§25.35.1haud segniter inde duces Poeni fortuna usi confestim e proelio vix necessaria quiete data militibus ad Hasdrubalem Hamilcaris citatum agmen rapiunt non dubia spe, cum se conianxissent, debellari posse.
Then, the Carthaginian generals, taking advantage of their good fortune, immediately after the battle, having given their soldiers only the scarcely necessary rest, hurried their column at a rapid pace toward Hasdrubal, son of Hamilcar, in the confident hope that, once they had united, the war could be brought to an end.
§25.35.2quo ubi est ventum, inter exercitus ducesque victoria recenti laetos gratulatio ingens facta imperatore tanto cum omni exercitu deleto et alteram pro haud dubia parem victoriam expectantes.
When they arrived there, a huge congratulation took place among the armies and generals, who were joyful at the recent victory, over the destruction of so great a commander with his entire army, and they were expecting another equal victory as beyond doubt.
§25.35.3ad Romanos nondum quidem fama tantae cladis pervenerat, sed maestum quoddam silentium erat et tacita divinatio qualis iam praesagientibus animis inminentis mali esse solet.
To the Romans, indeed, the report of so great a disaster had not yet arrived, but there was a certain gloomy silence and a tacit foreboding, such as is wont to arise in minds already presaging imminent evil.
§25.35.4imperator ipse, praeterquam quod ab sociis se desertum, hostium tantum auctas copias sentiebat, coniectura etiam et ratione ad suspicionem acceptae cladis quam ad ullam bonam spem pronior erat: quonam modo enim Hasdrubalem ac Magonem, §25.35.5nisi defunctos suo bello, sine certamine adducere exercitur potuisse?
The commander himself, besides the fact that he perceived that he had been deserted by the allies and that the forces of the enemy had been so greatly increased, was also, by conjecture and reasoning, more inclined to the suspicion of a received disaster than to any good hope: for in what way indeed could Hasdrubal and Mago, unless they had finished their own war, have been able to bring their armies without a contest?
§25.35.6quo modo autem non obstitisse aut ab tergo secutum fratrem, ut, si prohibere, quo minus in unum coirent et duces et exercitus hostium, non posset, ipse certe cum fratre coniungeret copias?
And how, moreover, could his brother not have opposed them or followed from the rear, so that, if he could not prevent both the generals and the armies of the enemy from coming together into one, he himself at least might join forces with his brother?
§25.35.7his anxius curis id modo esse salutare in praesens credebat, cedere inde, quantum posset; et una nocte ignaris hostibus et ob id quietis aliquantum emensus est iter.
Anxious with these cares, he believed that this alone was safe for the present: to withdraw from there as much as he could; and in one night, while the enemy was unaware and therefore quiet, he traversed a considerable distance of the journey.
§25.35.8luce ut sen. serunt profectos, hostes praemissis Numidis quam poterant maxime citato agmine sequi coeperunt.
As they perceived at daybreak that they had departed, the enemy, having sent ahead the Numidians, began to follow with as rapid a march as they could.
ante noctem adsecuti Numidae nunc ab tergo, nunc in latera incursantes consistere coegerunt ac tutari agmen; §25.35.9quantum possent tamen tuto, ut simul pugnarent procederentque, Scipio hortabatur, priusquam pedestres: copiae adsequerentur.
Having caught up before night, the Numidians, attacking now from the rear, now on the flanks, forced them to halt and defend their column; yet Scipio urged them to fight and advance at the same time, as far as they could do so safely, before the infantry forces should catch up.