§7.7.1proximum est de legibus contrariis dicere, quia inter omnes artium scriptores constitit, in antinomia duos esse scripti et voluntatis status; neque immerito; quia, cum lex legi obstat, et utrinque contra scriptum dicitur et quaestio est de voluntate; in utraque id ambigitur, an utique illa lege sit utendum.
Next we must speak of conflicting laws, because it is agreed among all writers on the art (of rhetoric) that in an antinomy there are two statuses of the letter and the intention; and not without reason; because, when law opposes law, on both sides arguments are made against the letter and the question is concerning the intention; in both cases it is doubted whether that law should indeed be used.
§7.7.2omnibus autem manifestum est nunquam esse legem legi contrariam iure ipso, quia, si diversum ius esset, alterum altero abrogaretur, sed eas casu collidi et eventu.
But it is manifest to all that a law is never contrary to a law in the law itself, because, if there were a different law, one would be abrogated by the other, but they collide by chance and circumstance.
§7.7.3colliduntur autem aut pares inter se, ut si optio tyrannicidae et viri fortis comparentur, utrique data quod velit petendi potestate; hic meritorum, temporis, praemii collatio est; aut secum ipsae, ut duorum fortium, duorum tyrannicidarum, duarum raptarum, in quibus non potest esse alia quaestio, quam temporis, utra prior sit, aut qualitatis, utra iustior sit petitio.
Now they collide either when they are equal to each other, as if the option of a tyrant-slayer and that of a brave man are compared, the power of demanding what he wishes having been given to each; here there is a comparison of merits, time, and reward; or within themselves, as in the case of two brave men, two tyrant-slayers, or two ravished women, in which there can be no other question than that of time, which of them is prior, or of quality, which demand is more just.
§7.7.4diversae quoque leges confligunt aut similes aut impares.
Different laws also conflict, either similar or unequal.
diversae, quibus etiam citra adversam legem contradici possit, ut in hac controversia: magistratus ab arce ne discedat; vir fortis optet quod volet: impunitatem magistratus petit.
They are different when they can be contradicted even apart from an opposing law, as in this controversy: 'Let a magistrate not depart from the citadel'; 'Let a brave man choose what he wishes': the brave man demands impunity for the magistrate.
vel alia nulla obstante quaeri potest, vir fortis an, quidquid optarit, accipere debeat.
Even with no other law opposing, it can be asked whether a brave man ought to receive whatever he has chosen.
et in legem magistratus multa dicentur, quibus scriptum expugnatur; si incendium in arce fuerit, si in hostes decurrendum.
And many things will be said against the law of the magistrate, by which the letter is defeated; such as 'if there was a fire in the citadel', 'if it was necessary to charge against the enemy'.
§7.7.5similes, contra quas nihil opponi potest nisi lex altera: tyrannicidae imago in gymnasio ponatur; contra, mulieris imago in gymnasio ne ponatur. mulier tyrannum occidit.
They are similar when nothing can be opposed to them except the other law: 'Let a statue of a tyrant-slayer be placed in the gymnasium'; on the other hand, 'Let a statue of a woman not be placed in the gymnasium.' A woman killed a tyrant.
nam neque mulieris imago ullo alio casu poni potest nec tyrannicidae ullo alio casu summoveri.
For neither can a woman's statue be placed in any other case, nor can a tyrant-slayer's statue be removed in any other case.
§7.7.6impares sunt, cum alteri multa opponi possunt, alteri nihil nisi quod in lite est: ut cum vir fortis impunitatem desertoris petit.
They are unequal when many things can be opposed to one, but nothing to the other except what is in the lawsuit: as when a brave man demands impunity for a deserter.
nam contra legem viri fortis, ut supra ostendi, multa dicuntur; adversus desertores scripta non potest nisi optione subverti.
For against the law of the brave man, as I showed above, many things are said; whereas the written law against deserters cannot be subverted except by the option.
§7.7.7item aut confessum ex utraque parte ius est aut dubium.
Likewise, the law is either admitted on both sides or is doubtful.
si confessum est, haec fere quaeruntur, utra lex potentior; ad deos pertineat an ad homines, rem publicam an privatos, de honore an de poena, de magnis rebus an de parvis; permittat an vetet an imperet.
If it is admitted, the following are generally asked: which law is the more powerful; whether it relates to gods or to men, to the state or to private individuals, to honor or to punishment, to great matters or to small; whether it permits, forbids, or commands.
§7.7.8solet tractari et, utra sit antiquior, sed velut potentissimum, utra minus perdat; ut in desertore et viro forti, quod illo non occiso lex tota tollatur, occiso, sit reliqua viro forti alia optio.
It is also customary to treat which is the older, but, as if it were the most powerful point, which of them loses less; as in the case of the deserter and the brave man, because if the former is not killed, the whole law is destroyed, whereas if he is killed, another option remains for the brave man.
plurimum tamen est in hoc, utrum fieri sit melius atque aequius; de quo nihil praecipi nisi proposita materia potest.
But the greatest part of this lies in which course is better and more equitable to be done; concerning which no rule can be given unless the subject matter is proposed.
§7.7.9si dubium, aut alteri aut invicem utrique de iure fit controversia, ut in re tali: patri in filium, patrono in libertum manus iniectio sit; liberti heredem sequantur. liberti filium quidam fecit heredem: invicem petitur manus iniectio; et pater dicit sibi ius in filium esse, et patronus negat ius patris illi fuisse, quia ipse in manu patroni fuerit.
If it is doubtful, a dispute about the law arises either for one party or mutually for both, as in such a case: 'Let a father have the right of laying hands on his son, and a patron on his freedman'; 'Let freedmen follow the heir.' Someone made the son of a freedman his heir: laying hands on him is mutually demanded; the father says that he has the right over his son, and the patron denies that the father had that right over him, because he himself had been in the hand of the patron.
§7.7.10duplices leges sicut duae colliduntur: ut nothus ante legitimum natus, legitimus sit; post legitimum, tantum civis. quod de legibus, idem de senatus consultis dictum; quae si aut inter se pugnent aut obstent legibus, non tamen aliud sit eius status nomen.
Double laws collide just as two laws do: as 'Let a bastard born before a legitimate child be legitimate; but if born after a legitimate child, only a citizen.' What is said of laws is also said of decrees of the senate; even if these conflict with each other or oppose laws, the name of the status would not be different.