§9.1.10est autem non mediocris inter auctores dissensio, et quae vis nominis eius et quot genera et quae quamque multae sint species.
But there is no small disagreement among authors as to what the force of its name is, how many classes there are, and what and how numerous are its species.
quare primum intuendum est, quid accipere debeamus figuram. nam duobus modis dicitur: uno qualiscunque forma sententiae, sicut in corporibus, quibus, quoquo modo sunt composita, utique habitus est aliquis; §9.1.11altero, quo proprie schema dicitur, in sensu vel sermone aliqua a vulgari et simplici specie cum ratione mutatio, sicut nos sedemus, incumbimus, respicimus.
Therefore, we must first look into what we ought to understand by "figure." For it is used in two ways: in one, it is any form of thought, just as in bodies, which, in whatever way they are composed, certainly have some posture; in the other, by which it is properly called "schema," it is some change with a reason in meaning or language from the common and simple appearance, just as we sit, lean, or look back.
itaque cum in eosdem casus aut tempora aut numeros aut etiam pedes continuo quis aut certe nimium frequenter incurrit, praecipere solemus variandas figuras esse vitandae similitudinis gratia.
And so, when someone continually or certainly too frequently runs into the same cases, tenses, numbers or even feet, we are accustomed to prescribe that figures should be varied for the sake of avoiding similarity.
§9.1.12in quo ita loquimur, tanquam omnis sermo habeat figuram, itemque eadem figura dicitur cursitare qua lectitare, id est eadem ratione declinari.
In this sense we speak as if all language had a figure, and likewise "to run about frequently" is said to have the same figure as "to read frequently," that is, to be inflected in the same method.
quare illo intellectu priore et communi nihil non figuratum est.
Wherefore in that prior and common understanding, there is nothing that is not figured.
quo si contenti sumus, non immerito Apollodorus, si tradenti Caecilio credimus, incomprehensibilia partis huius praecepta existimavit.
If we are content with this, not without reason did Apollodorus, if we believe Caecilius who hands it down, consider the precepts of this part to be incomprehensible.
§9.1.13sed si habitus quidam et quasi gestus sic appellandi sunt, id demum hoc loco accipi schema oportebit, quod sit a simplici atque in promptu posito dicendi modo poetice vel oratorie mutatum.
But if certain postures and, as it were, gestures are to be so called, then at last in this place we must understand "schema" as that which has been changed poetically or oratorically from the simple and readily available method of speaking.
sic enim verum erit, aliam esse orationem ἀσχημάτιστον id est carentem figuris, quod vitium non inter minima est, aliam ἐσχηματισμένην, id est figuratam.
For thus it will be true that one speech is aschematiston, that is, lacking figures (which is not among the smallest faults), and another is eschematismene, that is, figured.
§9.1.14verum id ipsum anguste Zoilus terminavit, qui id solum putaverit schema, quo aliud simulatur dici quam dicitur, quod sane vulgo quoque sic accipi scio; unde et figuratae controversiae quaedam, de quibus post paulo dicam, vocantur.
But Zoilus defined this very thing narrowly, who thought that alone to be a schema in which one thing is pretended to be said and another is actually said, which indeed I know is also accepted so by the vulgar; whence certain "figured controversies," of which I shall speak a little later, are also named.
ergo figura sit arte aliqua novata forma dicendi.
Therefore, let a figure be a form of speaking renewed by some art.
genus eius unum quidam putaverunt, §9.1.15in hoc ipso diversas opiniones secuti.
Some have thought that there is only one class of it, following different opinions in this very matter.
nam hi, quia verborum mutatio sensus quoque verteret, omnes figuras in verbis esse dixerunt; illi, quia verba rebus accommodarentur, omnes in sensibus.
For some, because a change of words also turned the meaning, said that all figures are in words; others, because words are accommodated to things, said that all are in thoughts.
quarum utraque manifesta cavillatio est.
Both of these opinions are manifest quibbles.
§9.1.16nam ut eadem dici solent aliter, manetque sensus elocutione mutata, et figura sententiae plures habere verborum figuras potest.
For as the same things are wont to be said otherwise, and the meaning remains although the expression is changed, a figure of thought can also have several figures of words.
illa est enim posita in concipienda cogitatione haec in enuntianda; sed frequentissime coeunt, ut in hoc iam iam, Dolabella, neque me tui neque tuorum liberum. nam oratio a iudice aversa in sententia, iam iam et liberum in verbis sunt schemata.
For the former is placed in conceiving the thought, the latter in pronouncing it; but they combine most frequently, as in this: "even now, even now, Dolabella, neither of you nor of your children." For the speech turned away from the judge is a schema in thought, while "even now" and "of your children" are schemata in words.
inter plurimos enim, §9.1.17quod sciam, consensus est duas eius esse partes, διανοίας, id est mentis vel sensus vel sententiarum, nam his omnibus modis dictum est, et λέξεως id est verborum vel dictionis vel elocutionis vel sermonis vel orationis; nam et variatur et nihil refert.
For among most authors, as far as I know, there is consensus that its parts are two: of dianoias, that is, of mind or meaning or thoughts, for it has been expressed in all these ways, and of lexeos, that is, of words or diction or expression or speech or language; for it is both varied and makes no difference.
§9.1.18Cornelius tamen Celsus adiicit verbis et sententiis figuras colorum, nimia profecto novitatis cupiditate ductus.
Cornelius Celsus, however, adds to words and thoughts the figures of "colors," led surely by an excessive desire for novelty.
nam quis ignorasse eruditum alioqui virum credat, colores et sententias sensus esse? quare sicut omnem orationem ita figuras quoque versari necesse est in sensu et in verbis.
For who would believe that a man otherwise learned was ignorant that colors and thoughts are meanings? Wherefore, just as all speech, so also figures must of necessity be employed in meaning and in words.