§6.3.1huic diversa virtus, quae risum iudicis movendo et illos tristes solvit adfectus et animum ab intentione rerum frequenter avertit et aliquando etiam reficit et a satietate vel a fatigatione renovat.
To this there is a different virtue, which by moving the laughter of the judge both dissolves those gloomy emotions and frequently averts the mind from attention to the facts, and sometimes even refreshes it and renews it from satiety or fatigue.
quanta sit autem in ea difficultas, vel duo maxime oratores, alter Graecae alter Latinae eloquentiae principes, docent.
But how great a difficulty there is in this, even the two greatest orators, the leaders respectively of Greek and Latin eloquence, teach us.
§6.3.2nam plerique Demostheni facultatem defuisse huius rei credunt, Ciceroni modum.
For most people believe that Demosthenes lacked the ability in this matter, and Cicero lacked moderation.
nec videri potest noluisse Demosthenes, cuius pauca admodum dicta nec sane ceteris eius virtutibus respondentia palam ostendunt, non displicuisse illi iocos, §6.3.3sed non contigisse.
Nor can it seem that Demosthenes did not wish for it, whose very few sayings, which are indeed not responsive to his other virtues, clearly show that jokes were not displeasing to him, but that it did not fall to his lot.
noster vero non solum extra iudicia, sed in ipsis etiam orationibus habitus est nimius risus adfectator.
Our orator indeed, not only outside of trials but even in his speeches themselves, was regarded as an excessive seeker of laughter.
mihi quidem, sive id recte iudico sive amore immodico praecipui in eloquentia viri labor, mira quaedam in eo videtur fuisse urbanitas.
To me indeed, whether I judge this rightly or suffer from an immoderate love for this preeminent man in eloquence, there seems to have been a certain wonderful urbanity in him.
§6.3.4nam et in sermone cotidiano multa et in altercationibus et interrogandis testibus plura quam quisquam dixit facete, et ipsa ilia, quae sunt in Verrem dicta frigidius, aliis adsignavit et testimonii loco posuit; ut, quo sunt magis vulgaria, eo sit credibilius ilia ab oratore non ficta sed passim esse iactata.
For both in daily conversation he said many witty things, and in altercations and in examining witnesses more than anyone else, and those very sayings which are rather coldly said against Verres, he attributed to others and put in the place of testimony; so that, the more common they are, the more credible it is that they were not invented by the orator but were bandied about everywhere.
§6.3.5utinamque libertus eius Tiro aut alius, quisquis fuit, qui tris hac de re libros edidit, parcius dictorum numero indulsissent et plus iudicii in eligendis quam in congerendis studii adhibuissent: minus obiectus calumniantibus foret, qui tamen nunc quoque, ut in omni eius ingenio, facilius, quod reici quam quod adiici possit, invenient.
And would that his freedman Tiro, or whoever else it was who published three books on this subject, had been more sparing in indulging the number of sayings and had applied more judgment in selecting them than zeal in collecting them: he would have been less exposed to detractors, who nevertheless even now, as in all his genius, will more easily find what can be rejected than what can be added.
§6.3.6adfert autem summam rei difficultatem primum, quod ridiculum dictum plerumque falsum est (hoc semper humile), saepe ex industria depravatum, praeterea nunquam honorificum; tum varia hominum iudicia in eo, quod non ratione aliqua sed motu animi quodam nescio an enarrabili iudicatur.
But first of all, a funny saying brings the greatest difficulty to the matter because it is usually false (which is always low), often intentionally distorted, and furthermore never honorable; then there are the diverse judgments of men in this, because it is judged not by some reason but by a certain movement of the mind, which is perhaps indescribable.
§6.3.7neque enim ab ullo satis explicari puto, licet multi temptaverint, unde risus, qui non solum facto aliquo dictove, sed interdum quodam etiam corporis tacta lacessitur.
For I do not think it is sufficiently explained by anyone, although many have attempted it, whence laughter arises, which is excited not only by some deed or word, but sometimes even by a certain touch of the body.
praeterea non una ratione moveri solet, neque enim acute tantum ac venuste sed stulte, iracunde, timide dicta aut facta ridentur; ideoque anceps eius rei ratio est, quod a derisu non procul abest risus.
Furthermore, it is not accustomed to be moved in one way only, for not only sayings or deeds done sharply and gracefully are laughed at, but also those done foolishly, angrily, and fearfully; and therefore the theory of this matter is double-edged, because laughter is not far removed from derision.
§6.3.8habet enim, ut Cicero dicit, sedem in deformitate aliqua et turpitudine, quae cum in aliis demonstrantur, urbanitas, cum in ipsos dicentes recidunt, stultitia vocatur.
For it has, as Cicero says, its seat in some deformity and baseness, which when pointed out in others is called urbanity, but when they fall back upon the speakers themselves, is called folly.
cum videatur autem res levis et quae ab scurris, mimis, insipientibus denique saepe moveatur, tamen habet vim nescio an imperiosissimam et cui repugnari minime potest.
But although it seems to be a light matter and one that is often moved by buffoons, actors, and finally fools, yet it has a power, perhaps most commanding, and which can be resisted least of all.
§6.3.9erumpit etiam invitis saepe, nec vultus modo ac vocis exprimit confessionem, sed totum corpus vi sua concutit.
It breaks out often even against our will, and not only forces a confession of the face and voice, but shakes the whole body with its power.
rerum autem saepe (ut dixi) maximarum momenta vertit, ut cum odium iramque frequentissime frangat.
Moreover, as I have said, it often turns the crises of the greatest matters, as when it most frequently breaks hatred and anger.
§6.3.10documento sunt iuvenes Tarentini, qui multa de rege Pyrrho sequius inter cenam locuti, cum rationem facti reposcerentur et neque negari res neque defendi posset, risu sunt et opportune ioco elapsi.
A proof of this is the young Tarentines, who, having spoken many disrespectful things about King Pyrrhus during dinner, when they were called to account for the deed and the matter could neither be denied nor defended, escaped by laughter and an opportune joke.
namque unus ex iis, immo, inquit, nisi lagona defecisset, occidissemus te; eaque urbanitate tota est invidia criminis dissoluta.
For one of them said, "Indeed, if the bottle had not failed us, we would have killed you"; and by that urbanity all the ill-will of the accusation was dissolved.
§6.3.11verum hoc, quidquid est, ut non ausim dicere carere omnino arte, quia nonnullam observationem habet, suntque ad id pertinentia et a Graecis et a Latinis composita praecepta, ita plane adfirmo, praecipue positum esse in natura et in occasione.
But this, whatever it is, though I would not dare to say it is entirely devoid of art, since it has some observation, and there are rules pertaining to it composed by both Greeks and Latins, yet I plainly affirm that it is chiefly placed in nature and in opportunity.
§6.3.12porro natura non tantum in hoc valet, ut acutior quis atque habilior sit ad inveniendum (nam id sane doctrina possit augeri), sed inest proprius quibusdam decor in habitu ac vultu, ut eadem illa minus alio dicente urbana esse videantur.
Furthermore, nature is not only powerful in this, that one is sharper and more fit for inventing (for that indeed could be increased by instruction), but there is a peculiar grace in the carriage and countenance of some, so that those same things seem less witty when spoken by another.