§1.12Brutum si qui roget, quid egerit in patria liberanda, si quis item reliquos eiusdem consilii socios, quid spectaverint, quid secuti sint: num quis exsistat, cui voluptas, cui divitiae, cui denique praeter officium fortis et magni viri quicquam aliud propositum fuisse videatur? quae res ad necem Porsennae C. Mucium inpulit sine ulla spe salutis suae? quae vis Coclitem contra omnis hostium copias tenuit in ponte solum? quae patrem Decium, quae filium devota vita inmisit in armatas hostium copias? quid continentia C. Fabricii, quid tenuitas victus M'. Curii sequebatur? quid duo propugnacula belli Punici, Cn. et P. Scipiones, qui Karthaginiensium adventum corporibus suis intercludendum putaverunt? quid Africanus maior? quid minor? quid inter horum aetates interiectus Cato? quid innumerabiles alii? - nam domesticis exemplis abundamus -: cogitassene quicquam in vita sibi esse expetendum nisi quod laudabile esse et praeclarum videretur?
If anyone were to ask Brutus what he did in liberating his country, or likewise the remaining associates in the same design, what they aimed at, what they followed: would anyone exist to whom it would seem that pleasure, that riches, in short, that anything else besides the duty of a brave and great man was proposed to them? What thing drove C. Mucius to the slaughter of Porsenna without any hope of his own safety? What force held Cocles alone on the bridge against all the forces of the enemy? What sent the father Decius, what sent the son, with their lives devoted, into the armed forces of the enemy? What did the self-restraint of C. Fabricius, what did the simple living of M'. Curius aim at? What did the two bulwarks of the Punic War, Cn. and P. Scipio, who thought that the advance of the Carthaginians must be blocked with their own bodies? What did Africanus the Elder? What the Younger? What did Cato, cast between the lifetimes of these? What did countless others? — for we abound in domestic examples —: did they think that anything in life was to be sought after by them, except what seemed to be praiseworthy and noble?
§1.13veniant igitur isti inrisores huius orationis ac sententiae, et iam vel ipsi iudicent, utrum se horum alicuius, qui marmoreis tectis ebore et auro fulgentibus, qui signis, qui tabulis, qui caelato auro et argento, qui Corinthiis operibus abundant, an C. Fabricii, qui nihil habuit eorum, nihil habere voluit, similis malint?
Let those mockers of this speech and opinion come, therefore, and let them now judge even themselves, whether they would prefer to be like any of those who abound in marble roofs gleaming with ivory and gold, in statues, in paintings, in engraved gold and silver, in Corinthian works, or like C. Fabricius, who had nothing of those things, and wished to have nothing?
§1.14atque haec quidem, quae modo huc, modo illuc transferuntur, facile adduci solent ut in bonis rebus esse negent; illud arte tenent accurateque defendunt, voluptatem esse summum bonum: quae quidem mihi vox pecudum videtur esse, non hominum.
And indeed these things, which are transferred now here, now there, men are easily accustomed to be brought to deny that they are among good things; but they hold tightly and defend carefully that pleasure is the highest good: which utterance indeed seems to me to be of beasts, not of men.
tu, cum tibi sive deus sive mater, ut ita dicam, rerum omnium natura dederit animum, quo nihil est praestantius neque divinius, sic te ipse abicies atque prosternes, ut nihil inter te atque inter quadripedem aliquam putes interesse? quicquam bonum est, quod non eum, qui id possidet, meliorem facit?
You, when either a god or mother Nature, the creator of all things, so to speak, has given you a mind, than which nothing is more excellent or more divine, will you so cast yourself down and prostrate yourself, that you think there is no difference between you and some quadruped? Is anything a good, which does not make him who possesses it better?
§1.15ut enim est quisque maxime boni particeps, ita est laudabilis maxime, neque est ullum bonum, de quo non is, qui id habeat, honeste possit gloriari.
For as each person is a sharer of the good in the highest degree, so is he praised in the highest degree, nor is there any good, concerning which he who has it cannot honorably boast.
quid autem est horum in voluptate? melioremne efficit aut laudabiliorem virum? an quisquam in potiendis voluptatibus gloriando se et praedicatione ecfert? atqui si voluptas, quae plurimorum patrociniis defenditur, in rebus bonis habenda non est, eaque quo est maior, eo magis mentem ex sua sede et statu demovet, profecto nihil est aliud bene et beate vivere nisi honeste et recte vivere.
But what of these things is in pleasure? Does it make a man better or more praiseworthy? Or does anyone, in obtaining pleasures, extol himself with boasting and praise? And yet, if pleasure, which is defended by the advocacy of very many, is not to be held among good things, and the greater it is, the more it moves the mind from its own seat and state, surely to live well and happily is nothing else than to live honorably and rightly.