§7.5.1qui neque fecisse se negabit neque aliud esse quod fecerit dicet neque factum defendet, necesse est in suo iure consistat, in quo plerumque actionis est quaestio.
He who will neither deny that he did it, nor say that what he did is something else, nor defend the deed, must of necessity take his stand on his legal right, in which for the most part the question is one of procedure.
§7.5.2ea non semper, ut quidam putaverunt, iudicium antecedit, qualia sunt praetorum curiosa consilia, cum de iure accusatoris ambigitur; sed in ipsis iudiciis frequentissime versatur.
This question does not always, as some have thought, precede the trial—such as are the careful deliberations of the praetors when there is a doubt about the right of the accuser—but is very frequently dealt with in the trials themselves.
est autem duplex eius disceptationis condicio, quod aut intentio aut praescriptio habet controversiam.
Moreover, the condition of this dispute is twofold, because either the charge or the demurrer contains the controversy.
ac fuerunt, qui praescriptionis statum facerent, tanquam ea non iisdem omnibus quibus ceterae leges quaestionibus contineretur.
And there have been those who made a status of demurrer, as if it were not contained by all the same questions as other laws.
§7.5.3cum ex praescriptione lis pendet, de ipsa re quaeri non est necesse.
When the lawsuit depends on a demurrer, it is not necessary to inquire into the case itself.
ignominioso filius praescribit: de eo solo iudicatio est, an liceat.
A son demurs against a disreputable father: the judgment is concerning this alone, whether it is permitted.
quotiens tamen poterimus, efficiendum est, ut de re quoque iudex bene sentiat; sic enim iuri nostro libentius indulgebit, ut in sponsionibus, quae ex interdictis fiunt, etiam si non proprietatis est quaestio sed tantum possessionis, tamen non solum possedisse nos, sed etiam nostrum possedisse docere oportebit.
Whenever we can, however, we must ensure that the judge also thinks well of the case; for in this way he will more willingly yield to our right, just as in formal agreements which arise from interdicts, even if the question is not one of property but only of possession, yet it will be necessary to show not only that we possessed, but also that we possessed what was our own.
sed frequentius etiam quaeritur de intentione.
But more frequently still, inquiry is made concerning the charge.
§7.5.4vir fortis optet, quod volet. nego illi dandum, quidquid optaverit: non habeo praescriptionem, sed tamen voluntate contra verba praescriptionis nodo utor.
'Let a brave man choose what he wishes.' I deny that whatever he has chosen should be given to him: I do not have a demurrer, but nevertheless, by the intention against the words, I use the knot of a demurrer.
in utroque autem genere status iidem sunt.
In both kinds, however, the statuses are the same.
§7.5.5porro lex omnis aut tribuit aut adimit aut punit aut iubet aut vetat aut permittit.
Furthermore, every law either grants, takes away, punishes, commands, forbids, or permits.
litem habet aut propter se ipsam aut propter alteram, quaestionem aut in scripto aut in voluntate.
It holds a lawsuit either on account of itself or on account of another law, and the question is either in the letter or in the intention.
§7.5.6scriptum aut apertum est aut obscurum aut ambiguum.
The letter is either clear, obscure, or ambiguous.
quod de legibus dico, idem accipi volo de testamentis, pactis, stipulationibus, omni denique scripto, idem de voce.
What I say of laws, I wish to be understood also of wills, compacts, stipulations, and in short, of every written document, and the same of spoken words.
et quoniam quattuor eius generis quaestiones vel status facimus, singulos percurram.
And since we make four questions or statuses of this kind, I shall run through each of them.