§8.3.47nec scripto modo id accidit, sed etiam sensu plerique obscene intelligere, nisi caveris, cupiunt (ut apud Ovidium quaeque latent meliora putat) et ex verbis, quae longissime ab obscenitate absunt, occasionem turpitudinis rapere.
Nor does this happen only in writing, but most people, unless you are on your guard, desire to understand obscenely in sense as well (as in Ovid: "and he thinks whatever is hidden is better") and to snatch an occasion for baseness from words that are furthest removed from obscenity.
siquidem Celsus κακέμφατον apud Vergilium putat:
"
incipiunt agitata tumescere. "
Quod si recipias, nihil loqui tutum est. §8.3.48deformitati proximum est humilitatis vitium, ταπείνωσιν vocant, qua rei magnitudo vel dignitas minuitur: ut saxea est verruca in summo montis vertice. cui natura contrarium, sed errore par est, parvis dare excedentia modum nomina, nisi cum ex industria risus inde captatur.
Indeed, Celsus thinks there is a kakemphaton in Vergil:\n"the agitated things begin to swell."\nBut if you admit this, nothing is safe to speak. Next to deformity is the vice of meanness, which they call tapeinosis, by which the greatness or dignity of a subject is diminished: as "a stony wart on the top of a mountain's brow." Opposite to this in nature, but equal in error, is to give to small things names that exceed moderation, except when amusement is intentionally sought from it.
itaque nec parricidam nequam dixeris hominem nec deditum forte meretrici nefarium; quia alterum parum, alterum nimium est.
Therefore, you should not call a parricide "good-for-nothing," nor perhaps one devoted to a courtesan "wicked"; because the former is too little, the latter too much.
proinde quaedam hebes, §8.3.49sordida, ieiuna, tristis, ingrata, vilis oratio est;
Likewise, some speech is dull, sordid, meager, gloomy, unpleasant, and mean; which vices will be made manifest most easily by their opposite virtues.
quae vitia facillime fient manifesta contrariis virtutibus. nam primum acuto, secundum nitido, tertium copioso, deinceps hilari, iucundo, accurato diversum est. §8.3.50vitari debet et μείωσις, cum sermoni deest aliquid, quo minus plenus sit; quanquam id obscurae potius quam inornatae orationis est vitium.
For the first is different from sharp, the second from bright, the third from copious, and the others from cheerful, pleasant, and careful. Meiosis must also be avoided, when something is wanting to the speech to prevent it from being full; although this is a vice of obscure rather than unadorned speech.
sed hoc quoque, cum a prudentibus fit, schema dici solet, sicut ταυτολογία id est eiusdem verbi aut sermonis iteratio.
But this also, when done by prudent writers, is usually called a schema, as is tautology, that is, the repetition of the same word or speech.
haec enim, §8.3.51quanquam non magnopere a summis auctoribus vitata, interim vitium videri potest, in quod saepe incidit etiam Cicero securus tam parvae observationis, sicut hoc loco, non solum igitur illud iudicium iudicii simile, iudices, non fuit. interim mutato nomine ἐπανάλημψις dicitur, atque est et ipsum inter schemata; quorum exempla illo loco quaerenda, quo virtutes erunt. §8.3.52peior hac ὁμοείδεια, quae nulla varietatis gratia levat taedium atque est tota coloris unius, qua maxime deprehenditur carens arte oratio; eaque et in sententiis et in figuris et in compositione longe non animis solum sed etiam auribus est ingratissima.
For this, although not very greatly avoided by the highest authors, may sometimes seem a vice, into which even Cicero often falls, careless of so small an observation, as in this place: "Therefore, judges, not only was that judgment not like a judgment." Sometimes, with a changed name, it is called epanalepsis, and is itself also among the schemata; examples of which must be sought in that place where virtues will be treated. Worse than this is homoeideia, which relieves tedium by no grace of variety and is entirely of one color, by which speech lacking art is most of all detected; and this, in thoughts, in figures, and in composition, is by far most unpleasant not only to minds but also to ears.
vitanda etiam μακρολογία, §8.3.53id est longior quam oportet sermo: ut apud T. Livium, legati non impetrata pace retro domum, unde venerant, abierunt. sed huic vicina periphrasis virtus habetur.
Macrologia also must be avoided, that is, speech longer than is necessary: as in Livy: "the ambassadors, peace not having been obtained, went back home, from whence they had come." But periphrasis, which is close to this, is held to be a virtue.
est et πλεονασμὸς vitium, cum supervacuis verbis oratio oneratur: ego oculis meis vidi; sat est enim vidi. §8.3.54emendavit hoc etiam urbane in Hirtio Cicero, cui sapasim cum declamans filium a matre decem mensibus in utero latum esse dixisset, quid? aliae, inquit, in perula solent ferre? nonnunquam tamen illud genus, cuius exemplum priore loco posui, adfirmationis gratia adhibetur:
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vocemque his auribus hausi. " §8.3.55at vitium erit, quotiens otiosum fuerit et supererit, non cum adiicietur.
Pleonasm is also a vice, when speech is burdened with superfluous words: "I saw with my own eyes"; for "I saw" is enough. Cicero also corrected this wittily in Hirtius, when the latter, declaiming, had said that a son had been carried by his mother for ten months in her womb: "What?" said Cicero, "are others accustomed to carry them in a little pouch?" Sometimes, however, that kind of which I placed an example in the former instance is used for the sake of affirmation:\n"and with these ears I drank in the voice." But it will be a vice as often as it is redundant and superfluous, not when it is added.
est etiam, quae περιεργία vocatur, supervacua, ut sic dixerim, operositas, ut a diligenti curiosus et a religion superstitio distat.
There is also that which is called periergia, a superfluous, so to speak, laboriousness, as a busybody differs from a diligent person, and superstition from religion.
atque, ut semel finiam, verbum omne, quod neque intellectum adiuvat neque ornatum, vitiosum dici potest. §8.3.56κακόζηλον id est mala adfectatio, per omne dicendi genus peccat.
And, to make an end once for all, every word that neither assists the understanding nor the adornment can be called faulty. Kakozelon, that is, bad affectation, offends in every kind of speech.
nam et tumida et pusilla et praedulcia et abundantia et arcessita et exultantia sub idem nomen cadunt.
For the tumid, the puny, the over-sweet, the redundant, the far-fetched, and the extravagant fall under the same name.
denique κακόζηλον vocatur, quidquid est ultra virtutem, quotiens ingenium iudicio caret et specie boni fallitur, omnium in eloquentia vitiorum pessimum.
In short, whatever is beyond virtue is called kakozelon, as often as talent lacks judgment and is deceived by the appearance of good, the worst of all vices in eloquence.
nam cetera parum vitantur, hoc petitur. §8.3.57est autem totum in elocutione.
For other vices are insufficiently avoided, but this is actively sought. But it is entirely in expression.
nam rerum vitia sunt stultum, commune, contrarium, supervacuum; corrupta oratio in verbis maxime impropriis, redundantibus, comprehensione obscura compositione fracta, vocum similium aut ambiguarum puerili captatione consistit.
For the vices of things are the foolish, the common, the contrary, the superfluous; corrupt speech consists in words that are extremely improper, redundant, in obscure comprehension, in broken composition, and in a childish catching at similar or ambiguous words.