§4.5.1partitio est nostrarum aut adversarii propositionum aut utrarumque ordine collocata enumeratio.
Partition is the orderly arranged enumeration of our propositions, or those of our adversary, or of both.
hac quidam utendum semper putant, quod ea fiat causa lucidior et iudex attentior ac docilior, si scierit et de quo dicamus et de quo dicturi postea simus.
Some think this should always be used, because it makes the cause clearer and the judge more attentive and teachable, if he knows both what we are speaking of and what we are going to speak of afterwards.
§4.5.2rursus quidam periculosum id oratori arbitrantur duabus ex causis: quod nonnunquam et excidere soleant quae promisimus et, si qua in partiendo praeterimus, occurrere; quod quidem nemini accidet, nisi qui plane vel nullo fuerit ingenio vel ad agendum nihil cogitati praemeditatique detulerit.
On the other hand, some judge it dangerous for an orator for two reasons: because sometimes those things which we promised are accustomed to escape us, and, if we pass over anything in partitioning, it may occur to us later; which indeed will happen to no one, except him who is plainly of no talent, or who has brought nothing thought out and premeditated to the pleading.
§4.5.3alioqui quae tam manifesta et lucida est ratio quam rectae partitionis? sequitur enim naturam ducem adeo ut memoriae id maximum sit auxilium via dicendi non decedere.
Otherwise, what method is so manifest and clear as that of a correct partition? For it follows nature as a guide, so much so that it is the greatest help to the memory not to depart from the path of speaking.
quapropter ne illos quidem probaverim, qui partitionem vetant ultra tres propositiones extendere.
Wherefore I should not approve of those either who forbid extending the partition beyond three propositions.
quae sine dubio, si nimium sit multiplex, fugiet memoriam iudicis et turbabit intentionem; hoc tamen numero velut lege non est alliganda, cum possit causa plures desiderare.
Indeed, if it is too manifold, it will escape the memory of the judge and disturb his attention; yet it should not be bound to this number as if by a law, since a cause may require more.
§4.5.4alia sunt magis, propter quae partitione non semper sit utendum: primum, quia pleraque gratiora sunt, si inventa subito nec domo adlata, sed inter dicendum ex re ipsa nata videantur, unde illa non iniucunda schemata, paene excidit mihi, et fugerat me, et recte admones. propositis enim probationibus omnis in reliquum gratia novitatis praecerpitur.
There are other things rather, because of which partition should not always be used: first, because most things are more pleasing if they seem to be found suddenly and not brought from home, but born during the speaking from the matter itself, whence those not unpleasant figures, "it almost escaped me," and "it had fled from me," and "you rightly remind me." For when the proofs are proposed beforehand, all the pleasure of novelty for the remainder is forestalled.
§4.5.5interim vero etiam fallendus est iudex et variis artibus subeundus, ut aliud agi quam quod petimus putet.
But sometimes indeed the judge must be deceived and approached by various arts, so that he may think something else is being done than what we seek.
nam est nonnunquam dura propositio, quod iudex si providit, non aliter praeformidat quam qui ferrum medici priusquam curetur aspexit; at si re non ante proposita securum ac nulla denuntiatione in se conversum intrarit oratio, efficiet, quod promittenti non crederetur.
For sometimes there is a harsh proposition, which if the judge foresees, he dreads it no otherwise than he who has seen the physician's steel before he is treated; but if, the matter not being proposed beforehand, the speech enters him while he is secure and turned toward himself by no warning, it will effect what would not have been believed of one who promised it.
§4.5.6interim refugienda non modo distinctio quaestionum est, sed omnino tractatio; adfectibus turbandus et ab intentione auferendus auditor.
Sometimes we must avoid not only the distinction of questions, but their treatment altogether; the hearer must be disturbed by passions and drawn away from his attention.
non enim solum oratoris est docere, sed plus eloquentia circa movendum valet.
For it is not only the duty of the orator to teach, but eloquence has more power in moving.
cui rei contraria est maxime tenuis illa et scrupulose in partes secta divisionis diligentia eo tempore quo cognoscenti iudicium conamur auferre.
To which thing that thin and scrupulously cut into parts diligence of division is most contrary, at that time when we are trying to take away judgment from him who is taking cognizance.
§4.5.7quid quod interim, quae per se levia sunt et infirma, turba valent? ideoque congerenda sunt potius et velut eruptione pugnandum; quod tamen rarum esse debet et ex necessitate demum, cum hoc ipsum quod dissimile rationi est coegerit ratio.
What of the fact that sometimes things which are light and weak in themselves have power in a crowd? And therefore they ought rather to be heaped up, and we must fight as if by a sally; which, however, ought to be rare, and only from necessity, when reason itself has compelled this very thing which is unlike reason.
§4.5.8praeter haec in omni partitione est utique aliquid potentissimum, quod cum audivit iudex cetera tanquam supervacua gravari solet.
Besides these, in every partition there is certainly something most powerful, which when the judge has heard, he is accustomed to be annoyed by the rest as if superfluous.
itaque si plura vel obiicienda sunt vel diluenda, et utilis et iucunda partitio est ut, quid quaque de re dicturi simus, ordine appareat; at si unum crimen varie defendemus, supervacua.
Therefore, if several charges are either to be made or washed away, partition is both useful and pleasant, so that it may appear in order what we are going to say on each matter; but if we defend one crime in various ways, it is superfluous.
§4.5.9ut si illa partiamur, dicam non talem esse hunc quem tueor reum, ut in eo credibile videri possit homicidium; dicam occidendi causam huic non fuisse; dicam hunc eo tempore quo homo occisus est trans mare fuisse, omnia, quae ante id quod ultimum est exsequeris, inania videri necesse est.
As if we should partition thus: "I shall say that this defendant whom I protect is not such a person that murder could seem credible in him; I shall say that he had no cause for killing; I shall say that he was across the sea at the time when the man was killed," all things which you execute before that which is last must of necessity seem useless.