§9.2.78nam rectum genius adprobari nisi maximis viribus non potest; haec deverticula et anfractus suffugia sunt infirmitatis, ut qui cursu parum valent, flexu eludant, cum haec, quae adfectatur, ratio sententiarum non procul a ratione iocandi abhorreat.
For the direct style cannot be approved except by the greatest powers; these detours and windings are the refuges of weakness, just as those who are not strong enough in running elude pursuit by a turn, especially since this system of figures, which is affected, is not far removed from the manner of joking.
adiuvat etiam, quod auditor gaudet intelligere, et favet ingenio suo et alio dicente se laudat.
It also helps that the hearer rejoices to understand, flatters his own intellect, and praises himself while another is speaking.
§9.2.79itaque non solum, si persona obstaret rectae orationi, (quo in genere saepius modo quam figuris opus est) decurrebant ad schemata, sed faciebant illis locum etiam, ubi inutiles ac nefariae essent, ut si pater, qui infamem in matrem filium secreto occidisset, reus malae tractationis iacularetur in uxorem obliquis sententiis.
Therefore, they did not only run to figures if a person stood in the way of direct speech (in which class of case there is more often need for moderation than for figures), but they made room for them even where they were useless and wicked, as if a father, who had secretly killed his son for being infamous toward his mother, being accused of ill-treatment, should hurl oblique sentiments at his wife.
nam quid impurius, quam retinuisse talem?
For what is more impure than to have retained such a woman?
§9.2.80quid porro tam contrarium quam eum, qui accusetur, quia summum nefas suspicatus de uxore videatur, confirmare id ipsa defensione, quod diluendum est? at si iudicum sumerent animum, scirent, quam eiusmodi actionem laturi non fuissent, multoque etiam minus, cum in parentes abominanda crimina spargerentur.
What, moreover, is so contrary as that he who is accused, because he seems to have suspected the greatest wickedness in his wife, should confirm by his very defense that which ought to be cleared away? But if they were to assume the mind of the judges, they would know how they would not have tolerated such a pleading, and much less indeed when abominable charges were scattered against parents.
§9.2.81et quatenus huc incidimus, paulo plus scholis demus.
And since we have stumbled upon this point, let us give a little more to the schools.
nam et in his educatur orator, et in eo, quomodo declamatur, positum est etiam, quomodo agatur.
For in these, too, the orator is trained, and on how one declaims depends also how one pleads.
dicendum ergo de iis quoque, in quibus non asperas figuras, sed palam contrarias causae plerique fecerunt: tyrannidis adfectatae damnatis torqueatur, ut conscios indicet; accusator eius optet, quod volet.
We must therefore speak also of those cases in which many have made figures that are not merely harsh, but openly contrary to their cause: let one condemned for affecting tyranny be tortured to name his accomplices; let his accuser choose what reward he wishes.
patrem quidam damnavit, optat, ne is torqueatur; paler ei contra dicit.
A certain man has condemned his father, and chooses that he should not be tortured; the father speaks against him.
§9.2.82nemo se tenuit agens pro patre, quin figuras in filium faceret, tanquam illum conscium in tormentis nominaturus.
No one, in pleading for the father, restrained himself from making figures against the son, as if he were going to name him as an accomplice in the tortures.
quo quid stultius? nam cum hoc iudices intellexerint, aut non torquebitur, cum ideo torqueri velit, aut torto non credetur.
What could be more foolish than this? For when the judges have understood this, either he will not be tortured, since he wishes to be tortured for this reason, or he will not be believed when tortured.
§9.2.83at credibile est, hoc eum velle.
But it is credible that he wishes this.
fortasse; dissimulet ergo, ut efficiat.
Perhaps; let him therefore disguise it, so that he may achieve it.
sed nobis (declamatoribus dico) quid proderit hoc intellexisse, nisi dixerimus? ergo, si vere ageretur, similiter consilium illud latens prodidissemus? quid? si neque utique verum est, et habere alias hic damnatus contradicendi causas potest, vel quod legem conservandam putet, vel quod nolit accusatori debere beneficium, vel (quod ego maxime sequerer) ut innocentem se esse in tormentis pertendat?
But what will it profit us (I speak of declaimers) to have understood this, unless we say it? Therefore, if it were pleaded in a real case, would we likewise have betrayed that hidden plan? What if this is not at all true, and this condemned man can have other reasons for opposing, either because he thinks the law ought to be preserved, or because he does not wish to owe a favor to his accuser, or (which I would especially follow) so that he may persist in tortures that he is innocent?
§9.2.84quare ne illud quidem semper succurret sic dicentibus, patrocinium hoc voluit, qui controversiam finxit. fortasse enim noluit; sed esto, voluerit: continuone, si ille stulte cogitavit, nobis quoque stulte dicendum est? at ego in causis agendis frequenter non puto intuendum, quid litigator velit.
Therefore, not even that excuse will always help those who speak thus: "the one who devised the controversy wished for this defense." For perhaps he did not wish it; but let it be that he did: is it therefore necessary that, if he thought foolishly, we also must speak foolishly? But I, in pleading cases, frequently think we ought not to look to what the litigant wishes.
§9.2.85est et ille in hoc genere frequens error, ut putent aliud quosdam dicere aliud velle, praecipue cum in themate est aliquem, ut sibi mori liceat, postulare, ut in illa controversia, qui aliquando fortiter fecerat et alio bello petierat, ut militia vacaret ex lege quod quinquagenarius esset, adversante filio ire in aciem coactus deseruit.
There is also that frequent error in this genre, that they think some people say one thing and wish another, especially when it is in the theme that someone petitions for permission to die, as in that controversy where a man, who had once acted bravely and in another war had petitioned that he should be exempt from military service by law because he was fifty years old, was forced to go into battle by his opposing son and deserted.
filius, qui fortiter eodem proelio fecerat, incolumitatem eius optat; contra dicit pater.
The son, who had acted bravely in the same battle, chooses his safety; the father speaks against it.
"non enim,"
inquiunt,
"mori vult, sed invidiam filio facere. " §9.2.86equidem rideo, quod illi sic timent tanquam ipsi morituri et in consilium suos metus ferunt, obliti tot exemplorum circa voluntariam mortem, causarum quoque, quas habet factus ex viro forti desertor. sed de una controversia loqui supervacuum est.
"For he does not," they say, "wish to die, but to bring hatred upon his son." For my part, I laugh because they fear thus as if they themselves were about to die, and bring their own fears into deliberation, forgetting so many examples concerning voluntary death, and also the causes which a deserter who has been made from a brave man possesses. But to speak of a single controversy is superfluous.