§12.7.1cum satis in omni certamine virium fecerit, prima ei cura in suscipiendis causis erit; in quibus defendere quidem reos profecto quam facere vir bonus malet, non tamen ita nomen ipsum accusatoris horrebit, ut nullo neque publico neque privato duci possit officio, ut aliquem ad reddendam rationem vitae vocet.
When he has shown sufficient strength in every contest, his first care in undertaking causes will be this; in which a good man will indeed certainly prefer to defend the accused rather than to prosecute, yet he will not so dread the very name of an accuser that he cannot be led by any duty, either public or private, to call someone to give an account of his life.
nam et leges ipsae nihil valeant, nisi actoris idonea voce munitae; et si poenas scelerum expetere fas non est, prope est ut scelera ipsa permissa sint, et licentiam malis dari certe contra bonos est.
For even the laws themselves have no power unless protected by the fit voice of a prosecutor; and if it is not lawful to demand punishment for crimes, it is almost as if crimes themselves were permitted, and to grant license to the wicked is certainly against the good.
§12.7.2quare neque sociorum querelas nec amici vel propinqui necem nec erupturas in rem publicam conspirationes inultas patietur orator, non poenae nocentium cupidus, sed emendandi vitia corrigendique mores.
Therefore, the orator will not suffer the complaints of allies, nor the death of a friend or relative, nor conspiracies about to burst forth upon the commonwealth to remain unavenged—not from a desire to punish the guilty, but to amend vices and correct morals.
nam qui ratione traduci ad meliora non possunt, solo metu continentur.
For those who cannot be led to better things by reason are restrained by fear alone.
§12.7.3itaque ut accusatoriam vitam vivere et ad deferendos reos praemio duci proximum latrocinio est, ita pestem intestinam propulsare cum propugnatoribus patriae comparandum.
Thus, just as to live an accuser's life and to be led by reward to defer charges against the accused is next to robbery, so to repel an internal pestilence is to be compared with the defenders of the fatherland.
ideoque principes in re publica viri non detrectaverunt hanc officii partem, creditique sunt etiam clari iuvenes obsidem rei publicae dare malorum civium accusationem, quia nec odisse improbos nec simultates provocare nisi ex fiducia bonae mentis videbantur; §12.7.4idque cum ab Hortensio, Lucullis, Sulpicio, Cicerone, Caesare, plurimis aliis, tum ab utroque Catone factum est, quorum alter appellatus est sapiens, alter nisi creditur fuisse, vix scio, cui reliquerit huius nominis locum.
And therefore, the leading men in the state did not decline this part of duty, and even illustrious youths were believed to give the accusation of bad citizens as a hostage to the commonwealth, because they seemed neither to hate the wicked nor to provoke enmities except from confidence in a good mind; and this was done not only by Hortensius, the Luculli, Sulpicius, Cicero, Caesar, and many others, but also by both Catos, of whom one was called the wise, and if the other is not believed to have been so, I scarcely know to whom he left the place for this name.
neque defendet omnis orator idem, portumque illum eloquentiae suae salutarem non etiam piratis patefaciet duceturque in advocationem maxime causa.
Nor will every orator defend the same things, and he will not open that salutary harbor of his eloquence even to pirates, and he will be led into advocacy chiefly by the cause.
§12.7.5quoniam tamen omnes, qui non improbe litigabunt, quorum certe bona pars est, sustinere non potest unus, aliquid et commendantium personis dabit et ipsorum qui iudicio decernent, ut optimi cuiusque voluntate moveatur; namque hos et amicissimos habebit vir bonus.
Since, however, one man cannot sustain all who will not litigate dishonestly—of whom there is certainly a goodly part—he will yield something both to the persons of those who recommend them, and to those who will decide by judgment, so that he may be moved by the will of every best man; for a good man will have these as his closest friends.
§12.7.6summovendum vero est utrumque ambitus genus vel potentibus contra humiles venditandi operam suam vel illud etiam iactantius minores utique contra dignitatem attollendi.
Indeed, both kinds of self-seeking must be removed, whether of selling one's labor to the powerful against the humble, or even more boastfully, raising up the inferior by all means against dignity.
non enim fortuna causas vel iustas vel improbas facit.
For fortune does not make causes either just or unjust.
neque vero pudor obstet, quo minus susceptam, cum melior videretur, litem cognita inter discendum iniquitate dimittat, cum prius litigatori dixerit verum.
Nor indeed should shame obstruct him from dismissing a suit he has undertaken when it seemed better, once its injustice is discovered during the course of learning it, provided he has first told the truth to the litigant.
§12.7.7nam et in hoc maximum, si aequi iudices sumus, beneficium est, ut non fallamus vana spe litigantem.
For in this too is the greatest benefit, if we are fair judges, that we do not deceive the litigant with vain hope.
neque est dignus opera patroni, qui non utitur consilio, et certe non convenit ei, quem oratorem esse volumus, iniusta tueri scientem.
Nor is he worthy of the patron's labor who does not use his counsel; and certainly it is not fitting for him whom we wish to be an orator to defend unjust things knowingly.
nam si ex illis, quas supra diximus, causis falsum tuebitur, erit tamen honestum quod ipse faciet.
For if, from those causes we mentioned above, he shall defend what is false, yet what he himself does will be honorable.
§12.7.8gratisne ei semper agendum sit, tractari potest.
Whether he should always plead for free can be discussed.
quod ex prima statim fronte diiudicare imprudentium est.
To decide this immediately from the first appearance is the part of the imprudent.
nam quis ignorat, quin id longe sit honestissimum ac liberalibus disciplinis et illo, quem exigimus, animo dignissimum, non vendere operam nec elevare tanti beneficii auctoritatem, cum pleraque hoc ipso possint videri vilia, quod pretium habent?
For who does not know that it is by far the most honorable and most worthy of liberal studies and of that mind which we require, not to sell one's labor, nor to lower the authority of so great a benefit, since most things can seem cheap for this very reason, that they have a price?
§12.7.9caecis hoc, ut aiunt, satis clarum est, nec quisquam, qui sufficientia sibi (modica autem haec sunt) possidebit, hunc quaestum sine crimine sordium fecerit.
This is clear enough, as they say, to the blind, nor would anyone who possesses enough for himself (and this is moderate) make this gain without the charge of sordidness.
at si res familiaris amplius aliquid ad usus necessarios exiget, secundum omnium sapientium leges patietur sibi gratiam referri, cum et Socrati collatum sit ad victum, et Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus mercedes a discipulis acceptaverint.
But if his domestic estate demands something more for necessary uses, he will permit thanks to be returned to him according to the laws of all the wise, since both a contribution was made to Socrates for his living, and Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus accepted fees from their disciples.
§12.7.10neque enim video, quae iustior acquirendi ratio quam ex honestissimo labore et ab iis, de quibus optime meruerint, quique, si nihil invicem praestent, indigni fuerint defensione.
For neither do I see what juster method of acquiring there is than from the most honorable labor and from those whom they have best deserved, and who, if they perform nothing in return, would be unworthy of defense.
quod quidem non iustum modo, sed necessarium etiam est, cum haec ipsa opera tempusque omne alienis negotiis datum facultatem aliter acquirendi recidant.
Which indeed is not only just, but also necessary, since this very labor and all the time given to others' affairs cut off the opportunity of acquiring in other ways.
§12.7.11sed tum quoque tenendus est modus, ac plurimum refert et a quo accipiat et quantum et quo usque.
But then also a moderation must be held, and it matters very much both from whom he receives, and how much, and for how long.
paciscendi quidem ille piraticus mos et imponentium periculis pretia procul abominanda negotiatio etiam a mediocriter improbis aberit, cum praesertim bonos homines bonasque causas tuenti non sit metuendus ingratus; quodsi sit futurus, malo tamen ille peccet.
Indeed, that piratical custom of bargaining, and that abominable transaction of those who impose prices on dangers, will be far from even the moderately wicked, especially since one who protects good men and good causes has no need to fear an ingrate; but if he should be so, I would rather that he commit the offense.
§12.7.12nihil ergo acquirere volet orator ultra quam satis erit; ac ne pauper quidem tanquam mercedem accipiet, sed mutua benivolentia utetur, cum sciat se tanto plus praestitisse.
Therefore, the orator will wish to acquire nothing beyond what will be sufficient; and not even a poor man will receive it as a wage, but will use mutual goodwill, since he knows that he has performed so much more.
non enim, quia venire hoc beneficium non oportet, oportet perire.
For it does not follow that, because this benefit ought not to be sold, it ought to perish.
denique ut gratus sit ad eum magis pertinet qui debet.
In short, to be grateful concerns more him who owes.