§8.16.1Caesar, etsi discessum hostium animadvertere non poterat incendiis oppositis, tamen id consilium cum fugae causa initum suspicaretur, legiones promovet, turmas mittit ad insequendum; ipse veritus insidias, ne forte in eodem loco subsistere hostis atque elicere nostros in locum conaretur iniquum, tardius procedit.
Caesar, although he could not perceive the departure of the enemy because of the intervening fires, nevertheless, suspecting that this plan had been formed for the purpose of flight, moved the legions forward and sent the cavalry squadrons to pursue them; he himself, fearing an ambush, lest by chance the enemy should try to remain in the same place and entice our men into an unfavorable position, advanced more slowly.
§8.16.2Equites cum intrare fumum et flammam densissimam timerent ac, si qui cupidius intraverant, vix suorum ipsi priores partes animadverterent equorum, insidias veriti liberam facultatem sui recipiendi Bellovacis dederunt.
Since the cavalry feared to enter the smoke and the very thick flame, and even if any had entered too eagerly, they themselves could scarcely see the front parts of their own horses, they, fearing an ambush, gave the Bellovaci a free opportunity to retreat.
§8.16.3Ita fuga timoris simul calliditatisque plena sine ullo detrimento milia non amplius decem progressi hostes loco munitissimo castra posuerunt.
Thus, after a retreat full of both fear and cunning, having advanced not more than ten miles without any loss, the enemy pitched their camp in a highly fortified position.
§8.16.4Inde cum saepe in insidiis equites peditesque disponerent, magna detrimenta Romanis in pabulationibus inferebant.
From there, as they frequently stationed cavalry and infantry in ambush, they inflicted great losses on the Romans during their foraging expeditions.