§11.1.64potest tamen aliquando mater et in re leviore aut minus infeste contra filium stare; tum lenior atque summissior decebit oratio.
However, sometimes a mother may stand against her son even in a lighter matter or less hostilely; then a gentler and more submissive speech will be fitting.
nam et satisfaciendo aut nostram minuemus invidiam aut etiam in diversum eam transferemus; et si graviter dolere filium palam fuerit, credetur abesse ab eo culpam fietque ultro miserabilis.
For by making amends we shall either lessen our own unpopularity or even transfer it in another direction; and if it is plain that the son is deeply grieving, it will be believed that guilt is absent from him, and he will furthermore become an object of pity.
§11.1.65avertere quoque in alios crimen decet, ut fraude aliquorum concita credatur, et omnia nos passuros, nihil aspere dicturos testandum, ut, etiamsi non possumus non conviciari, nolle videamur.
It is also becoming to turn the accusation away onto others, so that she may be believed to have been incited by the deceit of certain persons, and we must protest that we will suffer everything and say nothing harshly, so that, even if we cannot help reproaching her, we may seem unwilling to do so.
etiam, si quid obiciendum erit, officium est patroni, ut id filio invito, sed fide cogente facere credatur.
Also, if anything must be objected, it is the duty of the advocate that he should be believed to do this against the son's will, but compelled by good faith.
ita poterit uterque laudari.
In this way, both can be praised.
§11.1.66quod de matre dixi, de utroque parente accipiendum est; nam inter patres etiam filiosque, cum intervenisset emancipatio, litigatum scio.
What I have said about the mother must be understood of both parents; for I know that there have been lawsuits even between fathers and sons, when emancipation had intervened.
in aliis quoque propinquitatibus custodiendum est, ut inviti et necessario et parce iudicemur dixisse, magis autem aut minus, ut cuique personae debetur reverentia.
In other relationships also, care must be taken that we be judged to have spoken unwillingly, of necessity, and sparingly, more or less indeed, as reverence is due to each person.
eadem pro libertis adversus patronos observantia.
The same respect is to be observed on behalf of freedmen against their patrons.
et ut semel plura complectar, nunquam decebit sic adversus tales agere personas, quomodo contra nos agi ab hominibus condicionis eiusdem iniquo animo tulissemus.
And to embrace several things at once, it will never be becoming to act against such persons in such a way as we would have borne with resentment to be acted against us by men of the same condition.
§11.1.67praestatur hoc aliquando etiam dignationibus, ut libertatis nostrae ratio reddatur, ne quis nos aut petulantes in laedendis eis aut etiam ambitiosos putet.
This is sometimes paid even to ranks, so that an account of our freedom of speech may be rendered, lest anyone should think us either petulant in hurting them or even ostentatious.
itaque Cicero, quanquam erat in Cottam gravissime dicturus, neque aliter agi P. Oppii causa poterat, longa tamen praefatione excusavit officii sui necessitatem.
Therefore Cicero, although he was about to speak most severely against Cotta, nor could the cause of Publius Oppius be conducted otherwise, nevertheless excused the necessity of his duty with a long preface.
§11.1.68aliquando etiam inferioribus praecipueque adolescentulis parcere aut videri decet.
Sometimes it is also fitting to spare, or seem to spare, inferiors, and especially very young men.
utitur hac moderatione Cicero pro Caelio contra Atratinum, ut eum non inimice corripere, sed paene patrie monere videatur.
Cicero uses this moderation in Pro Caelio against Atratinus, so that he seems not to chide him hostilely, but to admonish him almost like a father.
nam et nobilis et iuvenis et non iniusto dolore venerat ad accusandum.
For he was both noble and young, and had come to accuse not without just resentment.
sed in his quidem, in quibus vel iudici vel etiam adsistentibus ratio nostrae moderationis probari debet, minor est labor; illic plus difficultatis, ubi ipsos, contra quos dicimus, veremur offendere.
But indeed in these cases, in which the reason for our moderation must be approved either by the judge or even by those standing by, there is less labor; there is more difficulty there, where we fear to offend those very persons against whom we speak.
§11.1.69duae simul huiusmodi personae Ciceroni pro Murena dicenti obstiterunt, M. Catonis Serviique Sulpicii.
Two persons of this kind at the same time stood in the way of Cicero when he was speaking Pro Murena, Marcus Cato and Servius Sulpicius.
quam decenter tamen Sulpicio, cum omnes concessisset virtutes, scientiam petendi consulatus ademit? quid enim aliud esset, quo se victum homo nobilis et iuris antistes magis ferret? ut vero rationem defensionis suae reddidit, cum se studuisse petitioni Sulpicii contra honorem Murenae, non idem debere accusationi contra caput diceret!
How decently, however, did he, while granting Sulpicius all virtues, deprive him of the knowledge of seeking the consulship? For what else would there be, in being defeated in which a noble man and guardian of the law would more easily bear it? How indeed did he render the account of his defense, when he said that he had supported the candidacy of Sulpicius against the honor of Murena, but did not owe the same support to an accusation against his life!
§11.1.70quam molli autem articulo tractavit Catonem Cuius natura summe admiratus non ipsius vitio, sed Stoicae sectae quibusdam in rebus factam duriorem videri volebat; ut inter eos non forensem contentionem, sed studiosam disputationem crederes incidisse.
With what a gentle touch, moreover, did he handle Cato! Whose nature having highly admired, he wished it to appear to have been made somewhat too harsh in certain matters, not by his own fault, but by that of the Stoic sect; so that you would believe that not a forensic contention, but a scholarly disputation had arisen between them.
§11.1.71haec est profecto ratio et certissimum praeceptorum genus illius viri observatio, ut, cum aliquid detrahere salva gratia velis, concedas alia omnia: in hoc solo vel minus peritum quam in ceteris, adiecta, si poterit fieri, etiam causa, cur id ita sit, vel paulo pertinaciorem vel credulum vel iratum vel impulsum ab aliis.
This is indeed the method, and the most certain kind of precept, namely, the observation of that great man: that when you wish to detract something without destroying goodwill, you should concede all other things, representing him as in this thing alone either less skilled than in the others—adding, if it can be done, also the cause why it is so—or a little too obstinate, or credulous, or angry, or impelled by others.
§11.1.72hoc enim commune remedium est, si in tota actione aequaliter appareat non honor modo eius, sed etiam caritas.
For this is the common remedy, if in the whole pleading there appears equally not only respect for him, but also affection.
praeterea causa sit nobis iusta sic dicendi, neque id moderate tantum faciamus, sed etiam necessario.
Furthermore, let there be a just cause for our speaking thus, and let us do it not only with moderation, but also of necessity.
§11.1.73diversum ab hoc sed facilius, cum hominum aut alioqui turpium aut nobis invisorum quaedam facta laudanda sunt.
Different from this, but easier, is when certain deeds of men who are otherwise disgraceful or hated by us must be praised.
decet enim rem ipsam probare in qualicunque persona.
For it is becoming to approve the deed itself in whatever kind of person.
dixit Cicero pro Gabinio et P. Vatinio, inimicissimis antea sibi hominibus et in quos orationes etiam scripserat, uerum ait, ut sit iusta causa sic faciendi, non se de ingenii fama, sed de fide esse sollicitum.
Cicero spoke on behalf of Gabinius and Publius Vatinius, men who had previously been most hostile to him, and against whom he had even written speeches, but he says, in order that there might be a just cause for so doing, that he was concerned not about the reputation of his talent, but about his good faith.