§4.2.77verbis elevare quaedam licebit; luxuria liberalitatis, avaritia parsimoniae, negligentia simplicitatis nomine lenietur; vultu denique, voce, habitu vel favoris aliquid vel miserationis merebor.
It will be permitted to tone down certain things with words; luxury will be softened under the name of liberality, avarice under that of parsimony, and negligence under that of simplicity; finally, by my countenance, voice, and bearing, I shall merit some degree of either favor or pity.
solet nonnunquam movere lacrimas ipsa confessio.
Sometimes confession itself is accustomed to move tears.
atque ego libenter interrogem, sint illa defensuri, quae non narraverint, necne?
And I would gladly ask whether they are going to defend those things which they have not narrated, or not?
§4.2.78nam si neque defenderint neque narraverint, tota causa prodetur; at si defensuri sunt, proponere certe plerumque id, quod confirmaturi sumus, oportet.
For if they neither defend nor narrate, the whole case will be betrayed; but if they are going to defend, it is certainly necessary for the most part to propose beforehand that which we are going to confirm.
cur ergo non exponamus, quod et dilui potest et, ut hoc contingat, utique indicandum est?
Why then should we not expose that which both can be diluted and, in order for this to happen, must at all events be indicated?
§4.2.79aut quid inter probationem et narrationem interest, nisi quod narratio est probationis continua propositio, rursus probatio narrationi congruens confirmatio? videamus ergo, num haec expositio longior demum debeat esse et paulo verbosior praeparatione et quibusdam argumentis (argumentis dico, non argumentatione), cui tamen plurimum confert frequens adfirmatio effecturos nos quod dicimus; non posse vim rerum ostendi prima expositione; exspectent et opiniones suas differant et bene sperent.
Or what is the difference between proof and statement of facts, except that the statement of facts is a continuous proposition of the proof, and on the other hand, the proof is a confirmation congruent with the statement of facts? Let us see, therefore, whether this exposition ought in the end to be longer and a little more wordy by means of preparation and certain arguments (I say arguments, not argumentation), to which, however, a frequent affirmation that we will effect what we say contributes very much: namely, that the force of things cannot be shown in the first exposition; let them wait, and defer their opinions, and hope for the best.
§4.2.80denique utique narrandum est, quidquid aliter quam adversarius exposuit narrari potest, aut etiam prooemia sunt in his causis supervacua;
In short, whatever can be narrated otherwise than the opponent has exposed must by all means be narrated, or else even proems are superfluous in these cases; for what do they do more than to make the judge more adaptable to the knowledge of the facts?
quae quid magis agunt, quam ut cognitioni rerum accommodatiorem iudicem faciant? atque constabit, nusquam esse eorum maiorem usum, quam ubi animus iudicis ab aliqua contra nos insita opinione flectendus est.
And it will be established that nowhere is their use greater than where the mind of the judge is to be turned from some opinion implanted against us.
§4.2.81coniecturales autem causae, in quibus de facto quaeritur, non tam saepe rei, de qua indicium est, quam eorum, per quae res colligenda est, expositionem habent.
But conjectural cases, in which the question is about the fact, not so often have an exposition of the matter concerning which there is a trial, as of those things through which the matter is to be inferred.
quae cum accusator suspiciose narret, reus levare suspicionem debeat, aliter ab hoc atque ab illo ad iudicem perferri oportet.
Since the accuser narrates these things suspiciously, and the defendant must alleviate the suspicion, they ought to be brought to the judge differently by the one and by the other.
§4.2.82at enim quaedam argumenta turba valent, diducta leviora sunt. id quidem non eo pertinet, ut quaeratur an narrandum, sed quomodo narrandum sit.
But it may be said, "certain arguments are strong in a crowd, but when separated they are weaker." That indeed does not pertain to the question of whether one should narrate, but how one should narrate.
nam et congerere plura in expositione quid prohibet, si id utile est causae, et promittere, sed et dividere narrationem et probationes subiungere partibus atque ita transire ad sequentia?
For what prevents us from both amassing many things in the exposition, if that is useful to the case, and promising, and even dividing the statement of facts and subjoining proofs to the parts, and so passing on to the following things?
§4.2.83nam ne iis quidem accedo, qui semper eo putant ordine, quo quid actum sit, esse narrandum, sed eo malo narrare, quo expedit.
For I do not even agree with those who think that the statement of facts must always be told in the order in which each thing was done, but I prefer to narrate in that order which is expedient.
quod fieri plurimis figuris licet.
This may be done by very many figures.
nam et aliquando nobis excidisse simulamus, cum quid utiliore loco reducimus, et interim nos reddituros reliquum ordinem testamur, quia sic futura sit causa lucidior; interim re exposita subiungimus causas quae antecesserunt.
For sometimes we pretend that something had escaped us, when we bring it back in a more useful place; and sometimes we declare that we will return to the remaining order because the case will thus be clearer; sometimes, after the fact has been exposed, we subjoin the causes which preceded it.
§4.2.84neque enim est una lex defensionis certumque praescriptum; pro re, pro tempore intuenda quae prosint, atque ut erit vulnus, ita vel curandum protinus vel, si curatio differri potest, interim deligandum.
For there is not one law of defense and a fixed rule; we must look to what is beneficial according to the matter and the time, and just as the wound is, so it must either be cured immediately or, if the cure can be deferred, bound up in the meantime.
§4.2.85nec saepius narrare duxerim nefas, quod Cicero pro Cluentio fecit; estque non concessum modo, sed aliquando etiam necessarium, ut in causis repetundarum omnibusque quae simplices non sunt.
Nor should I deem it a sin to narrate more than once, which Cicero did in his speech for Cluentius; and it is not only permitted, but sometimes even necessary, as in cases of extortion and in all that are not simple.
amentis est enim superstitione praeceptorum contra rationem causae trahi.
For it is the part of a madman to be dragged by a superstition for precepts against the utility of the case.
§4.2.86narrationem ideo ante probationes ponere est institutum, ne iudex, qua de re quaeratur, ignoret.
It was established to place the statement of facts before the proofs for this reason, lest the judge should be ignorant of the matter under inquiry.
cur igitur, si singula probanda aut refellenda erunt, non singula etiam narrentur? me certe, quantacunque nostris experimentis habenda est fides, fecisse hoc in foro, quotiens ita desiderabat utilitas, probantibus et eruditis et iis, qui iudicabant, scio; et (quod non arroganter dixerim, quia sunt plurimi, quibuscum egi, qui me refellere possint, si mentiar) fere ponendae a me causae officium exigebatur.
Why therefore, if individual points are to be proved or refuted, should they not also be individually narrated? I certainly know that I, whatever faith is to be placed in my experience, did this in the forum as often as utility so required, with the approval both of the learned and of those who judged; and (which I would not say arrogantly, because there are very many with whom I have pleaded who could refute me if I should lie) the duty of presenting the case was almost always demanded of me.