§3.20"o(/ti i)/sa ta\ a(marth/mata kai\ ta\ katorqw/mata"
"parva"
inquit
"est res.
"o(/ti i)/sa ta\ a(marth/mata kai\ ta\ katorqw/mata" ¦1 "It is a small matter," he says.
"
at magna culpa; nec enim peccata rerum eventis, sed vitiis hominum metienda sunt: in quo peccatur, id potest aliud alio maius esse aut minus, ipsum quidem illud peccare, quoquo verteris, unum est.
But the fault is great; for indeed sins are not to be measured by the events of things, but by the vices of men: that in which a sin is committed can be one thing greater or less than another, but that very act of sinning, whichever way you turn it, is one and the same.
auri navem evertat gubernator an paleae, in re aliquantum, in gubernatoris inscitia nihil interest.
Whether a helmsman capsizes a ship of gold or of chaff, it makes some difference in the matter, but none in the ignorance of the helmsman.
lapsa est lubido in muliere ignota, dolor ad pauciores pertinet, quam si petulans fuisset in aliqua generosa ac nobili virgine; peccavit vero nihilo minus, si quidem est peccare tamquam transire lineas, quod cum feceris, culpa commissa est: quam longe progrediare, cum semel transieris, ad augendam transeundi culpam nihil pertinet.
If lust has slipped with an unknown woman, the pain pertains to fewer people than if he had been insolent toward some highborn and noble virgin; yet he has sinned no less, if indeed sinning is like crossing lines, which when you have done, a fault has been committed: how far you proceed once you have crossed has nothing to do with increasing the fault of crossing.
peccare certe licet nemini; quod autem non licet, id hoc uno tenetur, si arguitur non licere: id si nec maius nec minus umquam fieri potest, quoniam in eo est peccatum, si non licuit, quod semper unum et idem est, quae ex eo peccata nascuntur aequalia sint oportet.
Certainly, no one is allowed to sin; and what is not allowed is bound by this one thing, if it is proved to be not allowed: if this can never become either greater or less, since the sin lies in this, that it was not allowed, which is always one and the same, it is necessary that the sins born from it be equal.
§3.21quod si virtutes sunt pares inter se, paria esse etiam vitia necesse est: atqui paris esse virtutes nec bono viro meliorem nec temperante temperantiorem nec. forti fortiorem nec sapienti sapientiorem posse fieri, facillume potest perspici.
But if virtues are equal to one another, it is necessary that vices also be equal: and yet, that virtues are equal, and that no one can become better than a good man, nor more temperate than a temperate man, nor braver than a brave man, nor wiser than a wise man, can be very easily perceived.
an virum bonum dices, qui depositum nullo teste, cum lucrari inpune posset auri pondo decem, reddiderit, si idem in decem milibus non idem fecerit? aut temperantem, qui se in aliqua libidine continuerit, in aliqua effuderit?
Or will you call a man good, who returned a deposit with no witness, when he could have pocketed ten pounds of gold with impunity, if he would not have done the same in the case of ten thousand? Or temperate, who restrained himself in one lust, but poured himself out in another?
§3.22una virtus est consentiens cum ratione et perpetua constantia; nihil huc addi potest, quo magis virtus sit, nihil demi, ut virtutis nomen relinquatur: etenim si bene facta recte facta sunt et nihil recto rectius, certe ne bono quidem melius quicquam inveniri potest.
Virtue is one, agreeing with reason and with perpetual constancy; nothing can be added here to make it more a virtue, nothing taken away so that the name of virtue might be left: for indeed if well-done actions are rightly-done actions, and nothing is righter than what is right, certainly nothing better than what is good can be found either.
sequitur igitur ut etiam vitia sint paria, si quidem pravitates animi recte vitia dicuntur.
It follows therefore that vices are also equal, if indeed depravities of the mind are rightly called vices.
atqui quoniam pares virtutes sunt, recte facta, quoniam a virtutibus proficiscuntur, paria esse debent, itemque peccata, quoniam ex vitiis manant, sint aequalia necesse est.
And yet, since virtues are equal, right actions, since they proceed from virtues, must be equal, and likewise sins, since they flow from vices, must be equal.
§3.23"a philosophis"
inquit
"ista sumis. "
metuebam ne a lenonibus diceres. "Socrates disputabat isto modo. "
bene hercule narras; nam istum doctum et sapientem virum fuisse memoriae traditum est.
"You take those arguments," he says, "from philosophers." I was afraid you would say "from pimps." "Socrates used to dispute in that manner." By Hercules, you speak well; for it has been handed down to memory that he was a learned and wise man.
sed tamen quaero ex te, quoniam verbis inter nos contendimus, non pugnis: utrum nobis est quaerendum quid baioli atque operarii an quid homines doctissimi senserint? praesertim cum hac sententia non modo verior, sed ne utilior quidem hominum vitae reperiri ulla possit.
But yet I ask of you, since we are contending in words and not with fists: should we ask what porters and laborers thought, or what the most learned men thought? Especially since no opinion can be found on this subject that is not only truer, but even more useful for human life.
quae vis est enim quae magis arceat homines ab inprobitate omni, quam si senserint nullum in delictis esse discrimen? aeque peccare se, si privatis ac si magistratibus manus adferant? quamcumque in domum stuprum intulerint, eandem esse labem lubidinis?
For what force is there that more restrains men from all wickedness than if they realize that there is no distinction in transgressions? That they sin equally, whether they lay hands on private citizens or on magistrates? That into whatever house they bring defilement, it is the same stain of lust?
§3.24"nihilne igitur interest"
—nam hoc dicet aliquis—
"patrem quis necet anne servum?"
nuda ista si ponas, iudicare qualia sint non facile possim.
"Does it make no difference then,"—for someone will say this—"whether one kills his father or his slave?" If you put those cases nakedly, I could not easily judge what they are like.
patrem vita privare si per se scelus est, Saguntini, qui parentes suos liberos emori quam servos vivere maluerunt, parricidae fuerunt: ergo et parenti non numquam adimi vita sine scelere potest et servo saepe sine iniuria non potest.
If to deprive a father of life is a crime in itself, the Saguntines, who preferred that their parents and children die free rather than live as slaves, were parricides: therefore, life can sometimes be taken from a parent without crime, and often cannot be taken from a slave without injustice.
causa igitur haec, non natura distinguit, quae quoniam utro accessit, id fit propensius, si utroque adiuncta est, paria fiant necesse est.
It is therefore the cause, not the nature, that distinguishes these; and since whichever side it approaches, that side becomes heavier, if it is joined to both, they must become equal.
§3.25illud tamen interest, quod in servo necando, si id fit iniuria, semel peccatur, in patris vita violanda multa peccantur: violatur is qui procreavit, is qui aluit, is qui erudivit, is qui in sede ac domo atque in re publica conlocavit; multitudine peccatorum praestat eoque poena maiore dignus est.
Yet this difference remains, that in killing a slave, if it is done unjustly, a sin is committed once; but in violating a father’s life, many sins are committed: he who procreated, he who nourished, he who educated, he who established him in his seat and home and in the state, is violated; it excels in the multitude of sins, and therefore is worthy of a greater punishment.
sed nos in vita non quae cuique peccato poena sit, sed quantum cuique liceat spectare debemus: quicquid non oportet scelus esse, quicquid non licet nefas putare debemus.
But we in life ought to look not at what punishment there is for each sin, but how much is allowed to each: whatever is not proper we ought to think a crime, whatever is not allowed, a sacrilege.
etiamne in minimis rebus? etiam, si quidem rerum modum figere non possumus, animorum modum tenere possumus.
Even in the smallest things? Yes, since if we cannot set a limit to things, we can hold a limit to our minds.
§3.26histrio si paulum se movit extra numerum aut si versus pronuntiatus est syllaba una brevior aut longior, exsibilatur, exploditur: in vita tu, quae omni gestu moderatior, omni versu aptior esse debet, in syllaba te peccasse dices? poetam non audio in nugis: in vitae societate audiam civem digitis peccata dimetientem sua? si vis, sane sint breviora, leviora qui possunt videri? cum quicquid peccatur perturbatione peccetur rationis atque ordinis, perturbata autem semel ratione et ordine nihil possit addi, quo magis peccari posse videatur.
If an actor moves even a little out of time, or if a verse is pronounced one syllable shorter or longer, he is hissed off, exploded: in life, which ought to be more moderate than any gesture, more fitting than any verse, will you say that you sinned only in a syllable? I do not listen to a poet in trifles: in the society of life, shall I listen to a citizen measuring his sins with his fingers? If you wish, let them indeed be shorter; but how can they seem lighter? Since whatever sin is committed is committed by a disturbance of reason and order, and when reason and order are once disturbed, nothing can be added to make it seem that a greater sin could be committed.