§35.27.1Nabis cum prospera re elatus, tum spem etiam haud dubiam nactus nihil iam a mari periculi fore, et terrestres aditus claudere opportune positis praesidiis voluit.
Nabis, being both elated by his success and having gained a doubtless hope that there would no longer be any danger from the sea, wished also to close the land approaches by opportunely posted garrisons.
§35.27.2tertia parte copiarum ab obsidione Gythei abducta ad Pleias posuit castra;
Having withdrawn a third part of his forces from the siege of Gytheum, he pitched his camp at Pleiae.
§35.27.3imminet is locus et Leucis et Acriis, qua videbantur hostes exercitum admoturi.
This place overlooks both Leucae and Acriae, by which route the enemy seemed likely to advance their army.
cum ibi stativa essent et pauci tabernacula haberent, multitudo alia casas ex harundine textas fronde, quae umbram modo praeberet, §35.27.4texissent, priusquam in conspectum hostis veniret, Philopoemen necopinantem eum improviso genere belli adgredi statuit.
Since there was a permanent station there and few had tents, and the rest of the multitude had built huts woven of reeds and covered with foliage, which would merely provide shade, before he should come into the sight of the enemy, Philopoemen determined to attack him while off his guard by an unexpected kind of war.
§35.27.5navigia parva in stationem occultam agri Argivi contraxit; in ea expeditos milites, caetratos plerosque, cum fundis et iaculis et alio levi genere armaturae imposuit.
He collected small vessels into a hidden anchorage of the Argive territory; in them he embarked light-armed soldiers, most of them targeteers, with slings and javelins and other light kinds of armor.
§35.27.6inde littora legens cum ad propinquum castris hostiumpromunturium venisset, egressus callibus notis nocte Pleias pervenit et sopitis vigilibus ut in nullo propinquo metu ignem casis ab omni parte castrorum iniecit.
Sailing from there along the coast, when he had come to a promontory near the enemy's camp, he landed and, proceeding by well-known paths at night, reached Pleiae; and, while the sentinels were asleep as if there were no danger near, he threw fire into the huts from every part of the camp.
§35.27.7multi prius incendio absumpti sunt, quam hostium adventum sentirent, et, qui senserant,
Many were consumed by the fire before they perceived the arrival of the enemy, and those who did perceive it could bring no help.
§35.27.8nullam opem ferre potuerunt. ferro flammaque omnia absumpta; perpauci ex tam ancipiti peste ad Gytheum in maiora castra perfugerunt.
All things were consumed by fire and sword; very few escaped from so critical a disaster to the larger camp at Gytheum.
§35.27.9ita perculsis hostibus Philopoemen protinus ad depopulandam Tripolim Laconici agri, §35.27.10qui proximus finem Megalopolitarum est, duxit et magna vi pecorum hominumque inde abrepta, priusquam a Gytheo tyrannus praesidium agris mitteret, §35.27.11discessit.
Having thus dismayed the enemy, Philopoemen marched immediately to plunder Tripolis of the Laconian territory, which is nearest to the territory of the Megalopolitans, and, having carried off a great quantity of cattle and men from there, he departed before the tyrant could send a garrison to the fields from Gytheum.
inde Tegeam exercitu contracto concilioque eodem et Achaeis et sociis indicto, §35.27.12in quo et Epirotarum et Acarnanum fuere principes, statuit, quoniam satis et suorum a pudore maritimae ignominiae restituti animi et hostium conterriti essent, ad Lacedaemonem ducere, eo modo uno ratus ab obsidione Gythei hostem abduci posse.
From there, having assembled his army at Tegea, and having summoned a council to the same place, both of the Achaeans and their allies, in which there were also chiefs of the Epirotes and Acarnanians, he determined, since the spirits of his own men were sufficiently recovered from the shame of the naval disgrace, and those of the enemy were terrified, to march to Lacedaemon, thinking that by this way alone the enemy could be drawn away from the siege of Gytheum.
§35.27.13ad Caryas primum in hostium terra posuit castra.
He first pitched his camp at Caryae in the enemy's land.
eo ipso die Gytheum expugnatum est.
On that very day Gytheum was taken by storm.
§35.27.14cuius rei ignarus Philopoemen castra ad Barnosthenem — mons est decem milia passuum ab Lacedaemone — promovit.
Philopoemen, ignorant of this event, advanced his camp to Barnosthenes — a mountain ten miles from Lacedaemon.
et Nabis, recepto Gytheo cum expedito exercitu inde profectus, cum praeter Lacedaemonem raptim duxisset, Pyrrhi quae vocant castra occupavit, quem peti locum ab Achaeis non dubitabat.
And Nabis, having recovered Gytheum and set out from there with a light-armed army, when he had marched rapidly past Lacedaemon, occupied what they call the Camp of Pyrrhus, which place he did not doubt was aimed at by the Achaeans.
§35.27.15inde hostibus occurrit.
From there he went to meet the enemy.
obtinebant autem longo agmine propter angustias viae prope quinque milia passuum; cogebatur agmen ab equitibus et maxima parte auxiliorum, quod existimabat Philopoemen tyrannum mercennariis militibus, quibus plurimum fideret, ab tergo suos adgressurum.
Moreover, they were holding a line of nearly five miles in a long column because of the narrowness of the road; the rear of the column was closed by the cavalry and the greatest part of the auxiliaries, because Philopoemen expected that the tyrant, with the mercenary soldiers in whom he most trusted, would attack his men from behind.
§35.27.16duae res simul inopinatae perculerunt eum, una praeoccupatus quem petebat locus, altera, quod primo agmini occurrisse hostem cernebat, ubi, cum per loca confragosa iter esset, sine levis armaturae praesidio signa ferri non videbat posse.
Two unexpected things at the same time struck him with dismay: one, that the place he was aiming at was pre-occupied; the other, because he saw that the enemy had met the head of his column, where, as the march was through rugged places, he did not see that the standards could be advanced without the protection of light-armed troops.