§4.5.19frequenter autem accidit, ut causa parum verecunda iure tuta sit; de quo ne inviti iudices audiant et aversi, frequentius sunt admonendi, secuturam defensionem probitatis et dignitatis; exspectent paulum et agi ordine sinant.
But it frequently happens that a cause which is not very respectable is safe in law; that the judges may not hear about this unwillingly and with aversion, they must be warned more frequently that a defense of integrity and dignity will follow; let them wait a little and allow the case to be conducted in order.
§4.5.20quaedam interim nos invitis litigatoribus simulandum est dicere, quod Cicero pro Cluentio facit circa iudiciariam legem; nonnunquam, quasi interpellemur ab iis, subsistere; saepe convertenda ad ipsos oratio; hortandi ut sinant nos uti nostro consilio.
In the meantime, we must pretend to say certain things against the will of our litigants, which Cicero does in his speech for Cluentius regarding the judiciary law; sometimes we must stop, as if we were interrupted by them; often our speech must be turned to them; they must be exhorted to allow us to use our own counsel.
ita surrepetur animo iudicis et, dum sperat probationem pudoris, asperioribus illis minus repugnabit.
Thus it will steal into the mind of the judge, and, while he hopes for the proof of honor, he will less repugn those harsher points.
§4.5.21quae cum receperit, etiam verecundiae defensioni facilior erit.
When he has received these, he will be more favorable even to the defense of honor.
sic utraque res invicem iuvabit, eritque iudex circa ius nostrum spe modestiae attentior, circa modestiam iuris probatione proclivior.
Thus each of the two things will assist the other in turn, and the judge will be more attentive to our right through the hope of modesty, and more inclined to modesty through the proof of right.
§4.5.22sed ut non semper necessaria aut utilis est partitio, ita opportune adhibita plurimum orationi lucis et gratiae confert.
But as partition is not always necessary or useful, so when opportunely applied it confers very much light and grace upon a speech.
neque enim solum id efficit, ut clariora fiant, quae dicuntur, rebus velut ex turba extractis et in conspectu iudicum positis; sed reficit quoque audientem certo singularum partium fine, non aliter quam facientibus iter multum detrahunt fatigationis notata inscriptis lapidibus spatia.
For it not only effects this, that what is said becomes clearer, the things being extracted as if from a crowd and placed in the view of the judges; but it also refreshes the hearer by a certain end of individual parts, not otherwise than marked distances on inscribed stones detract much of fatigue from those who make a journey.
§4.5.23nam et exhausti laboris nosse mensuram voluptati est, et hortatur ad reliqua fortius exsequenda scire quantum supersit.
For both to know the measure of exhausted labor is a pleasure, and to know how much remains exhorts to execute the rest more courageously.
nihil enim longum videri necesse est, in quo, quid ultimum sit, certum est.
For nothing is necessary to seem long, in which it is certain what is the last.
§4.5.24nec immerito multum ex diligentia partiendi tulit laudis Q. Hortensius, cuius tamen divisionem in digitos diductam nonnunquam Cicero leviter eludit.
Nor did Q. Hortensius undeservedly carry away much praise from his diligence in partitioning, whose division, however, drawn out on his fingers, Cicero sometimes lightly eludes.
nam est suus et in gestu modus, et vitanda, utique maxime, concisa nimium et velut articulosa partitio.
For there is a certain moderation in gesture too, and a partition too concise and, as it were, articulate must be avoided, especially and above all.
§4.5.25nam et auctoritati plurimum detrahunt minuta illa nec iam membra sed frusta, et huius gloriae cupidi, quo subtilius et copiosius divisisse videantur, et supervacua adsumunt et quae natura singularia sunt secant, nec tam plura faciunt quam minora; deinde cum fecerunt mille particulas, in eandem incidunt obscuritatem, contra quam partitio inventa est.
For those minute particles, no longer members but fragments, detract very much from authority; and those greedy of this glory, that they may seem to have divided more subtly and copiously, both assume superfluous things and cut what are by nature single, and do not make them so much more numerous as smaller; then when they have made a thousand particles, they fall into the same obscurity, against which partition was invented.
§4.5.26et divisa autem et simplex propositio, quotiens utiliter adhiberi potest, primum debet esse aperta atque lucida (nam quid sit turpius, quam id esse obscurum ipsum, quod in eum solum adhibetur usum, ne sint cetera obscura?), tum brevis nec ullo supervacuo onerata verbo.
And both a divided and a simple proposition, as often as it can be usefully applied, ought first to be open and clear (for what is more shameful than that that very thing which is applied for this sole use, lest other things be obscure, should itself be obscure?), then brief and burdened with no superfluous word.
non enim, quid dicamus, sed de quo dicturi simus ostendimus.
For we do not show what we are saying, but about what we are going to speak.
§4.5.27obtinendum etiam, ne quid in ea desit, ne quid supersit.
It must also be obtained that nothing is wanting in it, and nothing is superfluous.
superest autem sic fere, cum aut in species partimur, quod in genera partiri sit satis, aut genere posito subiicitur species, ut dicam de virtute, iustitia, continentia, cum iustitia atque continentia virtutis sint species.
But superfluity happens nearly thus: when we either partition into species what it is sufficient to partition into genera, or when, the genus having been placed, the species is subjoined, as if I should speak about virtue, justice, and temperance, since justice and temperance are species of virtue.
§4.5.28partitio prima est, quid sit de quo conveniat, quid de quo ambigatur.
The first partition is, what is that about which there is agreement, and what is that about which there is dispute.
in eo, quod convenit, quid adversarius fateatur, quid nos; in eo, de quo ambigitur, quae nostrae propositiones, quae partis adversae.
In that which is agreed, what the adversary confesses and what we do; in that about which there is dispute, what our propositions are and what those of the adverse party are.
pessimum vero, non eodem ordine exsequi, quo quidque proposueris.
But the worst is not to execute in the same order as you have proposed each thing.