." And to this the same objection is made; for many things excite the impulse of the mind, which are sought to the harm of those who seek them.
Melius illi, qui ita finierunt: "bonum est, quod ad se impetum animi secundum naturam movet et ita demum petendum est, cum coepit esse expetendum," Iam et honestum est; hoc enim est perfecte petendum.
Those have defined it better who spoke thus: "The good is that which excites the impulse of the mind in accordance with nature toward itself, and is to be sought in this way only when it has begun to be an object of desire." Now it is also the honorable; for this is what is perfectly to be sought.
§118.10Locus ipse me admonet, ut quid intersit inter bonum honestumque dicam.
The subject itself warns me to state what difference there is between the good and the honorable.
Aliquid inter se mixtum habent et inseparabile: nec potest bonum esse, nisi cui aliquid honesti inest, et honestum utique bonum est.
They have something mixed and inseparable between them: there cannot be a good unless some element of the honorable is in it, and the honorable is certainly a good.
Quid ergo inter duo interest? Honestum est perfectum bonum, quo beata vita completur, cuius contactu alia quoque bona fiunt.
What, then, is the difference between the two? The honorable is the perfect good, by which the happy life is completed, and by whose touch other things also become goods.
§118.11Quod dico, talest: sunt quaedam neque bona neque mala, tamquam militia, legatio, iurisdictio.
What I mean is this: there are certain things neither good nor bad, such as military service, an embassy, or the administration of justice.
Haec cum honeste administrata sunt, bona esse incipiunt et ex dubio in bonum transeunt.
When these have been honorably administered, they begin to be goods, and they pass from a doubtful state into a good.
Bonum societate honesti fit, honestum per se bonum est.
A good comes into being through association with the honorable; the honorable is a good of itself.
Bonum ex honesto fluit, honestum ex se est.
A good flows from the honorable; the honorable is from itself.
Quod bonum est, malum esse potuit; quod honestum est, nisi bonum esse non potuit.
What is a good could have been an evil; what is honorable could not have been anything but a good.
§118.12Hanc quidam finitionem reddiderunt: "bonum est, quod secundum naturam est. "Attende, quid dicam: quod bonum, est secundum naturam; non protinus quod secundum naturam est, etiam bonum est.
Some have offered this definition: "The good is that which is in accordance with nature." Attend to what I say: what is good is in accordance with nature; it does not follow immediately that what is in accordance with nature is also a good.
Multa naturae quidem consentiunt, sed tam pusilla sunt, ut non conveniat illis boni nomen.
Many things indeed agree with nature, but they are so petty that the name of good does not suit them.
Levia enim sunt, contemnenda.
For they are slight and to be disregarded.
Nullum est minimum contemnendum bonum; nam quamdiu exiguum est, bonum non est; cum bonum esse coepit, non est exiguum.
There is no minimum good that is to be disregarded; for as long as it is small, it is not a good; when it begins to be a good, it is not small.
Unde adcognoscitur bonum? Si perfecte secundum naturam est.
How is the good recognized? If it is perfectly in accordance with nature.
§118.13"Fateris," inquis, "quod bonum est, secundum naturam esse; haec eius proprietas est.
"You admit," you say, "that what is good is in accordance with nature; this is its property.
Fateris et alia secundum naturam quidem esse, sed bona non esse.
You admit also that other things are indeed in accordance with nature, but are not goods.
Quomodo ergo illud bonum est, cum haec non sint? Quomodo ad aliam proprietatem' pervenit, cum utrique praecipuum illud commune sit, secundum naturam esse?" §118.14Ipsa scilicet magnitudine.
How, then, is the former a good while these are not? How does it arrive at a different property, when that chief characteristic is common to both, namely, to be in accordance with nature?" By its very magnitude, of course.
Nec*' hoc novum est, quaedam crescendo mutari.
Nor is this new, that certain things are changed by growing.
Infans fuit; factus est pubes, alia eius proprietas fit.
He was an infant; he has become a youth, and a different property becomes his.
Ille enim inrationalis est, hic rationalis.
For the former is irrational, the latter rational.
Quaedam incremento non tantum in maius exeunt, sed in aliud.
Certain things by growth do not merely turn out larger, but different.
§118.15"Non fit," inquit, "aliud quod maius fit.
"That which becomes larger," he says, "does not become different.
Utrum lagonam an dolium impleas vino, nihil refert; in utroque proprietas vini est.
Whether you fill a jar or a cask with wine makes no difference; in both is the property of wine.
Et exiguum mellis pondus et magnum sapore non differt. "Diversa ponis exempla; in istis enim eadem qualitas est; quamvis augeantur, manet.
And a small weight of honey and a large one do not differ in taste." You are bringing forward different kinds of examples; for in those cases the same quality is present; although they are increased, it remains.
§118.16Quaedam amplificata in suo genere et in sua proprietate perdurant.
Some things, when amplified, persist in their own class and in their own property.
Quaedam post multa incrementa ultima demum vertit adiectio et novam illis aliamque quam in qua fuerunt, condicionem inprimit.
Other things, after many increases, are finally turned by the ultimate addition, which imprints on them a new condition, different from that in which they were.
Unus lapis facit fornicem, ille, qui latera inclinata cuneavit et interventu suo vinxit.
A single stone makes the arch—that one which wedges the sloping sides and binds them by its intervention.
Summa adiectio quare plurimum facit vel exigua? Quia non auget, sed implet.
Why does the final addition, even if tiny, do the most? Because it does not increase, but fills.
§118.17Quaedam processu priorem exuunt formam et in novam transeunt.
Certain things by progress cast off their former shape and pass into a new one.
Ubi aliquid animus diu protulit et magnitudinem eius sequendo lassatus est, infinitum coepit vocari. Quod longe aliud factum est quam fuit, cum magnum videretur, sed finitum.
When the mind has extended something for a long time and is exhausted by following its magnitude, it begins to be called "infinite." It has become something far different from what it was when it seemed large but finite.
Eodem modo aliquid difficulter secari cogitavimus; novissime crescente hac difficultate insecabile inventum est. Sic ab eo, quod vix et aegre movebatur, processimus ad inmobile. Eadem ratione aliquid secundum naturam fuit; hoc in aliam proprietatem magnitudo sua transtulit et bonum fecit.
In the same way, we thought of something as being cut with difficulty; at last, as this difficulty increased, it was found to be "indivisible." Thus, from that which was moved with difficulty and effort, we proceeded to the "immobile." By the same reasoning, something was in accordance with nature; its magnitude transferred this into another property and made it a good.
Vale.
Farewell.