§3.8.1deliberativas quoque miror a quibusdam sola utilitate finitas.
I am also surprised that deliberative speeches are defined by some by utility alone.
ac si quid in his unum sequi oporteret, potior fuisset apud me Ciceronis sententia, qui hoc materiae genus dignitate maxime contineri putat.
And if one had to follow any single thing in these, Cicero's opinion would have been preferable to me, who thinks that this kind of material is chiefly contained by dignity.
nec dubito, quin ii, qui sunt in illa priore sententia, secundum opinionem pulcherrimam ne utile quidem, nisi quod honestum esset, existimarint. §3.8.2et est haec ratio verissima, si consilium contingat semper bonorum atque sapientium.
Nor do I doubt that those who are of that former opinion, according to a most beautiful view, did not even consider anything useful unless it were honorable. And this reasoning is most true, if the consultation always happened to be among the good and wise.
verum apud imperitos, apud quos frequenter dicenda sententia est, populumque praecipue, qui ex pluribus constat indoctis, discernenda sunt haec et secundum communes magis intellectus loquendum. §3.8.3sunt enim multi, qui etiam, quae credunt honesta, non tamen satis eadem utilia quoque existiment, et quae turpia esse dubitare non possunt, utilitatis specie ducti probent, ut foedus Numantinum iugumque Caudinum. §3.8.4ne qualitatis quidem statu, in quo et honestorum et utilium quaestio est, complecti eas satis est.
But among the unskilful, before whom an opinion must frequently be spoken, and especially before the populace, which consists of many uneducated people, these things must be distinguished, and one must speak according to more common understandings. For there are many who do not think even those things which they believe to be honorable to be also sufficiently useful, and who, led by the appearance of utility, approve what they cannot doubt to be disgraceful, such as the treaty of Numantia and the Caudine yoke. It is not even sufficient to include them under the status of quality, in which there is the question of both honorable and useful things.
nam frequenter in his etiam coniecturae locus est, nonnunquam tractatur aliqua finitio, aliquando etiam legales possunt incidere tractatus, in privata maxime consilia, si quando ambigetur an liceat. §3.8.5de coniectura paulo post pluribus.
For frequently in these there is also room for conjecture, sometimes some definition is treated, and occasionally even legal discussions can occur, especially in private consultations, if ever there is doubt whether it is lawful. Concerning conjecture I shall speak a little later in more words.
interim est finitio apud Demosthenen, Det Halonnesum Philippus, an reddat? apud Ciceronem in Philippicis, Quid sit tumultus? quid? non illa similis iudicialium quaestio de statua Servi Sulpici, an iis demum ponenda sit, qui in legatione ferro sunt interempti? §3.8.6ergo pars deliberativa, quae eadem suasoria dicitur, de tempore futuro consultans quaerit etiam de praeterito.
In the meantime, there is a definition in Demosthenes, "Should Philip give Halonnesus, or restore it?" and in Cicero's Philippics, "What is a tumult?" And what about that similar judicial question concerning the statue of Servius Sulpicius, "Should it be erected only to those who were slain by the sword on an embassy?" Therefore, the deliberative part, which is also called suasory, consulting about future time, inquires also about the past.
officiis constat duobus suadendi ac dissuadendi.
It consists of two duties: advising and dissuading.
prooemio, quale est in iudicialibus, non ubique eget, quia conciliatus est ei quisque, quem consulit.
It does not everywhere need an introduction, such as there is in judicial speeches, because everyone is already well-disposed to him whom he consults.
initium tamen quodcunque debet habere aliquam prooemii speciem; neque enim abrupte nec unde libuit incipiendum, quia est aliquid in omni materia naturaliter primum. §3.8.7in senatu et utique in contionibus eadem ratio quae apud iudices, adquirendae sibi plerumque eorum, apud quos dicendum sit, benevolentiae.
Yet any beginning ought to have some appearance of an introduction; for we must not begin abruptly or from wherever we please, because there is something naturally first in every material. In the senate, and especially in public assemblies, the same principle holds as before judges, of acquiring for oneself for the most part the goodwill of those before whom one must speak.
nec mirum, cum etiam in panegyricis petatur audientium favor, ubi emolumentum non in utilitate aliqua, sed in sola laude consistit. §3.8.8Aristoteles quidem nec sine causa putat et a nostra et ab eius, qui dissentiet, persona duci frequenter in consiliis exordium, quasi mutuantibus hoc nobis a iudiciali genere, nonnunquam etiam, ut minor res maiorve videatur; in demonstrativis vero prooemia esse maxime libera existimat. §3.8.9nam et longe a materia duci, ut in Helenae laude Isocrates fecerit; et ex aliqua rei vicinia, ut idem in Panegyrico, cum queritur plus honoris corporum quam animorum virtutibus dari; et Gorgias in Olympico laudans eos, qui primi tales instituerint conventus.
And no wonder, since even in panegyrics the favor of the audience is sought, where the reward consists not in some utility, but in praise alone. Aristotle indeed thinks, and not without cause, that the introduction in consultations is frequently drawn both from our own person and from that of the opponent, as if we were borrowing this from the judicial genre, and sometimes also that a matter may seem smaller or greater; but in demonstrative speeches, he thinks that introductions are most free. For they may be drawn far from the material, as Isocrates did in his praise of Helen; or from some proximity of the matter, as the same author in his Panegyric, when he complains that more honor is given to the virtues of bodies than of minds; and Gorgias in his Olympic Oration, praising those who first established such assemblies.
quos secutus videlicet C. Sallustius in bello Iugurthino et Catilinae nihil ad historiam pertinentibus principiis orsus est. §3.8.10sed nunc ad suasoriam, in qua, etiam cum prooemio utemur, breviore tamen et velut quodam capite tantum et initio debebimus esse contenti.
Following whom, of course, Gaius Sallustius in the Jugurthine War and Catiline began with introductions that have nothing to do with history. But now to the suasory speech, in which, even when we use an introduction, we must nevertheless be content with a shorter one, and as it were only a certain head and beginning.
narrationem vero nunquam exigit privata deliberatio, eius duntaxat rei, de qua dicenda sententia est; quia nemo ignorat id de quo consulit. §3.8.11extrinsecus possunt pertinentia ad deliberationem multa narrari.
But private deliberation never requires a narration, at least of that matter about which an opinion is to be spoken; because no one is ignorant of that about which he consults. From the outside, many things pertaining to the deliberation can be narrated.
in contionibus saepe est etiam illa, quae ordinem rei docet, necessaria. §3.8.12adfectus ut quae maxime postulat.
In public assemblies, that narration which teaches the order of the matter is also often necessary. It demands the emotions as much as any genre does.
na M et concitanda et lenienda frequenter est ira, et ad metum, cupiditatem, odium, conciliationem impellendi animi.
For anger must frequently be both excited and softened, and minds must be impelled to fear, desire, hatred, and conciliation.
nonnunquam etiam movenda miseratio, sive, ut auxilium obsessis feratur, suadere oportebit sive sociae civitatis eversionem deflebimus.
Sometimes also pity must be moved, whether it is necessary to advise that aid be brought to the besieged, or we deplore the destruction of an allied city.