§4.2.1maxime naturale est et fieri frequentissime debet, ut praeparato per haec, quae supra dicta sunt, iudice res, de qua pronuntiaturus est, indicetur.
It is most natural, and ought to be done most frequently, that, the judge having been prepared by these things which have been said above, the matter about which he is to pronounce judgment should be indicated.
haec est narratio.
This is the statement of facts.
§4.2.2in qua sciens transcurram subtiles nimium divisiones quorundam plura eius genera facientium.
In this, I shall knowingly pass over the overly subtle divisions of certain writers who make more kinds of it.
non enim solam volunt esse illam negotii, de quo apud iudices quaeritur, expositionem, sed personae, ut M. Lollius Palicanus, humili loco Picens, loquax magis quam facundus; loci, ut oppidum est in Hellesponto Lampsacum, indices; temporis ut
"
vere nouo, gelidus canis cum montibus humo?
liquitur; "
causarum, quibus historici frequentissime utuntur, cum exponunt, unde bellum, seditio, pestilentia.
For they do not want it to be only the exposition of the business which is being inquired into before the judges, but also of the person (as: "Marcus Lollius Palicanus, a man of Picenum of humble origin, more loquacious than eloquent"); of the place (as: "Lampsacum is a town on the Hellespont, judges"); of time (as: "In early spring, when icy snow from snowy mountains melts on the ground..."); and of causes, which historians use most frequently when they explain whence a war, a sedition, or a pestilence arose.
§4.2.3praeter haec alias perfectas, alias imperfectas vocant;
In addition to these, they call some perfect, others imperfect; who is ignorant of this?
quod quis ignorat? adiiciunt expositionem et praeteritorum esse temporum, quae est frequentissima, et praesentium, qualis est Ciceronis de discursu amicorum Chrysogoni, postquam est nominatus, et futurorum, quae solis dari uaticinantibus potest; nam ὑποτύπωσις non est habenda narratio.
They add that exposition belongs to past times (which is the most frequent), to present times (such as Cicero's description of the running about of Chrysogonus's friends after he was named), and to future times (which can be granted only to those who prophesy; for hypotyposis is not to be regarded as a statement of facts).
§4.2.4sed nos potioribus vacemus.
But let us devote our time to more important matters.
plerique semper narrandum putaverunt, quod falsum esse pluribus coarguitur.
Most writers have thought that we must always make a statement of facts, which is proved to be false by many arguments.
sunt enim ante omnia quaedam tam breves causae, ut propositionem potius habeant quam narrationem.
For, above all, there are certain cases so short that they contain a proposition rather than a statement of facts.
§4.2.5id accidit aliquando utrique parti, cum vel nulla expositio est, vel de re constat, de iure quaeritur, ut apud centumviros, filius an frater debeat esse intestatae heres, pubertas annis an corporis habitu aestimetur: aut cum est quidem in re narrationi locus, sed aut ante iudici nota sunt omnia aut priore loco recte exposita.
This happens sometimes to both parties, when either there is no exposition, or the fact is admitted and the question is about the law, as before the centumviri, whether the son or the brother ought to be the heir of an intestate woman, or whether puberty is to be estimated by years or by the habit of the body; or when there is indeed room for a statement of facts in the case, but either all things are already known to the judge, or have been correctly set forth by the preceding speaker.
accidit aliquando alteri et saepius ab actore, §4.2.6vel quia satis est proponere vel quia sic magis expedit.
It happens sometimes to one of the parties, and more frequently to the plaintiff, either because it is sufficient to state the proposition, or because it is more expedient to do so.
satis est dixisse, certam creditam pecuniam peto ex stipulatione; Legatum peto ex testamento. diverse partis expositio est, cur ea non debeantur.
It is sufficient to have said, "I claim a certain sum of money lent under a stipulation," or "I claim a legacy under a will." The exposition of the opposite party is why those things are not owed.
§4.2.7et satis est actori et magis expedit sic indicare: dico ab Horatio sororem suam interfectam. namque et propositione iudex crimen omne cognoscit, et ordo et causa facti pro adversario magis est.
And it is sufficient for the plaintiff and more expedient to indicate it thus: "I say that his sister was killed by Horatius." For both the judge learns the whole charge by this proposition, and the order and cause of the deed are more in favor of the adversary.
§4.2.8reus contra tunc narrationem subtrahet, cum id, quod obiicitur, neque negari neque excusari poterit, sed in sola iuris quaestione consistet; ut in eo, qui, cum pecuniam privatam ex aede sacra surripuerit, sacrilegii reus est, confessio verecundior quam expositio: non negamus de templo pecuniam esse sublatam, calumniatur tamen accusator actione sacrilegii, cum privata fuerit non sacra; vos autem de hoc cognoscetis, an sacrilegium sit admissum. §4.2.9sed ut has aliquando non narrandi causas puto, sic ab illis dissentio, qui non existimant esse narrationem, cum reus quod obiicitur tantum negat;
The defendant, on the contrary, will omit the statement of facts when that which is charged can neither be denied nor excused, but consists in a question of law alone; as in the case of one who, having stolen private money from a sacred temple, is accused of sacrilege, a confession is more modest than an exposition: "We do not deny that the money was taken from the temple, but the accuser brings a false charge by an action of sacrilege, since it was private, not sacred; you, however, will decide on this, whether sacrilege has been committed." But though I think these are sometimes reasons for not making a statement of facts, yet I disagree with those who do not think there is a statement of facts when the defendant merely denies what is charged; in which opinion is Cornelius Celsus, who thinks most cases of murder, and all of bribery and extortion, are of this condition.
in qua est opinione Cornelius Celsus, qui condicionis huius esse arbitratur plerasque caedis causas et omnes ambitus ac repetundarum. §4.2.10non enim putat esse narrationem, nisi quae summam criminis de quo iudicium est contineat, deinde fatetur ipse pro Rabirio Postumo narrasse Ciceronem; atque ille et negavit pervenisse ad Rabirium pecuniam, qua de re erat quaestio constituta, et in hac narratione nihil de crimine exposuit.
For he does not think there is a statement of facts unless it contains the substance of the charge on which the judgment is to be passed; and yet he himself confesses that Cicero made a statement of facts in defense of Rabirius Postumus; though Cicero both denied that the money, concerning which the inquiry was instituted, had come to Rabirius, and in this statement of facts set forth nothing concerning the charge.
§4.2.11ego autem magnos alioqui secutus auctores, duas esse in iudiciis narrationum species existimo, alteram ipsius causae, alteram rerum ad causam pertinentium expositionem.
But I, following authors who are in other respects great, think that there are two species of statements of facts in trials: the one being the exposition of the case itself, the other of matters pertaining to the case.
§4.2.12non occidi hominem, nulla narratio est; convenit;
"I did not kill the man" is indeed no statement of facts; agreed.
sed erit aliqua et interim etiam longa contra argumenta eius criminis de anteacta vita, de causis, propter quas innocens in periculum deducatur, aliis, quibus incredibile id quod obiicitur fiat.
But there will be some, and sometimes even a long statement, against the arguments of that charge: concerning the past life, concerning the causes because of which an innocent man is brought into danger, and other things by which that which is charged may be made incredible.