§9.2.1ergo cui latius complecti conformationes verborum ac sententiarum placuerit, habet quod sequatur nec adfirmare ausim quicquam esse melius; sed haec ad propositi mei rationem legat.
Therefore, whoever has been pleased to embrace more widely the conformations of words and thoughts has something to follow, nor would I dare to assert that anything is better; but let him read these things in relation to the plan of my purpose.
nam mihi de his sententiarum figuris dicere in animo est, quae ab illo simplici modo indicandi recedunt; quod item multis doctissimis viris video placuisse.
For I intend to speak of those figures of thought which depart from that simple mode of declaring; which I see has likewise pleased many very learned men.
§9.2.2omnia tamen illa, etiam quae sunt alterius modi lumina, adeo sunt virtutes orationis ut sine iis nulla intelligi fere possit oratio.
Yet all those, even those which are the lights of the other kind, are so much the virtues of speech that without them almost no speech can be understood.
nam quomodo iudex doceri potest, si desit illustris explanatio, propositio, promissio, finitio, seiunctio, expositio sententiae suae, rationis apta conclusio, praemunitio, similitudo, exemplum, digestio, distributio, interpellatio, interpellantis coercitio, contentio, purgatio, laesio?
For how can a judge be taught if there is lacking clear explanation, proposition, promise, definition, separation, exposition of one's own opinion, a fitting conclusion of a reason, pre-fortification, similarity, example, digestion, distribution, interruption, the restraining of an interrupter, comparison, justification, or attack?
§9.2.3quid vero agit omnino eloquentia detractis amplificandi minuendique rationibus? quarum prior desiderat illam plus quam dixeris significationem, id est ἔμφασιν, et supralationem veritatis et traiectionem; haec altera extenuationem deprecationemque.
Indeed, what does eloquence do at all if the methods of amplifying and diminishing are taken away? The former of these requires that signification of more than you have said, that is, ἔμφασιν, and the hyperbole of truth and transference; the latter requires extenuation and deprecation.
qui adfectus erunt vel concitati detracta voce libera et effrenatiore, iracundia, obiurgatione, optatione, exsecratione? vel illi mitiores, nisi adiuvantur commendatione, conciliatione, ad hilaritatem impulsione?
What passions will there be, even excited ones, if free and more unbridled speech, anger, chiding, wishing, and cursing are taken away? Or those milder ones, unless they are aided by recommendation, conciliation, and incitement to mirth?
§9.2.4quae delectatio aut quod mediocriter saltem docti hominis indicium, nisi alia repetitione, alia commoratione infigere, digredi a re et redire ad propositum suum scierit, removere a se, in alium traiicere, quae relinquenda, quae contemnenda sint iudicare? motus est in his orationis atque actus, quibus detractis iacet et velut agitante corpus spiritu caret.
What pleasure or what proof of even a moderately learned man can there be, unless he knows how to impress one thing by repetition, another by lingering, to digress from the matter and return to his purpose, to remove from himself, to transfer to another, to judge what should be left and what should be despised? The movement and action of speech are in these, and if they are taken away, it lies flat and is as if lacking the breath that moves the body.
§9.2.5quae cum adesse debent, tum disponenda atque varianda sunt, ut auditorem, quod in fidibus fieri videmus, omni sono mulceant.
And these not only must be present, but they must be arranged and varied so that, as we see done with stringed instruments, they may soothe the hearer with every sound.
verum ea plerumque recta sunt nec se fingunt, sed confitentur.
But these are for the most part straightforward and do not disguise themselves, but declare themselves.
admittunt autem, ut dixi, figuras, quod vel ex proxima doceri potest.
However, they admit figures, as I have said, which can be shown even from the nearest example.
§9.2.6quid enim tam commune quam interrogare vel percontari? nam utroque utimur indifferenter, quanquam alterum noscendi, alterum arguendi gratia videtur adhiberi.
For what is so common as to ask or to inquire? For we use both indifferently, although one seems to be employed for the sake of knowing, the other for the sake of arguing.
at ea res, utrocunque dicitur modo, etiam multiplex habet schema.
But that thing, in whichever way it is spoken, also has a multiple schema.
incipiamus enim ab iis, quibus acrior ac vehementior fit probatio, quod primo loco posuimus.
Let us begin indeed with those by which proof becomes sharper and more vehement, which we placed in the first spot.
§9.2.7simplex est sic rogare,
"
sed vos qui tandem? quibus aut venistis ab oris?
"
Figuratum autem, quotiens non sciscitandi gratia adsumitur, sed instandi, quid enim tuus ille, Tubero, destrictus in acie Pharsalica gladius agebat? et, quousque tandem abutere, Catilina, patientia nostra? et, patere tua consilia non sentis? et totus denique hic locus.
It is simple to ask thus: "But you, who indeed are you? Or from what shores have you come?" But it is figured whenever it is assumed not for the sake of inquiring, but of pressing: "For what was that sword of yours, Tubero, drawn in the Pharsalian battle-line, doing?" and, "How long indeed, Catiline, will you abuse our patience?" and, "Do you not perceive that your plans are open?" and finally, this whole passage.
§9.2.8quanto enim magis ardet quam si diceretur, diu abuteris patientia nostra, et patent tua consilia. interrogamus etiam quod negari non possit, dixitne tandem causam C. Fidiculanius Falcula? aut ubi respondendi difficilis est ratio, ut vulgo uti solemus, quo modo? §9.2.9qui fieri potest? aut invidiae gratia, ut Medea apud Senecam, quas peti terras iubes? aut miserationis, ut Sinon apud Vergilium,
"
heu quae me tellus, inquit, quae me aequora possunt
accipere?
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aut instandi et auferendae dissimulationis, ut Asinius, audisne? furiosum, inquam, non inofficiosum testamentum reprehendimus.
For how much more does it burn than if it were said, "You have long abused our patience, and your plans are open." We also ask what cannot be denied: "Did Gaius Fidiculanius Falcula indeed plead his cause?" Or when the manner of answering is difficult, as we are commonly accustomed to use: "In what way?" "How can it be?" Or for the sake of exciting hatred, as Medea in Seneca: "What lands do you command me to seek?" Or of pity, as Sinon in Virgil: "Alas, what land, he says, what seas can receive me?" Or of pressing and removing dissimulation, as Asinius: "Do you hear?
§9.2.10totum hoc plenum est varietatis; nam et indignationi convenit:
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et quisquam numen Iunonis adoret?
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et admirationi:
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quid non mortalia pectora cogis,
auri sacra fames?
" §9.2.11est interim acrius imperandi genus:
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non arma expedient totaque ex urbe sequentur?
"
et ipsi nosmet rogamus, quale est illud Terentianum quid igitur faciam?
We find fault with a mad, not an undutiful, will, I say." This whole thing is full of variety; for it is suited also to indignation: "And will anyone adore the divinity of Juno?" and to wonder: "To what do you not drive mortal hearts, accursed hunger for gold?" There is sometimes a sharper kind of commanding: "Will they not make ready arms and follow from the whole city?" and we ask our very selves, of which kind is that Terentian: "What then shall I do?"