§11.1.11itaque quamvis Lysias, qui tum in dicendo praestantissimus habebatur, defensionem illi scriptam obtulisset, uti ea noluit, cum bonam quidem, sed parum sibi convenientem iudicavisset.
Therefore, although Lysias, who was then esteemed the most excellent in speaking, had offered him a written defense, he would not use it, since he had judged it to be good indeed, but little suited to himself.
quo vel solo patet non persuadendi sed bene dicendi finem in oratore servandum, cum interim persuadere deforme sit.
By this alone indeed it is clear that the end to be kept in view by an orator is not to persuade but to speak well, since meanwhile to persuade might even be unbecoming.
non fuit hoc utile absolutioni, sed, quod est maius, homini fuit.
This was not useful for his acquittal, but, what is greater, it was so for the man himself.
§11.1.12et nos secundum communem potius loquendi consuetudinem quam ipsam veritatis regulam divisione hac utimur, ut ab eo, quod deceat, utilitatem separemus; nisi forte prior ille Africanus, qui patria cedere quam cum tribuno plebis humillimo contendere de innocentia sua maluit, inutiliter sibi videtur consuluisse;
And we too, following the common custom of speaking rather than the rule of truth itself, employ this division, so as to separate utility from what is becoming; unless perhaps that elder Africanus, who preferred to depart from his country rather than contend about his innocence with a most humble tribune of the plebs, is thought to have consulted uselessly for himself; or P.
aut P. Rutilius, vel cum illo paene Socratico genere defensionis est usus, vel cum revocante eum P. Sulla manere in exilio maluit, quid sibi maxime conduceret, nesciebat.
Rutilius, either when he used that almost Socratic kind of defense, or when he preferred to remain in exile when P. Sulla recalled him, did not know what was most conducive to his own interest.
§11.1.13hi vero parva illa, quae abiectissimus quisque animus utilia credit, si cum virtute conferantur despicienda iudicaverunt, ideoque perpetua saeculorum admiratione celebrantur.
Indeed, these men judged those small things, which every most abject mind believes to be useful, worthy of contempt if they should be compared with virtue, and therefore they are celebrated with the perpetual admiration of ages.
neque nos simus tam humiles, ut quae laudamus inutilia credamus.
Nor indeed let us be so abject as to believe that what we praise is useless.
§11.1.14sed hoc qualecunque discrimen raro admodum eveniet: idem fere, ut dixi, in omni genere causarum et proderit et decebit.
But this difference, of whatever kind, will happen very rarely; almost the same thing, as I said, will both profit and become in every kind of case.
est autem, quod omnes et semper et ubique deceat, facere ac dicere honeste, contraque neminem unquam ullo in loco turpiter.
But that which becomes everyone, always and everywhere, is to act and speak honorably, and on the contrary, for no one ever in any place to act or speak basely.
minora vero quaeque sunt ex mediis plerumque sunt talia, ut aliis sint concedenda, aliis non sint, aut pro persona, tempore, loco, causa magis ac minus vel excusata debeant videri vel reprehendenda.
However, the smaller things among the indifferent are for the most part of such a kind that they are to be allowed to some and not to others, or according to person, time, place, and case, ought to appear more or less either excused or blamed.
§11.1.15cum dicamus autem de rebus aut alienis aut nostris, dividenda ratio est eorum, dum sciamus pleraque neutro loco convenire.
But when we speak of things either belonging to others or to ourselves, their method must be divided, provided that we know that most of them fit in neither situation.
in primis igitur omnis vitiosa iactatio est, eloquentiae tamen in oratore praecipue, adfertque audientibus non fastidium modo, sed plerumque etiam odium.
First of all, therefore, all boasting is offensive, but that of eloquence in an orator is especially so, and brings to the hearers not only weariness, but for the most part even hatred.
§11.1.16habet enim mens nostra sublime quiddam et erectum et impatiens superioris; ideoque abiectos aut summittentes se libenter allevamus, quia hoc facere tanquam maiores videmur; et quotiens discessit aemulatio, succedit humanitas.
For our mind has something sublime and erect and impatient of a superior; and therefore we willingly raise up the abject or those who submit themselves, because in doing this we seem to be greater, and as often as rivalry has departed, humanity succeeds.
at qui se supra modum extollit, premere ac despicere creditur, nec tam se maiorem quam minores ceteros facere.
But he who exalts himself beyond measure is believed to oppress and despise, and not so much to make himself greater as to make all others smaller.
§11.1.17inde invident humiliores, (hoc vitium est eorum, qui nec cedere volunt nec possunt contendere) rident superiores, improbant boni.
Hence the lower envy (this is the fault of those who neither wish to yield nor are able to contend), the higher laugh, the good disapprove.
plerumque vere deprehendas arrogantium falsum de se opinionem; sed in veris quoque sufficit conscientia.
For the most part indeed you may detect the false opinion of the arrogant concerning themselves; but even in true things self-consciousness is sufficient.
reprehensus est in hac parte non mediocriter Cicero, quanquam is quidem rerum a se gestarum maior quam eloquentiae fuit in orationibus utique iactator.
Cicero was blamed not a little in this part, although he indeed was a boaster in his speeches more of his achievements than of his eloquence.
§11.1.18et plerumque illud quoque non sine aliqua ratione fecit.
And for the most part he did that also not without some reason.
aut enim tuebatur eos, quibus erat adiutoribus usus in opprimenda coniuratione, aut respondebat invidiae (cui tamen non fuit par, servatae patriae poenam passus exilium), ut illorum, quae egerat in consulatu, frequens commemoratio possit videri non gloriae magis quam defensioni data.
For he was either defending those whose help he had used in suppressing the conspiracy, or replying to envy (to which, however, he was not equal, suffering exile as the punishment for saving his country), so that the frequent commemoration of those things which he had done in his consulship may seem to have been given not so much for glory as for defense.
§11.1.19eloquentiam quidem, cum plenissimam diversae partis advocatis concederet, sibi nunquam in agendo immodice adrogauit.
As for eloquence indeed, while he conceded the fullest measure of it to the advocates of the opposite side, he never immodicately arrogated it to himself in pleading.
illius sunt enim: si quid est ingenii in me, quod sentio quam sit exiguum, et, quo ingenio minus possum, subsidium mihi diligentia comparavi.
For these are his words: "if there is any talent in me, which I feel how small it is," and "in which talent, since I am less able, I have prepared a support for myself by diligence." Nay, even against Q.
§11.1.20quin etiam contra Q. Caecilium de accusatore in Verrem constituendo, quamvis multum esset in hoc quoque momenti, uter ad agendum magis idoneus veniret, dicendi tamen facultatem magis illi detraxit quam adrogauit sibi, seque non consecutum, sed omnia fecisse, ut posset eam consequi, dixit.
Caecilius concerning the appointing of an accuser against Verres, although there was much weight in this also, which of the two should come better fitted to plead, he nevertheless rather detracted the faculty of speaking from him than arrogated it to himself, and said that he had not attained it, but had done everything in order that he might be able to attain it.