§12.8.8frequenter autem et vulnus et remedium in iis orator inveniet, quae litigatori in neutram partem habere momentum videbantur.
Moreover, an orator will frequently find both the wound and the remedy in those things which seemed to the litigant to have importance in neither direction.
nec tanta sit acturo memoriae fiducia, ut subscribere audita pigeat.
Nor should there be such confidence in memory for one who is about to plead that he is loath to write down what he has heard.
nec semel audisse sit satis; cogendus eadem iterum ac saepius dicere litigator, non solum quia effugere aliqua prima expositione potuerunt, praesertim hominem (quod saepe evenit) imperitum, sed etiam ut sciamus an eadem dicat.
Nor should it be enough to have heard once; the litigant must be compelled to say the same things again and more often, not only because some things could have escaped in the first exposition, especially an inexperienced person (as often happens), but also that we may know whether he says the same things.
§12.8.9plurimi enim mentiuntur et, tanquam non doceant causam, sed agant, non ut cum patrono sed ut cum iudice loquuntur.
For very many lie, and, as if they were not teaching the cause but pleading it, they speak not as with an advocate but as with a judge.
quapropter nunquam satis credendum est, sed agitandus omnibus modis et turbandus et evocandus.
Wherefore he must never be believed enough, but must be shaken in every way, confused, and drawn out.
§12.8.10nam ut medicis non apparentia modo vitia curanda sunt sed etiam invenienda quae latent, saepe ipsis ea, qui sanandi sunt, occulentibus, ita advocatus plura quam ostenduntur aspiciat.
For just as for physicians, not only visible ailments are to be cured, but those which lie hidden must also be found, since those who are to be healed often conceal them themselves, so should the advocate look at more things than are shown.
nam cum satis in audiendo patientiae impenderit, in aliam rursus ei personam transeundum est, agendusque adversarius, proponendum quidquid omnino excogitari contra potest, quidquid recipit in eiusmodi disceptatione natura.
For when he has expended enough patience in hearing, he must pass again into another person, and act the adversary, proposing whatever can be devised against it at all, whatever the nature of such a dispute admits.
interrogandus quam infestissime ac premendus.
He must be questioned as hostilely as possible and hard pressed.
§12.8.11nam dum omnia quaerimus, aliquando ad verum, ubi minime exspectavimus, pervenimus.
For while we inquire into everything, we sometimes arrive at the truth where we least expected it.
in summa optimus est in discendo patronus incredulus.
In short, the best advocate in learning a case is an incredulous one.
promittit enim litigator omnia, testem populum, paratissimas consignationes, ipsum denique adversarium quaedam non negaturum.
For the litigant promises everything: that the people will be a witness, that the sealed documents are most ready, and finally that the adversary himself will not deny certain things.
§12.8.12ideoque opus est intueri omne litis instrumentum; quod videre non est satis, perlegendum erit.
And therefore it is necessary to inspect every instrument of the lawsuit; to see it is not enough, it will have to be read through.
nam frequentissime aut non sunt omnino, quae promittebantur, aut minus continent aut cum alio aliquo nocituro permixta sunt aut nimia sunt et fidem hoc ipso detractura quod non habent modum.
For very frequently either those things which were promised are not there at all, or they contain less, or they are mixed with some other harmful thing, or they are excessive and will detract from credibility by this very fact that they have no limit.
§12.8.13denique linum ruptum aut turbatam ceram aut sine agnitore signa frequenter invenies; quae, nisi domi excusseris, in foro inopinata decipient, plusque nocebunt destituta quam non promissa nocuissent.
Finally, you will frequently find a broken thread, or disturbed wax, or seals without an attester; which, unless you have examined them at home, will deceive you unexpectedly in the forum, and being found wanting will do more harm than if they had not been promised.
multa etiam, quae litigator nihil ad causam pertinere crediderit, patronus eruet, modo per omnes, quos tradidimus, argumentorum locos eat.
Many things also, which the litigant believed to have nothing to do with the cause, the advocate will dig out, provided he goes through all the loci of arguments which we have handed down.
§12.8.14quos ut circumspectare in agendo et attentare singulos minime convenit, propter quas diximus causas, ita in discendo rimari necessarium est, quae personae, quae tempora et loca, instituta, instrumenta, cetera, ex quibus non tantum illud, quod est artificiale probationis genus, colligi possit, sed qui metuendi testes, quomodo sint refellendi.
Just as it is by no means fitting to look around at these loci in pleading and to try each one, for the reasons we have stated, so in learning it is necessary to search out what persons, what times and places, customs, instruments, and other things, from which not only that which is the artificial kind of proof can be gathered, but also what witnesses are to be feared, and how they are to be refuted.
nam plurimum refert, invidia reus an odio an contemptu laboret, quorum fere pars prima superiores, proxima pares, tertia humiliores premit.
For it matters very much whether the accused suffers from envy, or hatred, or contempt, of which the first part generally oppresses superiors, the next equals, and the third inferiors.
§12.8.15sic causam perscrutatus, propositis ante oculos omnibus quae prosint noceantve, tertiam deinceps personam induat iudicis, fingatque apud se agi causam, et, quod ipsum movisset de eadem re pronuntiaturum, id potentissimum, apud quemcunque agetur, existimet.
Having thus thoroughly examined the cause, and having set before his eyes everything that may help or harm, he should then assume the third person of the judge, and imagine that the cause is being pleaded before himself; and whatever would have moved himself, if he were to pronounce judgment on the same matter, let him consider that to be the most powerful, before whomsoever it shall be pleaded.
sic eum raro fallet eventus, aut culpa iudicis erit.
Thus the event will rarely deceive him, or it will be the fault of the judge.