§3.6.74hoc illi simile est,
"puniendus es"
,
"non sum;
This is similar to that: 'You ought to be punished', 'I ought not to be'; the judge will see whether he ought to be punished.
"
videbit iudex, an puniendus sit. sed non hic erit quaestio nec hic status.
But the question will not be here, nor the state.
ubi ergo?
"puniendus es, hominem occidisti"
; "non occidi:"
an occiderit.
Where then? 'You ought to be punished, for you killed a man'; 'I did not kill him': whether he killed him.
"honorandus sum"
,
"non es;
'I ought to be honored', 'You ought not to be'; does this have a state?
"
num statum habet? non, ut puto.
No, as I think.
"honorandus sum, quia tyrannum occidi"
; "non occidisti; "
quaestio et status.
'I ought to be honored, because I killed a tyrant'; 'You did not kill him'; a question and a state.
§3.6.75similiter,
"non recte agis"
,
"recte ago"
non habet statum.
Similarly, 'You do not act rightly', 'I act rightly' has no state.
ubi est ergo?
"non recte agis ignominiosus. "
quaeritur, an ignominiosus sit; aut, an agere ignominioso liceat; quaestiones et status.
Where is it then? 'You do not act rightly, being infamous.' It is asked, whether he is infamous; or, whether it is permitted for an infamous person to act; questions and states.
ergo translativum genus causae ut comparativum et mutuae accusationis.
Therefore, the translative genus of cause is like the comparative genus and that of mutual accusation.
§3.6.76at enim simile est illi
"habeo ius"
,
"non habes,"
"occidisti"
,
"recte occidi. "
non nego, sed nec haec res status facit.
But indeed, 'I have the right', 'You do not have it' is similar to 'You killed', 'I killed rightfully.' I do not deny it, but neither does this thing make states.
non enim sunt hae propositiones (alioqui causa non explicabitur), sed, cum suis rationibus.
For these are not the propositions (otherwise the cause will not be explained), but when they are accompanied by their reasons.
"scelus commisit Horatius, sororem enim occidit.
'Horatius committed a crime, for he killed his sister.
non commisit, debuit enim occidere eam, quae hostis mortem maerebat. "
quaestio, an haec iusta causa; ita qualitas.
He did not commit it, for he ought to have killed her who was mourning the death of an enemy.' The question is whether this was a just cause; thus, it is quality.
§3.6.77et similiter in translatione,
"non habes ius abdicandi, quia ignominioso non est actio.
And similarly in transfer, 'You do not have the right of disinheriting, because an infamous person has no action.
habeo ius, quia abdicatio actio non est. "
quaeritur, quid sit actio: finiemus
"non licet abdicare filium"
syllogismo.
I have the right, because disinheriting is not an action.' It is asked, what is an action: we shall define 'it is not permitted to disinherit a son' by syllogism.
item cetera per omnes et rationales et legales status.
Likewise, other things through all the rational and legal states.
§3.6.78nec ignoro fuisse quosdam, qui translationem in rationali quoque genere ponerent hoc nodo,
"hominem occidi, iussus ab imperatore.
Nor am I ignorant that there were some who placed transfer also in the rational genus by this knot: 'I killed a man, being ordered by the general.
dona templi cogenti tyranno dedi.
I gave the gifts of the temple to a tyrant who compelled me.
deserui tempestatibus, luminibus, valetudine impeditus. "
id est, non per me stetit, sed per illud.
I deserted, prevented by storms, blindness, or ill health.' That is, it was not through me, but through that.
A quibus etiam liberius dissentio.
From whom I dissent even more freely.
§3.6.79non enim actio transfertur sed causa facti, quod accidit paene in omni defensione.
For it is not the action that is transferred, but the cause of the deed, which happens in almost every defense.
deinde is, qui tali utitur patrocinio, non recedit a forma qualitatis, dicit enim, se culpa vacare; ut magis qualitatis duplex ratio facienda sit, altera qua et factum defenditur, altera qua tantum reus.
Then, he who uses such a defense does not depart from the form of quality, for he says that he is free from fault; so that rather a double division of quality must be made, one in which the deed also is defended, the other in which only the accused is.
§3.6.80credendum est igitur his, quorum auctoritatem secutus est Cicero, tria esse, quae in omni disputatione quaerantur, an sit, quid sit, quale sit? quod ipsa nobis etiam natura praescribit.
We must believe, therefore, those whose authority Cicero followed, that there are three things which are sought in every disputation: whether it is, what it is, and of what kind it is. Which nature itself also prescribes to us.
nam primum oportet subesse aliquid, de quo ambigitur; quod, quid sit et quale sit, certe non potest aestimari, nisi prius esse constiterit, ideoque ea prima quaestio.
For first there must be something underneath about which there is doubt; what it is and of what kind it is certainly cannot be estimated unless it is first established that it exists, and therefore that is the first question.
§3.6.81sed non statim, quod esse manifestum est, etiam quid sit, apparet.
But what is manifest to exist does not immediately appear also what it is.
hoc quoque constituto novissima qualitas superest, neque his exploratis aliud est ultra.
When this also is established, at last quality remains, nor after these are explored is there anything beyond.
his infinitae quaestiones, his finitae continentur; horum aliqua in demonstrativa, deliberativa, iudiciali materia utique tractatur.
In these, infinite questions and finite questions are contained; some of these is certainly treated in demonstrative, deliberative, and judicial matter.
§3.6.82haec rursus iudiciales causas et rationali parte et legali continent; neque enim ulla iuris disceptatio nisi finitione, qualitate, coniectura potest explicari.
These again contain judicial causes both in the rational and in the legal part; for no legal discussion can be explained except by definition, quality, and conjecture.
§3.6.83sed instituentibus rudes non erit inutilis latius primo fusa ratio et, si non statim rectissima linea tensa, facilior tamen et apertior via.
But for those who instruct the unskillful, a method more widely spread at first, and a path which, if not immediately stretched in the straightest line, is yet easier and more open, will not be useless.
discant igitur ante omnia quadripertitam in omnibus causis esse rationem, quam primam intueri debeat qui acturus est.
Let them learn, therefore, before all things, that there is a fourfold division in all causes, which he who is about to plead ought to look at first.
nam, ut a defensore potissimum incipiam, longe fortissima tuendi se ratio est, si quod obiicitur negari potest; proxima, si non id, quod obiicitur, factum esse dicitur; tertia honestissima, qua recte factum defenditur.
For, to begin especially with the defender, by far the strongest method of defending oneself is if what is charged can be denied; the next, if it is said that what is charged was not the deed that was done; the third, the most honorable, by which the deed is defended as having been done rightly.
quibus si deficiamur, ultima quidem sed iam sola superest salus aliquo iuris adiutorio elabendi ex crimine, quod neque negari neque defendi potest, ut non videatur iure actio intendi.
If we are destitute of these, there remains indeed the last, but now the only safety, of escaping from the charge which can neither be denied nor defended, by some assistance of law, so that it may seem that the action is not brought lawfully.