§25.33.1Hasdrubal postquam animadvertit exiguum Romanum exercitum in castris et spem omnem in Celtiberorum auxiliis esse, §25.33.2peritus omnis barbaricae et praecipue earum gentium, in quibus per tot annos militabat, §25.33.3perfidiae, facili linguae commercio, cum utraque castra plena Hispanorum essent, per occulta conloquia paciscitur magna mercede cum Celtiberorum principibus, ut copias inde abducant.
After Hasdrubal noticed that there was only a small Roman army in the camp and that all hope rested on the auxiliary forces of the Celtiberians, being experienced in all the faithlessness of barbarians, and especially of those nations in which he had been campaigning for so many years, thanks to an easy exchange of language, since both camps were full of Spaniards, he bargained through secret conferences with the leaders of the Celtiberians for a large reward, that they should withdraw their forces from there.
§25.33.4nec atrox visum facinus; non enim ut in Romanos verterent arma agebatur, et merces, quanta vel pro bello satis esset, dabatur, ne bellum gererent, et cum quies ipsa, tum reditus domum fructusque videndi suos suaque grata vulgo erant.
Nor did the deed seem atrocious; for they were not being asked to turn their arms against the Romans, and a reward as large as would be sufficient even for a war was being given, simply that they should not wage war; and not only was rest itself pleasing to the common soldiers, but also the return home and the pleasure of seeing their loved ones and possessions.
§25.33.5itaque non ducibus facilius quam multitudini persuasum est.
Therefore, the multitude was persuaded no less easily than the leaders.
simul ne metus quidem ab Romanis erat, quippe tam paucis, si vi retinerent.
At the same time, there was not even any fear of the Romans, who were indeed so few, if they should try to retain them by force.
§25.33.6id quidem cavendum semper Romanis ducibus erit, exemplaque haec vere pro documentis habenda, ne ita externis credant auxiliis, ut non plus sui roboris suarumque proprie virium in castris habeant.
This indeed must always be guarded against by Roman generals, and these examples must truly be regarded as lessons, lest they trust external auxiliaries to such an extent that they do not keep more of their own strength and their own proper forces in the camp.
§25.33.7signis repente sublatis Celtiberi abeunt nihil aliud quaerentibus causam obtestantibusque, ut manerent, Romanis respondentes quam domestico se avocari bello.
With the standards suddenly raised, the Celtiberians departed, replying nothing else to the Romans, who were asking the cause and imploring them to stay, than that they were being called away by a domestic war.
§25.33.8Scipio, postquam socii nec precibus nec vi retineri poterant, nec se aut parem sine illis hosti esse aut fratri rursus coniungi vidit posse, nec ullum aliud salutare consilium in promptu esse, §25.33.9retro quantum posset cedere statuit, in id omni cura intentus, necubi hosti aequo; se committeret loco, qui transgressus flumen prope vestigiis abeuntium insistebat.
Scipio, after the allies could be retained neither by prayers nor by force, and he saw that without them he was neither a match for the enemy nor able to be reunited with his brother, and that no other salutary counsel was at hand, decided to retreat as far as he could, with all his care intent on this, lest anywhere he should engage the enemy in an unfavorable place, who, having crossed the river, was pressing almost on the heels of those departing.