§4.2.54ne illud quidem fuerit inutile, semina quaedam probationum spargere, verum sic ut narrationem esse meminerimus non probationem.
Nor will it have been useless to sow certain seeds of proof, but in such a way that we remember it is a statement of facts, not a proof.
nonnunquam tamen etiam argumento aliquo confirmabimus, quod proposuerimus, sed simplici et brevi, ut in veneficiis: sanus bibit, statim concidit, livor ac tumor confestim est insecutus. §4.2.55hoc faciunt et illae praeparationes, cum reus dicitur robustus, armatus contra infirmos, inermes, securos.
Sometimes, however, we shall also confirm what we have proposed with some argument, but a simple and brief one, as in cases of poisoning: "He drank while healthy, he fell immediately, blackness and swelling confestim followed." Those preparations also do this, when the accused is said to be robust, armed against the weak, unarmed, and unsuspecting.
omnia denique, quae probation tractaturi sumus, personam, causam, locum, tempus, instrumentum, occasionem, narratione delibabimus.
In short, all things that we are going to treat in the proof—person, cause, place, time, instrument, occasion—we shall touch upon in the statement of facts.
§4.2.56aliquando, si destituti fuerimus his, etiam fatebimur vix esse credibile, sed verum et hoc maius habendum scelus; nescire nos quomodo factum sit aut quare, mirari sed probaturos.
Sometimes, if we are destitute of these, we shall even confess that it is scarcely credible, but true, and that for this reason the crime must be held more heinous; that we do not know how it was done or why, that we wonder, but we will prove it.
§4.2.57optimae vero praeparationes erunt quae latuerint, it a Cicerone sunt quidem utilissime praedicta omnia, per quae Miloni Clodius non Clodio Milo insidiatus esse videatur; plurimum tamen facit illa callidissima simplicitatis imitatio: Milo autem, cum in senate fuisset eo die, (quoad senatus est dimissus, domum venit, calceos et vestimenta mutauit, paulisper, dum se uxor, ut fit, comparat, commoratus est. §4.2.58quam nihil festinato, nihil praeparato fecisse videtur Milo! quod non solum rebus ipsis vir eloquentissimus, quibus moras et lentum profectionis ordinem ducit, sed verbis etiam vulgaribus et cotidianis et arte occulta consecutus est; quae si aliter dicta essent, strepitu ipso iudicem ad custodiendum patronum excitassent.
But the best preparations will be those that are concealed. Thus, all things have indeed been most usefully foretold by Cicero, through which Clodius may seem to have ambushed Milo, not Milo Clodius; yet that most crafty imitation of simplicity does the most: "But Milo, when he had been in the senate on that day, as long as the senate was dismissed, came home, changed his shoes and garments, and tarried for a little while, while his wife, as is wont, prepared herself." How Milo seems to have done nothing in haste, nothing prepared! Which that most eloquent man achieved not only by the facts themselves, with which he draws out delays and a slow order of departure, but also by vulgar and everyday words and hidden art; which if they had been said otherwise, by their very noise they would have excited the judge to guard the patron.
§4.2.59frigere videntur ista plerisque, sed hoc ipso manifestum est, quomodo iudicem fefellerit, quod vix a lectore deprehenditur.
These things seem cold to most people, but by this very fact it is manifest how it deceived the judge, because it is scarcely detected by a reader.
haec sunt quae credibilem faciant expositionem.
These are the things that make the exposition credible.
§4.2.60nam id quidem, ne qua contraria aut sibi repugnantia in narratione dicamus, si cui praecipiendum est, is reliqua frustra docetur, etiamsi quidam scriptores artium hoc quoque tanquam occultum et a se prudenter erutum tradunt.
For as to that, indeed, that we should not say anything contrary or repugnant to itself in the statement of facts, if this is to be instructed to anyone, he is taught the rest in vain, even though certain writers of arts hand this down also as something hidden and prudently dug out by themselves.
§4.2.61his tribus narrandi virtutibus adiiciunt quidam magnificentiam, quam μεγαλοπρέπειαν vocant, quae neque in omnes causas cadit (nam quid in plerisque iudiciis privatis, de certa credita, locato et conducto, interdictis habere loci potest supra modum se tollens oratio?) neque semper est utilis, velut proximo exemplo Miloniano patet.
To these three virtues of narrating, certain writers add magnificence, which they call megaloprepena, which neither falls upon all cases (for what place can an oration raising itself beyond measure have in most private judgments, concerning a certain debt, letting and hiring, or interdicts?) nor is it always useful, as is clear from the next Milonian example.
§4.2.62et meminerimus multas esse causas, in quibus confitendum, excusandum, summittendum sit quod exponimus; quibus omnibus aliena est illa magnificentiae virtus.
And let us remember that there are many cases in which what we expose must be confessed, excused, or submitted; to all of which that virtue of magnificence is foreign.
quare non magis proprium narrationis est magnifice dicere quam miserabiliter, invidiose, graviter, dulciter, urbane; quae, cum suo quoque loco sint laudabilia, non sunt huic parti proprie adsignata et velut dedita.
Therefore it is no more proper to a statement of facts to speak magnificently than miserably, invidiously, gravely, sweetly, or urbanely; which, although they are praiseworthy in their own place, are not properly assigned and, as it were, dedicated to this part.
§4.2.63illa quoque ut narrationi apta, ita ceteris quoque partibus communis est virtus, quam Theodectes huic uni proprie dedit; non enim magnificam modo vult esse, verum etiam iucundam expositionem.
That virtue also, as it is fit for narration, so is it common to other parts, which Theodectes gave properly to this one alone; for he wants the exposition to be not only magnificent, but also pleasant.
sunt qui adiiciant his evidentiam, quae ἐνάργεια Graece vocatur.
There are those who add to these vividness, which in Greek is called enargeia.
§4.2.64neque ego quemquam deceperim, ut dissimulem Ciceroni quoque plures partes placere.
Nor would I deceive anyone, so as to dissimulate that more parts pleased Cicero too.
nam praeterquam planam et brevem et credibilem vult esse evidentem, moratam cum dignitate.
For besides wanting it to be clear, brief, and credible, he wants it to be vivid, and moral with dignity.
sed in oratione morata debent esse omnia cum dignitate, quae poterunt.
But in a moral speech all things ought to be with dignity that can be.
evidentia in narratione, quantum ego intelligo, est quidem magna virtus, cum quid veri non dicendum, sed quodammodo etiam ostendendum est; sed subiici perspicuitati potest, quam quidam etiam contrariam interim putaverunt, quia in quibusdam causis obscuranda veritas esset; quod est ridiculum.
Vividness in narration, as far as I understand, is indeed a great virtue, when some truth is not to be told, but in a certain way also shown; but it can be subjected to perspicuity, which some even thought contrary to it at times, because in certain cases the truth had to be obscured; which is ridiculous.
§4.2.65nam qui obscurare vult, narrat falsa pro veris, et in iis quae narrat debet laborare, ut videantur quam evidentissima.
For he who wants to obscure, narrates false things for true ones, and in those things which he narrates, he must labor so that they seem as vivid as possible.