§12.10.50praeterea in agendo plus impetus plerumque et petitas vel paulo licentius voluptates, commovendos enim esse ducendosque animos imperitorum; at quod libris dedicatum in exemplum edatur, id tersum ac limatum et ad legem ac regulam conpositum esse oportere, quia veniat in manus doctorum et iudices artis habeat artifices.
Moreover, in delivery there is generally more impetus and pleasures sought somewhat more freely, for the minds of the unlearned must be moved and guided; but that which is dedicated to books and published as a model ought to be polished, refined, and composed according to law and rule, because it comes into the hands of the learned and has craftsmen as judges of the art.
§12.10.51quin illi subtiles (ut sibimet ac multis persuaserunt) magistri παράδειγμα dicendo, ἐνθύμημα scribendo esse aptius tradiderunt.
Indeed, those subtle teachers (as they persuaded themselves and many others) have handed down that paradigm is more suitable for speaking, and enthymeme for writing.
mihi unum atque idem videtur bene dicere ac bene scribere, neque aliud esse oratio scripta quam monumentum actionis habitae.
To me, to speak well and to write well seem to be one and the same thing, and a written speech is nothing other than a record of the delivery that took place.
itaque nullas non, ut opinor, debet habere virtutes, virtutes dico, non vitia.
Therefore, in my opinion, it ought to have every virtue—I say virtues, not vices.
nam imperitis placere aliquando quae vitiosa sint, scio.
For I know that what is faulty sometimes pleases the unlearned.
§12.10.52quo different igitur? quodsi mihi des consilium iudicum sapientium, perquam multa recidam ex orationibus non Ciceronis modo, sed etiam eius, qui est strictior multo, Demosthenis.
Wherein, then, will they differ? Yet if you were to give me a council of wise judges, I should cut out very many things from the speeches not only of Cicero, but even of Demosthenes, who is much more concise.
neque enim adfectus omnino movendi erunt, nec aures delectatione mulcendae, cum etiam prooemia supervacua esse apud tales Aristoteles existimet; non enim trahentur his illi sapientes; proprie et significanter rem indicare, probationes colligere satis est.
For indeed, feelings would not have to be moved at all, nor ears soothed with pleasure, since Aristotle thinks that even introductions are superfluous before such men; for those wise men will not be drawn by these things; it is enough to indicate the matter properly and significantly, and to collect proofs.
§12.10.53cum vero iudex detur aut populus aut ex populo, laturique sint sententiam indocti saepius atque interim rustici, omnia quae ad obtinendum, quod intendimus, prodesse credemus adhibenda sunt; eaque et cum dicimus promenda et cum scribimus ostendenda sunt, si modo ideo scribimus, ut doceamus quomodo dici oporteat.
But when the judge given is either the people or from the people, and those who are to pass sentence are more often unlearned and sometimes rustic, all things which we believe to be useful for obtaining what we intend must be employed; and these must both be brought forward when we speak and shown when we write, if only we write for this reason, to teach how one ought to speak.
§12.10.54an Demosthenes male sic egisset, ut scripsit, aut Cicero? aut eos praestantissimos oratores alia re quam scriptis cognoscimus? melius egerunt igitur an peius? nam si peius, sic potius oportuit dici, ut scripserunt; si melius, sic potius oportuit scribi, ut dixerunt.
Or would Demosthenes have spoken badly in this way, as he wrote, or Cicero? Or do we know those most excellent orators by any other thing than their writings? Did they deliver better, then, or worse? For if worse, it ought rather to have been spoken as they wrote; if better, it ought rather to have been written as they spoke.
§12.10.55quid ergo? semper sic aget orator, ut scribet? si licebit, semper. si vero quando impediant brevitate tempora a iudice data, multum ex eo, quod oportuit dici, recidetur; editio habebit omnia.
What then? Will the orator always speak as he writes? If it is permitted, always. But if ever the times granted by the judge hinder by their brevity, much of what ought to have been spoken will be cut off; the published version will have everything.
quae tamen secundum naturam iudicantium dicta sunt, non ita posteris tradentur, ne videantur propositi fuisse, non temporis.
Yet those things which were spoken according to the nature of those judging will not be handed down to posterity in that way, lest they should seem to have been of deliberate intent, and not of the occasion.
§12.10.56nam id quoque plurimum refert, quomodo audire iudex velit, atque eius vultus saepe ipse rector est dicentis, ut Cicero praecipit.
For this also is of the greatest importance, how the judge wishes to hear, and his countenance itself is often the director of the speaker, as Cicero teaches.
ideoque instandum iis quae placere intellexeris, resiliendum ab iis quae non recipientur.
And therefore one must insist on those things which you understand to please, and retreat from those which will not be received.
sermo ipse, qui facillime iudicem doceat, aptandus.
The speech itself, which may most easily instruct the judge, must be adapted.
nec id mirum sit, cum etiam testium personis aliqua mutentur.
Nor should that be surprising, since some things are altered even by the characters of the witnesses.
§12.10.57prudenter enim, qui cum interrogasset rusticum testem, an Amphionem nosset, negante eo, detraxit aspirationem breviavitque secundam eius nominis syllabam, et ille eum sic optime norat.
For he acted prudently who, when he had asked a rustic witness whether he knew Amphion, and the witness denied it, took away the aspiration and shortened the second syllable of that name, and he then knew him very well.
huiusmodi casus efficient, ut aliquando dicatur liter quam scribitur, cum dicere, quomodo scribendum est, non licet.
Occurrences of this kind will bring it about that sometimes it is spoken otherwise than it is written, when it is not permitted to speak in the way it ought to be written.
§12.10.58altera est divisio, quae in tres partes et ipsa discedit, qua discerni posse etiam recte dicendi genera inter se videntur.
There is another division, which itself also departs into three parts, by which the types of speaking correctly also seem to be able to be distinguished among themselves.
namque unum subtile, quod ἰσχνόν vocant, alterum grande atque robustum, quod ἁδρόν dicunt, constituunt; tertium alii, medium ex duobus, alii floridum (namque id ἀνθηρόν appellant) addiderunt.
For they establish one as subtle, which they call *ischnon*, the other as grand and robust, which they call *hadron*; a third some have added as a medium between the two, others as florid (for they call it *antheron*).
§12.10.59quorum tamen ea fere ratio est, ut primum docendi, secundum movendi, tertium illud, utrocumque est nomine, delectandi sire, ut alii dicunt, conciliandi praestare videatur officium; in docendo autem acumen, in conciliando lenitas, in movendo vis exigi videatur.
Yet the rationale of these is generally such that the first seems to perform the duty of instructing, the second of moving, and that third, by whatever name it is called, of pleasing or, as others say, of winning over; but in instructing acumen seems to be required, in winning over gentleness, and in moving power.
itaque illo subtili praecipue ratio narrandi probandique consistet, sed saepe id etiam detractis ceteris virtutibus suo genere plenum.
Therefore, in that subtle style the method of narrating and proving will chiefly consist, but often it is complete in its own kind even when the other virtues are removed.