§8.6.1tropus est verbi vel sermonis a propria significatione id aliam cum virtute mutatio.
A trope is a change of a word or phrase from its proper signification into another, with decorative virtue.
circa quem inexplicabilis et grammaticis inter ipsos et philosophis pugna est, quae sint genera, quae species, qui numerus, quis cuique subiiciatur.
Concerning this, there is an inexplicable battle among grammarians themselves and philosophers as to what are the genera, what the species, what the number, and which is subordinated to which.
§8.6.2nos omissis, quae nihil ad instruendum oratorem pertinent, cauillationibus, necessarios maxime atque id usum receptos exsequemur, haec modo id his adnotasse contenti, quosdam gratia significationis quosdam decoris assumi, et esse alios id verbis propriis alios id tralatis, vertique formas non verborum modo sed et sensuum et compositionis.
Omitting those cavils which pertain nothing to instructing an orator, we shall pursue those that are most necessary and received into common use, content only to have noted in these that some are assumed for the sake of signification, some for decorum, and that some are in proper words, others in translated ones, and that the forms are turned not only of words but also of thoughts and of composition.
§8.6.3quare mihi videntur errasse, qui non alios crediderunt tropos, quam id quibus verbum pro verbo poneretur.
Wherefore, they seem to me to have erred who believed there were no other tropes than those in which a word was put for a word.
neque illud ignoro, id iisdem fere, qui significandi gratia adhibentur, esse et ornatum; sed non idem accidet contra, eruntque quidam tantum ad speciem accommodati.
Nor am I ignorant that in almost the same tropes which are applied for the sake of signifying, there is also ornament; but the same will not happen to the contrary, and some will be accommodated only to appearance.
§8.6.4incipiamus igitur ab eo, qui cum frequentissimus est tum longe pulcherrimus, translatione dico, quae μεταφορά Graece vocatur.
Let us begin therefore from that which is both most frequent and by far the most beautiful: I mean metaphor, which is called μεταφορά in Greek.
quae quidem cum ita est ab ipsa nobis concessa natura, ut indocti quoque ac non sentientes ea frequenter utantur, tum ita iucunda atque nitida, ut id oratione quamlibet clara proprio tamen lumine eluceat.
This indeed is not only granted to us by nature itself in such a way that the unlearned and those not perceiving it use it frequently, but is also so pleasant and bright that, in a speech however clear, it shines out with its own proper light.
§8.6.5neque enim vulgaris esse neque humilis nec insuavis apte ac recte modo adscita potest.
For it can neither be vulgar, nor low, nor unpleasant, provided it is adopted aptly and rightly.
copiam quoque sermonis auget permutando aut mutuando quae non habet, quodque est difficillimum, praestat ne ulli rei nomen deesse videatur.
It also increases the copiousness of speech by exchanging or borrowing what it does not have, and, what is most difficult, it ensures that no name seems to be lacking for any thing.
transfertur ergo nomen aut verbum ex eo loco id quo proprium est, id eum id quo aut proprium deest aut translatum proprio melius est.
A noun or a verb is therefore transferred from that place in which it is proper, into that in which either the proper name is lacking or the translated one is better than the proper.
id facimus, §8.6.6aut quia necesse est aut quia significantius est aut (ut dixi) quia decentius.
This we do, either because it is necessary, or because it is more significant, or (as I said) because it is more decent.
ubi nihil horum praestabit, quod transferetur, improprium erit.
Where nothing of these is achieved, the word that is transferred will be improper.
necessitate rustici gemmam id vitibus (quid enim dicerent aliud?), et sitire segetes et fructus laborare; necessitate nos durum hominem aut asperum; non enim proprium erat, quod daremus his adfectibus, nomen.
By necessity, country folk speak of the "bud" in vines (for what else could they say?), and that the crops are "thirsty," and that the fruits are "suffering"; by necessity, we speak of a "hard" or "rough" man; for there was no proper name that we could give to these states of mind.
§8.6.7iam incensum ira et inflammatum cupiditate et lapsum errore significandi gratia; nihil enim horum suis verbis quam his arcessitis magis proprium erit.
Furthermore, "burning with anger" and "inflamed with desire" and "fallen into error" are for the sake of signifying; for none of these things will be more proper in their own words than in these borrowed ones.
illa ad ornatum, lumen orationis et generis claritatem et contionum procellas et eloquentiae fulmina, ut Cicero pro Milone Clodium fontem gloriae eius vocat et alio loco segetem ac materiem. §8.6.8quaedam etiam parum speciosa dictu per hanc explicantur:
"
hoc faciunt, nimio ne luxu obtunsior usus
sit genitali arvo et sulcos oblimet inertes. "
| totum autem metaphora brevior est similitudo, eoque distat, quod illa comparatur rei quam volumus exprimere, haec pro ipsa re dicitur.
Those others are for ornament: "the light of speech," "the brightness of pedigree," "the tempests of public assemblies," and "the thunderbolts of eloquence," as Cicero in his speech for Milo calls Clodius "the fountain of his glory," and in another place "the seed-plot and material." Certain things also which are not very decent to say are explained by this: "This they do, lest by too much luxury the use of the genital field should become too dull and clog the inactive furrows." Generally, however, a metaphor is a shorter simile, and differs in this: that the latter is compared to the thing we wish to express, while the former is spoken instead of the thing itself.
§8.6.9comparatio est, cum dico fecisse quid hominem ut leonem; translatio, cum dico de homine, leo est. huius vis omnis quadruplex maxime videtur: cum id rebus animalibus aliud pro alio ponitur, ut de agitatore,
"
gubernator magna contorsit equum vi; "
aut ut Livius Scipionem a Catone adlatrari solitum refert.
It is a simile when I say that a man did something "like a lion"; it is a metaphor when I say of a man, "he is a lion." The whole power of this seems to be chiefly fourfold: when, among animate things, one is put for another, as of a charioteer, "The pilot turned the horses with great force"; or as Livy reports that Scipio was accustomed to be "barked at" by Cato.
§8.6.10inanima pro aliis generis eiusdem sumuntur, ut:
"
classique immittit habenas; "
aut pro rebus animalibus inanima,
"
ferron an fato moerus Argivom occidit?
"
aut contra:
"
sedet inscius alto
accipiens sonitum saxi de uertice pastor. "
Praecipueque ex his oritur mira sublimitas, §8.6.11quae audaci et proxime periculum translatione tolluntur, cum rebus sensu carentibus actum quendam et animos damus, qualis est
"
pontem indignatus Araxes,
"
et illa Ciceronis,
Inanimate things are taken for others of the same kind, as: "And he flings the reins to the fleet"; or inanimate things for animate things, "Did the wall of the Argives fall by iron or by fate?" or on the contrary: "The ignorant shepherd sits, receiving the sound from the top of a high rock." And especially from these arises a wonderful sublimity, which are raised by a bold and almost dangerous metaphor, when we give to things lacking sense a certain action and soul, such as: "Araxes indignant at the bridge," and those words of Cicero,