§9Quaeramus igitur causam, quae inpulerit eum, qui haec machinatus sit, ut originem rerum et molitionem novam quaereret.
Let us therefore seek the cause which impelled him who devised these things to seek the origin of things and a new construction.
Probitate videlicet praestabat; probus autem invidet nemini; itaque omnia sui similia generavit.
Clearly he excelled in goodness; and he who is good envies no one; therefore he generated all things like himself.
Haec nimirum gignendi mundi causa iustissima.
This is indeed the most just cause of generating the world.
Nam cum constituisset deus bonis omnibus explere mundum, mali nihil admiscere, quoad natura pateretur, quicquid erat, quod in cernendi sensum caderet, id sibi adsumpsit non tranquillum et quietum, sed inmoderate agitatum et fluitans, idque ex inordinato in ordinem adduxit; hoc enim iudicabat esse praestantius.
For when God had resolved to fill the world with all good things, and to mix in nothing of evil, so far as nature allowed, whatever there was that fell under the sense of sight, which was not tranquil and quiet but immoderately agitated and fluctuating, he took to himself, and brought it from disorder into order; for he judged this to be more outstanding.
§10Fas autem nec est nec umquam fuit quicquam nisi pulcherrimum facere ei, qui esset optumus.
Now it is not, nor ever was, lawful for him who is best to do anything except what is most beautiful.
Cum rationem igitur habuisset, reperiebat nihil esse eorum, quae natura cernerentur, inintellegens intellegente in toto genere praestantius.
Therefore, when he had taken thought, he found that among those things which are discerned by nature, nothing devoid of intelligence could be more outstanding than that which possesses intelligence in their whole class.
Quocirca intellegentiam in animo, animum inclusit in corpore.
Wherefore he enclosed intelligence in the soul, and the soul in the body.
Sic ratus est opus illud effectum esse pulcherrimum.
Thus he thought that that work was made most beautiful.
Quam ob causam non est cunctandum profiteri, si modo investigari aliquid coniectura potest, hunc mundum animal esse, idque intellegens et divina providentia constitutum.
For which cause we must not hesitate to declare, if only something can be investigated by conjecture, that this world is a living being, and one that is intelligent and established by divine providence.
§11Hoc posito, quod sequitur, videndum est, cuiusnam animantium deus in fingendo mundo similitudinem secutus sit.
This being established, we must see what follows: the likeness of which of the living beings did God follow in fashioning the world?
Nullius profecto id quidem, quae sunt nobis nota animantia; sunt enim omnia in quaedam genera partita aut inchoata nulla ex parte perfecta; imperfecto autem nec absoluto simile pulchrum esse nihil potest.
Certainly of none of the living beings known to us; for they are all divided into certain classes, or incomplete and in no part perfect; and nothing similar to what is imperfect and not completed can be beautiful.
Cuius ergo omne animal quasi particula quaedam est, sive in singulis sive in universo genere cernatur, eius similem mundum esse dicamus.
Let us say, therefore, that the world is similar to that of which every living being is, as it were, a certain small part, whether it is discerned in individual cases or in the whole class.
Omnes igitur, qui animo cernuntur et ratione intelleguntur, animantes conplexu rationis et intellegentiae sicut homines hoc mundo et pecudes et omnia, quae sub aspectum cadunt, conprehenduntur.
Therefore, all living beings that are discerned by the mind and understood by reason are comprehended within the embrace of reason and intelligence, just as men and cattle and all things which fall under sight are comprehended by this world.
§12Quod enim pulcherrimum in rerum natura intellegi potest, et quod ex omni parte absolutissimum est, cum deus eius similem mundum efficere vellet, animal unum aspectabile, in quo omnia animalia continerentur, effecit.
For when God wished to make the world similar to that which can be understood as most beautiful in the nature of things, and which is in every part most perfect, he made one visible living being, in which all living beings should be contained.
Rectene igitur unum mundum diximus, an fuit pluris aut innumerabilis dictu melius et verius? Unus profecto, siquidem factus est ad exemplum.
Have we then correctly spoken of one world, or would it be better and truer to say there are many or countless? One indeed, if indeed it was made according to the model.
Quod enim omnis animantis eos, qui ratione intelleguntur, complectitur, id non potest esse cum altero.
For that which embraces all living beings that are understood by reason cannot exist along with another.
Rursus enim alius animans, qui eum contineat, sit necesse est, cuius partes sint animantes superiores, caelumque hoc simulacrum illius ultimi sit, non proximi.
For there would have to be another living being to contain it, of which the former living beings would be parts, and this heaven would be an image of that ultimate one, not of the next.
Quorum ne quid accideret, atque ut hic mundus esset animanti absoluto simillimus, hoc ipso, quod solus atque unus esset, idcirco singularem deus hunc mundum atque unigenam procreavit.
Lest any of these things should happen, and so that this world might be most similar to the perfect living being, by this very fact that it was alone and one, God therefore procreated this world unique and only-begotten.
§13Corporeum autem et aspectabile itemque tractabile omne necesse est esse, quod natum est.
Now everything that is born must of necessity be corporeal, visible, and likewise tangible.
Nihil porro igni vacuum aspici ac videri potest nec vero tangi, quod careat solido, solidum autem nihil, quod terrae sit expers; quam ob rem mundum efficere moliens deus terram primum ignemque iungebat.
Furthermore, nothing devoid of fire can be seen or appear, nor indeed can anything be touched which lacks solidity, and nothing can be solid which is devoid of earth; wherefore God, striving to fashion the world, first joined earth and fire.
Omnia autem duo ad cohaerendum tertium aliquid anquirunt et quasi nodum vinculumque desiderant.
But any two things search for some third thing to hold them together, and desire, as it were, a knot and a bond.
Sed vinculorum id est aptissimum atque pulcherrimum, quod ex se atque de iis, quae stringit, quam maxime unum efficit.
But of bonds that is the most fitting and beautiful which makes itself and those things which it binds into one as much as possible.
Id optime adsequitur, quae Graece a)nalogi/a, Latine (audendum est enim, quoniam haec primum a nobis novantur) conparatio proportiove dici potest.
This is best achieved by what in Greek can be called analogia, and in Latin (for we must venture, since these terms are first introduced as new by us) comparatio or proportio.
§14Quando enim trium vel numerorum vel figurarum vel quorumcumque generum contingit ut, quod medium sit, ut ei primum proportione, ita id postremo comparetur, vicissimque, ut extremum cum medio, sic medium cum primo conferatur, id, quod medium est, tum primum fit, tum postremum, postrema autem et prima media fiunt; ita necessitas cogit, ut eadem sint ea, quae diiuncta fuerant; eadem autem cum facta sint, efficitur, ut omnia sint unum.
For when, in the case of three numbers or figures or any kinds of things whatsoever, it happens that as the first is to the middle in proportion, so the middle is to the last, and conversely, as the last is to the middle, so the middle is to the first, then that which is the middle becomes at one time the first, and at another time the last, and the last and the first become the middle; thus necessity compels that those things which had been disjoined become the same; and since they have been made the same, it follows that all things are one.
Quodsi universi corpus planum et aequabile explicaretur neque in eo quicquam esset † requisitum, unum interiectum medium et se ipsum et ea, quibus esset interpositum, conligaret.
But if the body of the universe were unfolded as flat and uniform, and nothing in it were † required, a single interposed middle would bind both itself and those things between which it was placed.