§7.10.1est autem quaedam inter hos status cognatio.
Moreover, there is a certain relationship between these statuses.
nam et in finitione, quae sit voluntas nominis, quaeritur, et in syllogismo, qui secundus a finitione status est, spectatur quid voluerit scriptor; et contrarias leges duos esse scripti et voluntatis status apparet.
For in definition, what is the intention of the term is asked; and in syllogism, which is the second status from definition, what the writer intended is considered; and it is clear that contrary laws are two statuses of the written word and intention.
rursus et finitio quodammodo est amphibolia, cum in duas partes diducatur intellectus nominis.
Furthermore, definition also is in a way an ambiguity, since the understanding of the term is divided into two parts.
§7.10.2scriptum et voluntas habet in verbis iuris quaestionem, quod idem antinomia petitur.
"The written word and intention" has a question of law in the words, which same thing is sought by antinomy.
ideoque omnia haec quidam scriptum et voluntatem esse dixerunt, alii in scripto et voluntate amphiboliam esse, quae facit quaestionem.
And therefore, some have said that all these are "the written word and intention," while others say that there is ambiguity in "the written word and intention" which produces the question.
sed distincta sunt; aliud est enim obscurum ius, aliud ambiguum.
But they are distinct; for an obscure law is one thing, an ambiguous one another.
§7.10.3igitur finitio in natura ipsa nominis quaestionem habet generalem, et quae esse etiam citra complexum causae possit; scriptum et voluntas de eo disputat iure quod est in lege, syllogismus de eo quod non est.
Therefore, definition has a general question in the very nature of the word, and one which can exist even apart from the context of a cause; "the written word and intention" disputes about that law which is in the statute, syllogism about that which is not.
amphiboliae lis in diversum trahit, legum contrariarum ex diverso pugna est.
The litigation of ambiguity pulls in different directions, while the battle of contrary laws is a clash from different directions.
§7.10.4neque immerito et recepta est a doctissimis haec differentia et apud plurimos ac prudentissimos durat.
And not without reason has this distinction been accepted by the most learned and continues among the most numerous and prudent.
et de hoc quidem genere dispositionis, etiamsi non omnia, tradi tamen aliqua potuerunt.
And concerning this kind of arrangement, even if not everything, some things at least could be handed down.
§7.10.5sunt alia quae, nisi proposita de qua dicendum est materia, viam docendi non praebeant.
There are other things which, unless the matter to be spoken of is proposed, do not offer a path of teaching.
non enim causa tantum universa in quaestiones ac locos diducenda est, sed hae ipsae partes habent rursus ordinem suum.
For not only must the whole cause be divided into questions and topics, but these very parts have in turn their own order.
nam et in prooemio primum est aliquid et secundum ac deinceps, et quaestio omnis ac locus habet suam dispositionem ut theses etiam simplices.
For in the introduction also there is something first, second, and so on, and every question and topic has its own arrangement, just like simple theses.
nisi forte satis erit dividendi peritus, §7.10.6qui controversiam in haec diduxerit, an omne praemium viro forti dandum sit, an ex privato, an nuptiae, an eius quae nupta sit, an hae; deinde, cum fuerit de prima quaestione dicendum, passim et ut quidque in mentem veniet miscuerit, non primum in ea scierit esse tractandum, §7.10.7verbis legis standum sit an voluntate, huius ipsius particulae aliquod initium fecerit, deinde proxima subnectens struxerit orationem, ut pars hominis est manus, eius digiti, illorum quoque articuli.
Unless perchance it will be enough for one skilled in dividing, who has divided the controversy into these points: whether every reward should be given to a brave man, whether from private property, whether a marriage, whether of her who is married, or of this woman; and then, when he has to speak on the first question, mixes things up everywhere and as each comes into his mind, not knowing that in that question the first thing to be treated is, whether one should stand by the words of the law or the intention, and makes some beginning from this very small part, and then, weaving in what is nearest, structures his speech, just as the hand is a part of a man, the fingers are of it, and the joints also of them.
hoc est quod scriptor demonstrare non possit, nisi certa definitaque materia.
This is what a writer cannot demonstrate without a certain and defined matter.
§7.10.8sed quid una faciet aut altera, quin immo centum ac mille in re infinita? Praeceptoris est, in alio atque alio genere cotidie ostendere, quis ordo sit rerum et quae copulatio, ut paulatim fiat usus et ad similia transitus.
But what will one or another do, or rather a hundred and a thousand, in an infinite matter? It is the duty of the teacher, in one kind after another daily to show what the order of things is and what the connection, so that by degrees practice may be formed and a transition to similar things.
tradi enim omnia, quae ars efficit, non possunt.
For all things which art accomplishes cannot be handed down.
nam quis pictor omnia, §7.10.9quae in rerum natura sunt, adumbrare didicit? sed percepta semel imitandi ratione adsimulabit quidquid acceperit.
For what painter has learned to sketch all things that are in the nature of things? But having once acquired the method of imitation, he will represent whatever he has received.
quis non faber vasculum aliquod, quale nunquam viderat, fecit?
What smith has not made some vessel of a kind he had never seen?