§24Communi igitur consuetudine sermonis abutimur, cum ita dicimus, velle aliquid quempiam aut nolle sine causa; ita enim dicimus
"sine causa"
, ut dicamus: sine externa et antecedente causa, non sine aliqua; ut, cum vas inane dicimus, non ita loquimur, ut physici, quibus inane esse nihil placet, sed ita, ut verbi causa sine aqua, sine vino, sine oleo vas esse dicamus, sic, cum sine causa animum dicimus moveri, sine antecedente et externa causa moveri, non omnino sine causa dicimus.
Therefore we abuse the common custom of speech when we say that someone wishes or does not wish something "without a cause"; for we say "sine causa" (without a cause) in such a way as to say: "without an external and antecedent cause," not "without any cause at all"; just as, when we say a "void vessel," we do not speak like the physicists, to whom it pleases that nothing is void, but in such a way as to say, for example, that the vessel is without water, without wine, without oil; so, when we say the mind is moved without a cause, we say it is moved without an antecedent and external cause, not entirely without a cause.
De ipsa atomo dici potest, cum per inane moveatur gravitate et pondere, sine causa moveri, quia nulla causa accedat extrinsecus.
Concerning the atom itself, it can be said that when it is moved through the void by gravity and weight, it is moved without a cause, because no cause approaches from without.
§25Rursus autem, ne omnes physici inrideant nos, si dicamus quicquam fieri sine causa, distinguendum est et ita dicendum, ipsius individui hanc esse naturam, ut pondere et gravitate moveatur, eamque ipsam esse causam, cur ita feratur.
But on the other hand, lest all the physicists laugh at us if we should say that anything happens without a cause, we must make a distinction and speak thus: that this is the nature of the individual body itself, to be moved by weight and gravity, and that this very nature is the cause why it is carried so.
Similiter ad animorum motus voluntarios non est requirenda externa causa; motus enim voluntarius eam naturam in se ipse continet, ut sit in nostra potestate nobisque pareat, nec id sine causa; eius rei enim causa ipsa natura est.
Similarly, for the voluntary motions of minds, an external cause is not to be sought; for voluntary motion contains in itself this nature, that it is in our power and obeys us, and that not without a cause; for the cause of this thing is nature itself.
§26Quod cum ita sit, quid est, cur non omnis pronuntiatio aut vera aut falsa sit, nisi concesserimus fato fieri, quaecumque fiant? Quia futura vera, inquit, non possunt esse ea, quae causas, cur futura sint, non habent;
Since this is so, what is the reason why every proposition is not either true or false, unless we concede that whatever happens happens by fate?
habeant igitur causas necesse est ea, quae vera sunt; ita, cum evenerint, fato evenerint. Confectum negotium, siquidem concedendum tibi est aut fato omnia fieri, aut quicquam fieri posse sine causa.
"Because," he says, "future true things cannot be those which do not have causes why they are to be; therefore those things which are true must have causes; thus, when they happen, they happen by fate." The business is finished, if indeed you must concede either that all things happen by fate, or that something can happen without a cause.
§27An aliter haec enuntiatio vera esse non potest:
"Capiet Numantiam Scipio"
, nisi ex aeternitate causa causam serens hoc erit effectura? An hoc falsum potuisset esse, si esset sescentis saeculis ante dictum? Et si tum non esset vera haec enuntiatio:
"Capiet Numantiam Scipio"
, ne illa quidem eversa vera est haec enuntiatio:
"Cepit Numantiam Scipio.
Or can this proposition not be true otherwise: "Capiet Numantiam Scipio", unless a cause weaving cause from eternity will bring this about? Or could this have been false if it had been spoken six hundred generations before? And if this proposition: "Scipio will take Numantia" was not true then, not even after that city was destroyed is this proposition true: "Cepit Numantiam Scipio".
"
Potest igitur quicquam factum esse, quod non verum fuerit futurum esse? Nam ut praeterita ea vera dicimus, quorum superiore tempore vera fuerit instantia, sic futura, quorum consequenti tempore vera erit instantia, ea vera dicemus.
Can anything, therefore, have happened which was not going to be true in the future? For just as we call those past things true whose presence was true in a former time, so we shall call those future things true whose presence will be true in a subsequent time.
§28Nec, si omne enuntiatum aut verum aut falsum est, sequitur ilico esse causas inmutabilis, easque aeternas, quae prohibeant quicquam secus cadere, atque casurum sit; fortuitae sunt causae, quae efficiant, ut vere dicantur, quae ita dicentur:
"Veniet in senatum Cato"
, non inclusae in rerum natura atque mundo; et tamen tam est inmutabile venturum, cum est verum, quam venisse, nec ob eam causam fatum aut necessitas extimescenda est.
Nor, if every proposition is either true or false, does it follow immediately that there are immutable and eternal causes which prevent anything from falling out otherwise than it is about to fall out; the causes which bring about that those things are said truly which will be said thus: "Veniet in senatum Cato", are fortuitous, not included in the nature of things and the universe; and yet what is to come, when it is true, is as immutable as what has come, nor for that reason is fate or necessity to be dreaded.
Etenim erit confiteri necesse:
"Si hoc enuntiatum: "Veniet in Tusculanum Hortensius" verum non est, sequitur, ut falsum sit. "
Quorum isti neutrum volunt; quod fieri non potest.
For it will be necessary to confess: "If this proposition: 'Hortensius will come to his Tusculan villa' is not true, it follows that it is false." Of which two choices those men want neither; which is impossible.
Nec nos impediet illa ignava ratio, quae dicitur; appellatur enim quidam a philosophis a)rgo\s lo/gos, cui si pareamus, nihil omnino agamus in vita.
Nor will that so-called idle argument hinder us; for a certain argument is called by philosophers the *argos logos*, which if we should obey, we would do nothing at all in life.
§29Sic enim interrogant:
"Si fatum tibi est ex hoc morbo convalescere, sive tu medicum adhibueris sive non adhibueris, convalesces; item, si fatum tibi est ex hoc morbo non convalescere, sive tu medicum adhibueris sive non adhibueris, non convalesces; et alterutrum fatum est; medicum ergo adhibere nihil attinet. "
Recte genus hoc interrogationis ignavum atque iners nominatum est, quod eadem ratione omnis e vita tolletur actio.
For they inquire thus: "If it is fated for you to recover from this illness, whether you call a doctor or do not call a doctor, you will recover; likewise, if it is fated for you not to recover from this illness, whether you call a doctor or do not call a doctor, you will not recover; and one or the other is fated; therefore, it is of no use to call a doctor." Correctly has this kind of inquiry been named idle and inert, because by the same reasoning all action is removed from life.
Licet etiam inmutare, ut fati nomen ne adiungas et eandem tamen teneas sententiam, hoc modo:
"Si ex aeternitate verum hoc fuit: "Ex isto morbo convalesces", sive adhibueris medicum sive non adhibueris, convalesces; itemque, si ex aeternitate falsum hoc fuit: "Ex isto morbo convalesces", sive adhibueris medicum sive non adhibueris, non convalesces"
; deinde cetera.
It is also permitted to modify it, so that you do not add the name of fate and yet keep the same meaning, in this manner: "If from eternity this was true: 'You will recover from that illness', whether you call a doctor or do not call a doctor, you will recover; and likewise, if from eternity this was false: 'You will recover from that illness', whether you call a doctor or do not call a doctor, you will not recover"; then the rest.
Haec ratio a Chrysippo reprehenditur.
This argument is refuted by Chrysippus.