§8.5.1sententiam veteres, quod animo sensissent, vocaverunt.
Our ancestors called what they had felt in their minds a 'sententia'.
id cum est apud oratores frequentissimum, tum etiam in usu cotidiano quasdam reliquias habet; nam et iuraturi ex animo nostri sententia et gratulantes ex sententia dicimus.
While this is extremely frequent among orators, it also has certain remains in daily usage; for when about to take an oath we say 'ex animi nostri sententia' (according to the judgment of our mind), and when congratulating we say 'ex sententia' (according to your desire).
non raro tamen et sic locuti sunt, ut sensa sua dicerent; nam sensus corporis videbantur.
Yet not infrequently they also spoke in such a way as to say 'sensa' for their thoughts; for 'sensus' was seen to belong to the body.
§8.5.2sed consuetudo iam tenuit, ut mente concepta sensus vocaremus, lumina autem praecipueque in clausulis posita sententias; quae minus celebratae apud antiquos nostris temporibus modo carent.
But custom has now held that we call thoughts conceived in the mind 'sensus', but the brilliant flashes, especially those placed at the ends of clauses, 'sententiae'; which, less celebrated among the ancients, in our times lack moderation.
ideoque mihi et de generibus earum et de usu arbitror pauca dicenda. antiquissimae sunt,
And therefore I think a few things should be said by me both concerning their kinds and their use.
§8.5.3quae proprie, quamvis omnibus idem nomen sit, sententiae vocantur, quas Graeci excedit, B: excidit, A. γνώμας appellant; utrumque autem nomen ex eo acceperunt, quod similes sunt consiliis aut decretis.
The oldest are those which are properly called 'sententiae' (although all have the same name), which the Greeks call 'gnomae'; moreover, they received both names from the fact that they are similar to counsels or decrees.
est autem haec vox universalis, quae etiam citra complexum causae possit esse laudabilis, interim ad rem tantum relata, ut nihil est tam populare quam bonitas, interim ad personam, quale est Afri Domitii, princeps, qui vult omnia scire, necesse habet multa ignoscere.
Now this is a universal saying, which can be praiseworthy even without the context of a cause, sometimes referred only to a thing, such as 'nothing is so popular as goodness', sometimes to a person, such as that of Domitius Afer: 'a prince who wishes to know all things has need to forgive many things'.
§8.5.4hanc quidam partem enthymematis, quidam initium aut clausulam epichirematis esse dixerunt; et est aliquando, non tamen semper.
Some have said that this is a part of an enthymeme, others the beginning or the conclusion of an epicheireme; and it is so sometimes, yet not always.
illud verius esse eam aliquando simplicem, ut ea, quae supra dixi, aliquando ratione subiecta: nam in omni certamine, qui opulentior est, etiamsi accipit iniuriam, tamen, quia plus potest, facere videtur; nonnumquam duplicem:
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obsequium amicos, veritas odium parit. " §8.5.5sunt etiam, qui decem genera fecerint, sed eo modo, quo fieri vel plura possunt, per interrogationem, per comparationem, infitiationem, similitudinem, admirationem, et cetera huiusmodi; per omnes enim figuras tractari potest.
It is truer that it is sometimes simple, like those things which I said above, sometimes with a reason subjoined: 'for in every contest, he who is wealthier, even if he receives an injury, yet, because he is more powerful, seems to commit it'; sometimes double: 'compliance breeds friends, truth breeds hatred.' There are also some who have made ten kinds, but in that manner in which even more can be made, through interrogation, comparison, denial, likeness, admiration, and other things of this sort; for it can be treated through all figures.
illud notabile ex diversis:
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mors misera non est, aditus ad mortem est miser. "
Ac rectae quidem sunt tales: §8.5.6"
tam deest avaro, quod habet, quam quod non habet. "
Sed maiorem vim accipiunt et mutatione figurae, ut
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usque adeone mori miserum est?
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acrius hoc enim quam per se, mors misera non est. et translatione a communi ad proprium; nam, cum sit rectum, nocere facile est, prodesse difficile, vehementius apud Ovidium Medea dicit,
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servare potui; perdere an possim, rogas?
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Vertit ad personam Cicero: §8.5.7nihil habet, Caesar, nec fortuna tua maius quam ut possis, nec natura melius quam ut velis servare quam plurimos. ita, quae erant rerum, propria fecit hominis.
This is notable from opposites: 'death is not miserable, the approach to death is miserable.' And indeed such direct ones are: 'the miser lacks what he has as much as what he has not.' But they receive greater force also by a change of figure, as: 'is it so very miserable to die?' for this is sharper than by itself, 'death is not miserable.' And by translation from the common to the proper; for, while it is direct, 'to harm is easy, to do good is difficult', Medea says more vehemently in Ovid: 'I was able to save; do you ask whether I can destroy?' Cicero turns it to a person: 'your fortune, Caesar, has nothing greater than that you are able, nor your nature anything better than that you wish, to save as many as possible.' Thus, what belonged to things, he made proper to a man.
in hoc genere custodiendum est et id, quod ubique, ne crebrae sint, ne palam falsae (quales frequenter ab iis dicuntur, qui haec καθολικὰ vocant, et, quidquid pro causa videtur, quasi indubitatum pronuntiant), et ne passim et a quocunque dicantur.
In this kind we must guard against, as everywhere, their being too frequent, or openly false (such as are frequently said by those who call these 'katholika', and pronounce whatever seems to favor their cause as if it were indubitable), and that they be not said everywhere and by just anyone.
§8.5.8magis enim decet eos, in quibus est auctoritas, ut rei pondus etiam persona confirmet.
For it is more fitting for those in whom there is authority, so that the person may also confirm the weight of the matter.
quis enim ferat puerum aut adolescentulum aut etiam ignobilem, si iudicet in dicendo et quodammodo praecipiat?
For who would tolerate a boy or a youth or even an ignoble person, if he should pass judgment in speaking and in a manner lecture us?
§8.5.9enthymema quoque est omne quod mente concepimus; proprie tamen dicitur, quae est sententia ex contrariis, propterea quod eminere inter ceteras videtur, ut Homerus poeta, urbs Roma.
An enthymeme also is everything that we have conceived in the mind; properly, however, that is called which is a sentence from contraries, because it seems to stand out among the rest, just as 'Homer the poet', 'the city of Rome'.
de hoc in argumentis satis dictum est.
Concerning this, enough has been said in the section on arguments.
non semper autem ad probationem adhibetur sed aliquando ad ornatum: §8.5.10quorum igitur impunitas, Caesar, tuae clementiae laus est, eorum te ipsorum ad crudelitatem acuet oratio? non quia sit ratio dissimilis, sed quia iam per alia, ut id iniustum appareret, effectum erat;
It is not always applied for proof, however, but sometimes for ornament: 'shall the speech of those very men, Caesar, whose impunity is a praise of your clemency, whet you to cruelty?' Not because the reasoning is different, but because it had already been brought about through other means that this should appear unjust;