§4.2.33quo diligentius distinguenda sunt singula, ut quid quoque loco prosit ostendam.
Therefore, each particular must be distinguished all the more carefully, so that I may show what is useful in each place.
narratio est aut tota pro nobis aut tota pro adversariis aut mixta ex utrisque.
A statement of facts is either entirely for us, or entirely for our opponents, or mixed from both.
si erit tota pro nobis, contenti sumus his tribus partibus per quas efficitur, quo facilius iudex intelligat, meminerit, credat.
If it is entirely for us, we are content with these three parts through which it is brought about that the judge may more easily understand, remember, and believe.
§4.2.34nec quisquam reprehensione dignum putet, quod proposuerim eam, quae sit tota pro nobis, debere esse verisimilem, cum vera sit.
And let no one think it worthy of blame that I have proposed that that which is entirely for us ought to be plausible, although it be true.
sunt enim plurima uera quidem, sed parum credibilia, sicut falsa quoque frequenter verisimilia.
For there are very many things which are indeed true, but not very credible, just as false things also are frequently plausible.
quare non minus laborandum est, ut iudex, quae vere dicimus quam quae fingimus, credat.
Therefore, no less effort must be made that the judge may believe what we speak truly than what we invent.
§4.2.35sunt quidem hae, quas supra retuli, virtutes aliarum quoque partium.
These virtues indeed, which I mentioned above, are also of other parts.
nam et per totam actionem vitanda est obscuritas et modus ubique custodiendus, et credibilia esse omnia oportet quae dicuntur.
For obscurity must be avoided throughout the whole pleading, and measure must be observed everywhere, and all things that are said ought to be credible.
maxime tamen haec in ea parte custodienda sunt, quae prima iudicem docet; in qua si acciderit, ut aut non intelligat aut non meminerit aut non credat, frustra in reliquis laborabimus.
Most of all, however, these must be observed in that part which first instructs the judge; in which if it happens that he either does not understand, or does not remember, or does not believe, we shall labor in vain in the remaining parts.
§4.2.36erit autem narratio aperta atque dilucida, si fuerit primum exposita verbis propriis et significantibus et non sordidis quidem, non tamen exquisitis et ab usu remotis, tum distincta rebus, personis, temporibus, locis, causis, ipsa etiam pronuntiatione in hoc accommodata, ut iudex quae dicentur quam facillime accipiat.
The statement of facts, moreover, will be open and clear, if first it is set forth in proper and expressive words, and indeed not vulgar, yet not exquisite and remote from common use; then, distinguished by facts, persons, times, places, causes; and adapted also in its very delivery to this end, that the judge may receive what is said as easily as possible.
§4.2.37quae quidem virtus negligitur a plurimis, qui ad clamorem dispositae vel etiam forte circumfusae multitudinis compositi non ferunt illud intentionis silentium nec sibi diserti videntur, nisi omnia tumultu et vociferatione concusserint; rem indicate sermonis cotidiani et in quemcumque etiam indoctorum cadentis existimant, cum interim, quod tanquam facile contemnunt, nescias, praestare minus velint an possint.
Which virtue indeed is neglected by very many, who, having composed themselves for the applause of a crowd arranged or even by chance gathered around them, do not bear that silence of attention, nor do they seem eloquent to themselves unless they have shaken everything with tumult and vociferation; they think that stating the case is a matter of everyday speech and falling within the capacity of any uneducated person; whereas in the meantime, as to that which they despise as easy, you would not know whether they are less willing or less able to perform it.
§4.2.38neque enim aliud in eloquentia, cuncta experti, difficilius reperient quam id, quod se fuisse dicturos omnes putant, postquam audierunt, quia non bona iudicant esse illa, sed vera.
For those who have tried all things will find nothing else in eloquence more difficult than that which all people, after they have heard it, think they would have said themselves, because they judge those things to be not fine, but true.
tum autem optime dicit orator, cum videtur vera dicere. at nunc,
But the orator speaks best then, when he seems to speak the truth.
§4.2.39velut campum nacti expositionis, hic potissimum et vocem flectunt et cervicem reponunt et brachium in latus iactant totoque et rerum et verborum et compositionis genere lasciviunt; deinde, quod sit monstro simile, placet actio, causa non intelligitur.
But now, as if having found a field in the exposition, here most of all they bend their voice, throw back their neck, toss their arm to the side, and run riot in the whole style of matters, words, and composition; then, what is like a monster, the delivery pleases, but the case is not understood.
verum haec omittamus, ne minus gratiae praecipiendo recta quam offensae reprehendendo prava mereamur.
But let us omit these things, lest we earn less gratitude by teaching what is right than offense by censuring what is wrong.
§4.2.40brevis erit narratio ante omnia, si inde coeperimus rem exponere, unde ad iudicem pertinet; deinde, si nihil extra causam dixerimus; tum etiam,si reciderimus omnia, quibus sublatis neque cognitioni quidquam neque utilitati detrahatur.
The statement of facts will be brief, above all, if we begin to set forth the matter from that point where it concerns the judge; next, if we say nothing outside the case; then also, if we cut away all things from which, if removed, nothing is detracted either from understanding or from utility.
§4.2.41solet enim quaedam esse partium brevitas, quae longam tamen efficit summam.
For there is accustomed to be a certain brevity of parts, which nevertheless makes a long total.
in portum veni, navem prospexi, quanti veheret interrogavi, de pretio convenit, conscendi, sublatae sunt ancorae, solvimus oram, profecti sumus. nihil horum dici celerius potest, sed sufficit dicere e portu navigavi. et quotiens exitus rei satis ostendit priora, debemus hoc esse contenti, quo reliqua intelliguntur.
"I came into the port, I looked out at a ship, I asked how much she would carry me for, we agreed on the price, I went on board, the anchors were weighed, we cast off the cable, we set out." None of these things can be said more quickly, but it is enough to say: "I sailed from the port." And as often as the outcome of a thing sufficiently shows what went before, we ought to be content with that by which the remaining things are understood.
quare, §4.2.42cum dicere liceat, est mihi filius iuvenis, omnia illa supervacua: cupidus ego liberorum uxorem duxi, natum filium sustuli, educavi, in adolescentiam perduxi. ideoque Graecorum aliqui aliud circumcisam expositionem, id est σύντομον, aliud brevem putaverunt, quod illa supervacuis careret, haec posset aliquid ex necessariis desiderare.
Therefore, since it is permitted to say, "I have a young son," all those things are superfluous: "I, desiring children, took a wife, raised up my newborn son, educated him, brought him to youth." And therefore some of the Greeks thought a "circumcised" exposition, that is, syntomon, to be one thing, and a "brief" one to be another; because the former is without superfluities, while the latter might lack some of the necessary things.