§20video, iudices, esse crimen et genere ipso magnum—vectigal enim esse impositum fructibus nostris dicitur, et pecuniam permagnam ratione ista cogi potuisse confiteor—et invidia vel maximum; maxime enim inimici hanc rem sermonibus divolgare voluerunt.
I see, judges, that the charge is great both in its very nature—for a tax is said to have been imposed on our produce, and I confess that a very large amount of money could have been collected by that method—and greatest of all in hostility; for my enemies especially wished to spread this matter abroad in rumors.
sed ego ita existimo, quo maius crimen sit id quod ostendatur esse falsum, hoc maiorem ab eo iniuriam fieri qui id confingat.
But I think thus, that the greater the charge which is shown to be false, the greater is the injury done by him who fabricates it.
volt enim magnitudine rei sic occupare animos eorum qui audiunt ut difficilis aditus veritati relinquatur.
For he wishes by the magnitude of the matter to so occupy the minds of those who listen that a difficult approach may be left for the truth.
"de crimine vinario. "
"de bello Vocontiorvm. "
"de"
"dispositione hibernorvm. " §21'at hoc Galli negant. ' at ratio rerum et vis argumentorum coarguit.
"On the wine charge." "On the war with the Vocontii." "On ""the arrangement of winter quarters." 'But the Gauls deny this.' Yet the reality of things and the force of arguments refute them.
potest igitur testibus iudex non credere? cupidis et iratis et coniuratis et ab religione remotis non solum potest sed etiam debet.
Can a judge, therefore, not believe witnesses? When they are greedy, angry, conspiratorial, and far removed from religion, he not only can but even ought not to believe them.
etenim si, quia Galli dicunt, idcirco M. Fonteius nocens existimandus est, quid mihi opus est sapiente iudice, quid aequo quaesitore, quid oratore non stulto? dicunt enim Galli; negare non possumus.
For indeed, if Marcus Fonteius is to be thought guilty for the reason that the Gauls say so, what need do I have of a wise judge, what of an impartial investigator, what of an orator who is not foolish? For the Gauls say it; we cannot deny it.
hic si ingeniosi et periti et aequi iudicis has partis esse existimatis ut, quoniam quidem testes dicunt, sine ulla dubitatione credendum sit, salus ipsa virorum fortium innocentiam tueri non potest; sin autem in rebus iudicandis non minimam partem tenere ad unam quamque rem aestimandam momentoque suo ponderandam sapientiam iudicis, videte ne multo vestrae maiores gravioresque partes sint ad cogitandum quam ad dicendum meae.
Here, if you think that these are the duties of an ingenious, experienced, and impartial judge, that because the witnesses speak, they must be believed without any doubt, the safety itself of brave men cannot protect their innocence; but if, in judging matters, the wisdom of the judge holds a not insignificant part in evaluating each matter and weighing it with its own momentum, see to it lest your part in thinking be much greater and heavier than mine in speaking.
§22mihi enim semper una quaque de re testis non solum semel verum etiam breviter interrogandus est, saepe etiam non interrogandus, ne aut irato facultas ad dicendum data aut cupido auctoritas attributa esse videatur; vos et saepius eandem rem animis agitare et diutius uno quoque de teste cogitare potestis et, si quem nos interrogare noluimus, quae causa nobis tacendi fuerit existimare debetis.
For to me, indeed, on each matter a witness must be questioned not only once but also briefly, and often indeed not questioned, lest either opportunity for speaking seem to have been given to the angry or authority attributed to the greedy; you can both agitate the same matter more often in your minds and think longer about each individual witness, and, if we have been unwilling to question anyone, you ought to consider what was our reason for keeping silent.
quam ob rem, si hoc iudici praescriptum lege aut officio putatis, testibus credere, nihil est cur alius alio iudice melior aut sapientior existimetur.
Therefore, if you think this is prescribed to a judge by law or duty, to believe witnesses, there is no reason why one judge should be thought better or wiser than another.
Vnum est enim et simplex aurium iudicium et promisce et communiter stultis ac sapientibus ab natura datum.
For the judgment of the ears is one and simple, given by nature promiscuously and commonly to the foolish and the wise alike.
§23quid est igitur ubi elucere possit prudentia, ubi discerni stultus auditor et credulus ab religioso et sapienti iudice? nimirum illud in quo ea quae dicuntur a testibus coniecturae et cogitationi traduntur, quanta auctoritate, quanta animi aequitate, quanto pudore, quanta fide, quanta religione, quanto studio existimationis bonae, quanta cura, quanto timore dicantur.
Where, then, is it that wisdom can shine forth, where can a foolish and credulous listener be distinguished from a religious and wise judge? No doubt it is in that situation where those things which are said by witnesses are committed to conjecture and consideration, with what authority, with what equity of mind, with what modesty, with what faith, with what religion, with what zeal for a good reputation, with what care, with what fear they are spoken.
an vero vos id in testimoniis hominum barbarorum dubitabitis quod persaepe et nostra et patrum memoria sapientissimi iudices de clarissimis nostrae civitatis viris dubitandum non putaverunt? qui Cn.
Or indeed will you doubt in the testimonies of barbarian men that which very often within both our own and our fathers' memory the wisest judges did not think ought to be doubted concerning the most illustrious men of our state?
et Q. Caepionibus, L. et Q. Metellis testibus in Q. Pompeium, hominem novum, non crediderunt, quorum virtuti, generi, rebus gestis fidem et auctoritatem in testimonio cupiditatis atque inimicitiarum suspicio derogavit.
They did not believe Gnaeus and Quintus Caepio, Lucius and Quintus Metellus when they were witnesses against Quintus Pompeius, a new man; the suspicion of greed and enmity in their testimony detracted from the faith and authority of their virtue, family, and deeds.
ecquem hominem vidimus, §24ecquem vere commemorare possumus parem consilio, gravitate, constantia, ceteris virtutibus, honoris, ingeni, rerum gestarum ornamentis M. Aemilio Scauro fuisse? tamen huius cuius iniurati nutu prope terrarum orbis regebatur iurati testimonio neque in C. Fimbriam neque in C. Memmium creditum est; noluerunt ei qui iudicabant hanc patere inimicitiis viam, quem quisque odisset, ut eum testimonio posset tollere.
Have we seen any man, can we truly commemorate anyone to have been equal in counsel, gravity, constancy, other virtues, and the ornaments of honor, genius, and deeds, to Marcus Aemilius Scaurus? Yet, although the whole world was ruled almost by the mere nod of this man when unsworn, when he swore and gave testimony he was believed neither against Gaius Fimbria nor against Gaius Memmius; those who were judging were unwilling that this path should lie open to enmities, so that anyone might be able to destroy by his testimony the man whom he hated.
quantus in L. Crasso pudor fuerit, quod ingenium, quanta auctoritas, quis ignorat? tamen is cuius etiam sermo testimoni auctoritatem habebat, testimonio ipso, quae in M. Marcellum inimico animo dixit, probare non potuit.
Who is ignorant of how great modesty was in Lucius Crassus, what genius, how great authority? Yet he, whose very conversation had the authority of a testimony, was unable to prove by his testimony itself what he said with hostile mind against Marcus Marcellus.